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INTRODUCTION
I.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE PULLMAN DOCTRINE

The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State....
Though the amendment does not in terms so state, it has been
established that states are similarly protected against suits by
their own citizens.' Moreover the protection extends beyond
suits against states as such to cover actions in which persons
acting as state officials are named as defendants. 2 Thus it
would appear that individual litigants may never sue a state
without its consent.
In 1908, however, in Ex parte Young, 3 the Supreme Court
severely qualified this protection 4 by holding that a suit against
a state officer alleged to be acting unconstitutionally. is not a
suit against the state. Its "reasoning" was that a state official
cannot be acting on behalf of the state when he acts unconstitutionally. 5 The same rationale would seem to exempt the
I Hans v.

Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
2 Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 122-23 (1828) (Marshall,
C.J.). Chief Justice Marshall had earlier held that the eleventh amendment protects
the state only when the state is the named defendant, Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 846, 857 (1824), but his position in Madrazo, apparently altering that aspect of Osborn, has since been settled doctrine. The amendment would be of little avail if it did not apply to suits against state officials. The
case law is less than clear, however, on when an individual acts as a state official
and when he acts in his private capacity. See, e.g., Georgia R.R. v. Redwine, 342 U.S.
299 (1952); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
3 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
" Although Young is the case that has come to symbolize the doctrine, there were
earlier cases tending in the same direction. See, e.g., Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537
(1-903); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U.S. 362 (1894).
5 In Ex parte Young the Court said:
[T]he use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the
injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one
which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It
is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the
use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is
void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General
seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in
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states from the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment and
6
other constitutional provisions regulating only state action.
Nevertheless, the Court has held that acts of state officials
7
can violate those constitutional provisions as acts of the state.
The tw6 doctrines in combination enabled individual litigants to question the constitutionality of state actions in federal court, even where the state had not consented to suit.
They thereby significantly facilitated enforcing state compliance
with federal constitutional standardsA At the same time, the
proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any
immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States....
209 U.S. at 159-160.
6 Another difficulty with the rationale is how, given the usual principles for
construing the statutory federal question jurisdiction, see Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), these cases are deemed to "arise under" the Constitution when the official character of the action is raised only as justification and
the invalidity of the statutory authority only by reply to that justification.
7 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). The Court there
said:
[I]t may not be doubted that where a state officer under an assertion of
power from the State is doing an act which could only be done upon the
predicate that there was such power, the inquiry as to the repugnancy of
the act to the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be avoided by insisting that
there is a want of power. That is to say, a state officer cannot on the one
hand as a means of doing a wrong forbidden by the Amendment proceed
upon the assumption of the possession of state power and at the same time
for the purpose of avoiding the application of the Amendment, deny the
power and thus accomplish the wrong. To repeat, for the purpose of enforcing the rights guaranteed by the Amendment when it is alleged that
a state officer in virtue of state power is doing an act which if permitted
to be done prima faie would violate the Amendment, the subject must be
tested by assuming that the officer possessed power if the act be one which
there would not be opportunity to perform but for the possession of some
state authority.
227 U.S. at 288-89. Home Tel. & Tel. thus goes beyond contradicting the Young
rationale-which seemingly would exempt states from the fourteenth amendment
even when the state instigates or directs the unconstitutional action and its courts
expressly approve it-and deems even actions that the state apparently prohibits
to be state action within the fourteenth amendment. Some actions on the part of
officials, however, are considered individual rather than state conduct. See note 2
supra. See also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1960); Mosher v. City of
Phoenix, 287 U.S. 29 (1932).
8 If one were not permitted to sue state officers for violating the Constitution,
the most obvious way to raise constituti6nal issues would be in defense of a criminal
prosecution. For a discussion of that and other possible methods of enforcing the
Constitution against the states, see H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 936-37 (2d ed. 1973) and C.A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS,

185-86 (2d ed. 1970). See also Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 750-52 (1883)
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doctrines made possible substantial federal court interference
with state programs by making every program, whether it was
longstanding or newly enacted and not yet launched, subject
to constitutional attack in the federal courts and to issuance
of an injunction against its execution or continuation. Even
if the federal system ultimately sustained the validity of the
program, interlocutory orders delaying its enforcement could
cause irreparable damage to state policy. 9
Congress rejected legislative proposals to overturn entirely the new federal jurisdiction.' 0 But over a period of years it
passed a number of bills designed to cut down on the -adverse
effects on the execution of state policy that Ex parte Young
had made possible. The most significant of these bills took
from the federal courts all power to enjoin state rate orders
and tax collections so long as "a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy" is available in the courts of the state;" and required
a district court of three judges to pass upon attempts to enjoin
state statutes or administrative orders on constitutional grounds,
12
with direct Supreme Court review of their decisions.
The courts joined with Congress in imposing limitations
upon the situations and the manner in which injunctions
against state officials should issue. One of the most important
court-imposed limitations has come to be known as "the Pullman doctrine" from the case in which it was first fully articulated.' 3 The doctrine concerns the federal courts' abstention
in certain constitutional cases from the exercise of jurisdiction
that Young and ensuing congressional statutes would seem
to allow to them.
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Professor Wright concludes that -in perspective the doctrine
of Ex parte Young seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law." C.A. WRIGHT, supra at 186.
9 In an era when state economic regulation was often found vulnerable to due
process attack, the new federal jurisdiction was especially disruptive.
is See, e.g., 45 CONG. R c. 7256 (1910) (remarks of Senator Overman); 42 CONG.
REc. 4848-49 (1908); F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT 143 (1928).

"Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970); Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1970).
12 The original three-judge court act applied only to state statutes and not administrative orders. 36 Stat. 557 (1910). It was codified as § 266 of the 1911 Judicial Code. The provision has been modified in several respects over a period of years.
See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 8 at 967-68. The current version is 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
13Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Cases that might be
deemed precursors to Pullman can be found in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note
8 at 988-89.
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II.

THE PULLMAN CASE

Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. 14 involved a
challenge to an order of the Texas Railroad Commission that
all sleeping cars operated by railroads in Texas must be in
the charge of a Pullman conductor. Prior to the Commission's
order, trains with only one sleeping car had been in the charge
of a porter instead of a conductor. Porters were black, conductors white. The order was attacked 15 on the grounds that
it violated the commerce, due process and equal protection
clauses' 6 of the Federal Constitution and that it was invalid
under Texas law. A three-judge district court held that the
Texas statute which gave the Commission power over railroads and which made it "the duty of the said Commission...
to correct abuses and prevent unjust discrimination in the
rates, charges and tolls of such railroads . . . and to prevent
any and all other abuses in the conduct of their business...,u1
did not authorize the Commission to issue the order as the
correction of an "abuse," and the court enjoined enforcement
of the Commission's order on that ground.' 8 On direct review
the Supreme Court held, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
that the district court should have abstained from deciding
the case.
Although Pullman was within the original federal jurisdiction as a federal question case, jurisdiction also extended to
the ancillary state issue.' 9 In fact, the Supreme Court had suggested that in such cases federal courts should decide the
state questions first if, as in Pullman, doing so might avoid a
federal constitutional decision. 20 The difficulty in Pullman was
that, according to Justice Frankfurter, Texas law was "far
from clear. ' '2 ' It is true that the language of the Texas statute
did not permit a confident determination whether or not the
14 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

15The complainants were the Pullman Company and the affected railroads. The
porters intervened as complainants and the conductors intervened in support of
the order. Id. at 498.
16The fourteenth amendment challenges were both that the order was unjust
and arbitrary and that it discriminated against Blacks.
1 312 U.S. at 499 n.1.
18 Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
19See Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
20See. e.g., Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930); Greene v. Louisville &
Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 508, 519 (1917); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213
U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
21 312 U.S. at 499.
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Commission's order was within its purview.2 2 Justice Frankfurter said as well that Texas decisions interpreting the statutory language did not clarify the issue. 2 3 On that assumption,
a federal court that follows the policy of deciding state issues
first runs a high risk of deciding those questions erroneously.
If it erroneously holds the order authorized, it will needlessly
reach the federal constitutional questions.2 4 If it erroneously
holds that the order is unauthorized, it will avoid for the moment deciding the constitutional questions, but only at the
risk of improvidently enjoining an ostensibly valid state program. Moreover, if the state courts subsequently expose the
error by deciding the state question differently, the federal
decision will be subject to reopening. 25 If it is reopened, the
federal constitutional questions may then have to be litigated.
Therefore, although the Supreme Court in Pullman did not
find the district court's "forecast of Texas law" unreasonable,
it concluded that only the course of abstaining in favor of the
state judicial system could "avoid [both] the waste of a tentative
decision [and] . . . the friction of a premature constitutional
26
adjudication.
III.

THE ENGLAND PROCEDURE

The Pullman Court indicated its belief that abstention
would not prejudice the complainants' federal constitutional
claims,2 7 but it did not make explicit whether those claims
28
would ultimately be decided in state or in federal court.
22 The statutory language provides little guidance concerning the limits of the
Commission's power to correct "abuses." Justice Frankfurter also raised the possibility that the order might be authorized under the Commission's power to correct "discrimination." It seems plain on the face of the statute, however, that the
power to prevent "unjust discrimination" is limited to railroads' "rates, charges
and tolls"-although in quoting from the statute in the body of the opinion the
Justice omitted the reference to "rates, charges, and tolls." 312 U.S. at 498 & n.1, 499.
23 In fact such decisions, which the district court had relied upon, were relatively
unambiguous, indicating that to be correctible by the Commission an "abuse" must
be defined as such by law. Pullman Co. v. Railroad Commission, 33 F. Supp. 675,
676-77 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
24 If the court then held the order constitutional, the ultimate disposition of
the controversy would also be erroneous.
22See, e.g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co.,
290 U.S. 177 (1933).
26 312 U.S. at 500.
27
Id. at 501.
28 There are suggestions in the opinion, however, that a return to the federal
forum was contemplated. Justice Frankfurter speaks of the state settling "the issue
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For a period after the Pullman decision, it remained unsettled
whether the parties remanded to a state court should submit
their federal as well as their state claims for the determination
of that tribunal or whether they could reserve their federal
claims for initial determination by the federal district court
in case the state law questions did not in fact dispose of the
controversy. 29 In 1964 in England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners,3" the Supreme Court settled most questions
about the procedure to be followed when Pullman abstention is
ordered. It held that a litigant remanded to state court under
that doctrine cannot be compelled to submit his federal claims
for state court disposition; abstention may not be used to deprive him of the benefits of an initial federal determination
of the federal issues and of the facts on which disposition of
those issues depends. 3 1 Although the litigant must inform state
courts of the nature of his federal claims so that they may
construe state law in light of them, he need not litigate the
issues in state court. 32 While prior to 1964 it was not clear
whether the original federal forum was preserved for the litigants, and while that uncertainty may possibly have affected
the disposition of some pre-1964 cases, the evaluation of the
Pullman doctrine that follows, and the discussion of which
cases require abstention, will proceed on the assumption that
33
the England procedure is and was the rule.
of state law." Id. at 501. Moreover, he directs the district court to retain jurisdiction
over2the controversy pending the state adjudication. Id. at 501-02.
9See, e.g., Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 229 (1948). The later case of Government Employees
v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957), which held that litigants remitted to state courts
must present their federal constitutional contentions so that state courts can interpret their law in the light of the constitutional claims, contributed to an impression
that once the federal court has abstained, the state court to which the issue is delegated has jurisdiction of the whole controversy.
30 375 U.S. 411 (1964).

31375 U.S. at 416-17. Accordingly, the federal district court should retain
jurisdiction rather than dismiss when it orders abstention. See American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey S. Ct., 409 U.S. 467 (1973).
32 A litigant may, however, submit his federal along with his state claims for
decision in the state courts. If he does that, he is- bound by the state court's decision
and can have it overturned only by seeking review in the Supreme Court of the
United States. 375 U.S. at 417-19. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 427 (1963).
33 One cannot sensibly discuss the proper scope for an abstention doctrine without making an explicit assumption concerning the abstention procedure, for the
scope of the doctrine should vary with the procedure contemplated. Abstention
for state court adjudication of federal as well as state claims, for example, might
well be invoked in fewer or in different cases than abstention for state court determination of state issues alone. Under the American Law Institute's proposal regard-
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PART ONE: THE CASES IN WHICH PULLMAN
ABSTENTION IS PROPER
I.

ALLOWING STATE COURTS TO RULE ON FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL

ISSUES-AN IMPROPER

PURPOSE FOR ABSTENTION

An abstention policy could serve several different purposes in cases involving the federal constitutionality of state
enactments; the purpose intended will define the range of
cases appropriate for abstention. One possible approach would
allow state courts to rule on the validity of state enactments
even when the only issues at stake were federal. The Pullman
doctrine rather clearly does not adopt this approach.3 4 Nonetheless, it is necessary to examine its validity in order to detering abstention, for example, a case in which abstention is ordered will not, in the
normal course, return to federal court, but instead will be fully decided within the
state system subject only to possible review in the United States Supreme Court.
The Institute recognizes that this fact makes abstention appropriate only when the
district judge finds, inter alia, "that the parties' claims of federal right, if any, including [any] issues of fact material [thereto], can be adequately protected by review
in the Supreme Court of the United States." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF
THE DivIsIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 289 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]. This limitation, according to the ALI commentary,
will "ordinarily" bar abstention "[i]f there is a genuine issue of fact material to the
federal contentions in the case." Id. 290. The conception then of the ALI procedure
is to allow courts to remove entirely from the original federal jurisdiction cases
that, though falling within a category of cases for which Congress has deemed federal jurisdiction necessary, do not on their facts show any need for federal jurisdiction. That conception is sufficiently different from the Pullman-England one,
which allows each forum to adjudicate its own legal issues, that the ALI approach
could supplement the current concept as readily as it could replace it.
Another change in procedures which would affect the proper scope of abstention would be the removal of some of the burdens abstention presently imposes on
parties wishing to invoke federal jurisdiction. If, for example, a procedure were
available for certification of a disputed state issue to the highest state court and
if that procedure adequately met the needs for state court input in the particular
case, then abstention might be more readily ordered than under the more cumbersome England procedure of requiring the plaintiff to initiate an action at the lowest
state court level and to appeal the result through the state system before returning
to the federal forum. Cf. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 42 U.S.L.W. 4603 (U.S. Apr.
29, 1974).
11 The Court has stated that "abstention cannot be ordered simply to give state
courts the first opportunity to vindicate the federal claim." Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 251 (1967). See also id. at 247, (quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928)); McNeese v. Board of Educ. 373 U.S.
668, 672, 674 (1963). Cf England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964). Moreover, the England holding that parties may withhold federal issues from state tribunals when abstention is ordered clearly demonstrates that the purpose of abstention cannot be state decision of federal issues.
That will nonetheless be an effect of abstention when the remanded party chooses
to present his federal claims in state court.
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mine whether Pullman is undesirably narrow in this respect,
especially since some members of the present Supreme Court
appear to favor abstaining in some instances for state court
35
determination of federal issues.
A policy of abstaining for state adjudication of federal constitutional challenges to state action would be grounded in a
concern both to relieve federal courts of congestion3 6 and
to "steer around head-on collisions with the States by avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. ' 37 It would rest on
the propositions that state courts are as capable of deciding
these controversies as are federal courts, 38 and that Supreme
Court review would adequately protect federal rights.
Such a policy would undoubtedly reduce the workoad of
the lower federal courts. It is less clear that federal-state comity would be promoted to any significant degree, since the
premise of the policy is that transferring jurisdiction to state
tribunals for decision of federal issues would not change the
result of litigation. If federal, instead of state, tribunals void
state legislation, doing simply what state tribunals would have
been required to do had they heard the case, the harm to
state interests, if any, is not any tangible damage but rather
a harm to state pride.3 9 Certainly any friction a federal court
might create by properly deciding an issue of federal law is
3rIn Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), Chief Justice Burger, in
a dissenting opinion that Justice Blackmun joined, objected to the Court declaring
a state statute unconstitutional without giving the Wisconsin courts the first opportunity to invalidate it under the state or federal constitutions. Id. at 440. But see
Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See note 167 infra.
36 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 443 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
37Id. at 442 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
38In Constantineau the Chief Justice said:
[N]o one could reasonably think that the judges of Wisconsin have less
fidelity to due process requirements of the Federal Constitution than we
do ....
Id. at 440.
39 And it is not in keeping with the current legal environment to expect a great
blow to state pride from federal courts instead of state ones telling the states of
the limitations the Federal Constitution imposes. It is true that there was an outcry
in 1908 when Ex parte Young was decided. See 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 717 (1926). Today, however, people are accustomed
to the notion that the federal government places limits upon the states. Moreover
Young did more than say that federal courts rather than state ones could enjoin
state officials' actions: Without its'doctrine, state action often could not be invalidated
at all (for the exceptions, see note 8 supra), for the eleventh amendment would protect the state from suit in both state and federal court. Young therefore affected
tangible state interests, not solely state pride.
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far less serious than the friction that would result from it
mistakenly deciding an issue of state law and, as a result, possibly voiding a state program that did not in fact transgress
either state or federal bounds.
Moreover, using abstention to allow state courts to rule
first on federal constitutional issues seems directly inconsistent
with the general federal question jurisdiction 40 and with Congress' rejection of proposals to delete from it suits challenging
state enactments after it became clear that such suits were
deemed within the jurisdiction. 4 1 The subject under discussion
is not whether it would be wise for Congress to alter jurisdictional statutes 42 but rather how courts should apply the judgemade abstention doctrine. Congress' withdrawal from the federal jurisdiction of limited classes of suits against the statethose to enjoin state rate orders and tax collections, given "a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy" in state court 43 -supports
the argument that using abstention to enlarge the exception
would impinge upon Congress' domain.
A more limited extension of the congressionally enacted
exceptions would call for deferral to a state system only when
it had never passed on the constitutionality of the state statute
at issue. 44 While that use of abstention may seem a less direct
repudiation of Congress' jurisdictional scheme than deferring
to state courts for all constitutional challenges to state enactments, it would still remove some cases within congressional
jurisdictional grants and would rest upon premises contrary
to those underlying current federal question jurisdiction. 4 5
40 Under the

operative statutes the jurisdiction is concurrent with state juris-

diction, and either the plaintiff or the defendant may opt for the federal forum.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1441(b) (1970).
41See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
42 Some commentators have suggested that Congress confine challenges to state
enactments to state fora. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 29, at 229. One reason that
course may have once seemed unsatisfactory lacks validity today. Earlier in the
century it was often impossible to challenge state enactments in state court without
violating them, and irreparable damage often resulted from the violation that was
necessary in order to test the law. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 131,
144-48 (1908). Now, however, the vast majority of states have adopted the federally
enacted declaratory judgment procedure.
43
Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970); Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
4 Such a procedure appears to be the one advocated by Chief Justice Burger in
his dissent in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 440, though there is some indication that the Chief Justice would require abstention only in cases considered
"non-urgent." See id. at 443. But cf. id. at 442 n.2.
'5 Chief Justice Burger appeared to recognize a conflict between this approach,
which he advocated in Constantineau, see note 44 supra, and the congressional juris-
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Congress' grant of original federal question jurisdiction
allows for federal factfinding and federal determination of
legal issues on the hypotheses that federal judges are more
capable of deciding questions of federal law and are more
sympathetic to federal constitutional claims than are state
court judges. 46 Federal judges are primarily responsible for
mastering federal law, while state judges concentrate on state
law. And it has been argued that federal courts, trial and appellate, accord greater deference to Supreme Court pronouncements, produce a more unified system of national law, and are
more independent of local pressures than state tribunals on
issues of fact as well as of law. 4 7 Bias against federal claims

may not be widespread among state court judges, but the ease
with which the judge who finds the facts can alter the ultimate
result in a case 48 makes such a bias particularly difficult to
guard against without original federal jurisdiction. Since bias
may be especially likely when state law provisions are claimed
to transgress federal constitutional bounds, 49 the fact that the
state interest is particularly great in this group of cases can
cut in favor of original federal jurisdiction rather than cutting
in favor of original state jurisdiction. Nor would the possibility
of Supreme Court review as the sole federal input in these
cases adequately protect the federal interests embodied in the
jurisdictional statute. That tribunal has a limited capacity
which is already overtaxed. 50 It is by no means certain that it
could or would hear every case in which it would ultimately
determine the federal claim to be a deserving one. 51 Moredictional arrangement when he called that arrangement "unwise" and "unwarranted." 400 U.S. at 443 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The quoted adjectives were
directed toward the use of three-judge courts and direct Supreme Court review
of their decisions, rather than to the existence of federal jurisdiction as such, and
the Chief Justice's comments in general seem influenced by a distaste for the threejudge court procedure, which is applicable to many Pullman challenges. See 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). If the procedure is unwise, Congress should remedy its shortcomings rather than the judiciary using abstention to sidestep it.
46 Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. Rtv. 157,
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin].
158-59
47
id. 158-59, 175.
48 See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
416-17 (1964); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228 (1908); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824).
4
See ALI STUDY, supra note 33, at 282.
50 Burger, Report on the FederalJudicialBranch, 94 S.Ct. 3, 11-12 (1973).
" See C.A. WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 494. Though appeals of right inhere in
the defeat in state court of constitutional challenges to state statutes, 28 U.S.C. §
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over, when the Court does grant a full hearing it typically will
not review the factual determinations that state courts have
made, 52 even though such determinations dictate the resolution of the federal constitutional claims.
II.

ALLOWING STATE COURTS TO DECIDE STATE

ISSUES-A PROPER PURPOSE IN SOME INSTANCES

A.

The Advantages of Abstainingfor State Court
Decision of State Issues and Its Costs
The Court has consistently used the abstention doctrine
as a means of allowing state courts to resolve state law issues
in particular types of cases. 53 This use of the Pullman doctrine,
in combination with the England procedure, would appear an
effective solution to some central problems of federalism. In
a system in which federal courts are -the final authority on
questions of federal law and state courts are final on questions
of state law, 54 but where the two legal systems are often intertwined in a particular case, 55 prior allocation to the state or
federal forum would logically (except where there is some
competing interest at stake) 56 be made according to the prob1257(2) (1970), the same is not true of challenges to other state action. Moreover,
the Court disposes of many appeals on the basis of the jurisdictional statement,
without a full hearing. While those dispositions are technically on the merits, they
seem as similar to discretionary certiorari dispositions as to adjudication on the
merits after full briefs and oral argument. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 126 (1962); address of Chief Justice Warren, ALI Annual Meeting, May 19,
1954 (quoted in Weiner, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARV. L. REV. 20, 51
(1954). But see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1964).
" See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50-51 (1949) (citing Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-90 (1935)). This is not to intimate that the Court has no
power to review such factual determinations, but simply to suggest that as a practical
matter it is rarely exercised. For a discussion of the Court's power in that regard see
Mishkin, supra note 46, at 173-74.
" See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-12 (1972);
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528,
534-35 (1965); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1964); England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 n.7 (1964); Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167, 176-78 (1959).
54 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 618-33 (1875).
s5 See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 470-71.
56 The most obvious example is diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970). Its purpose is often deemed to be protecting out-of-staters from state court
discrimination, actual or feared. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111
(1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938); Bank of United States v.
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ability that a particular forum's law will be the more important
to the disposition of the controversy. 57 The probability obviously is not always fulfilled. If state courts are left with a case
that turns, either entirely or in part, upon a federal -question,
state courts are under a duty, imposed by the supremacy
clause, to decide the case in accordance with Supreme Court
decisions.5 8 Similarly, if a case within the federal jurisdiction
requires resolution of a question of state law, federal judges
are under a duty to decide that question as they believe the
highest court of the state would decide it. 59
Despite its limitations, 60 the availability of Supreme Court
review does afford some protection against error or bias when
state courts decide federal issues. When federal courts decide
questions of state law, however, there is no possibility of any
review within the authoritative state judicial system of their
prediction of how state tribunals would rule. The abstention
doctrine, by contrast, allows a case to be divided so that federal tribunals can make the final decision on the federal issues
and the facts on which they are based, while state tribunals
have the final decision on state issues, thereby apparently providing a means of securing the most correct possible decision
on every issue. If it were costless, one would wonder why that
approach would not be embraced in every case involving both
state and federal issues.
The advantages of abstention, however, are obtained only
at a high price. Parties who have chosen to litigate in federal
court are shuttled into state court for prior determination of
a state law issue, involving them in considerable delay and
expense. 6 1 The England case, for example, was decided on
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). Cf Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REv. 483, 495-97, 510 (1928).
57 Mishkin, supra note 46, at 164-65. See Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284
U.S. 239 (1931); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 489, 507 & n.56 (1954); Comment
The State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 ALBANY L. Rmv. 73 (1963).
"8 See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95, 102-104 (1962).
59 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See Hart, supra note 57, at
510; Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 204-218 (1957). See also C.A. WRIGHT, supra note 8 at
236-41.
60 See notes 50-52 supra & accompanying text.
61E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the merits only after nine years of litigation; final decision
came five years after abstention was ordered. 62 The decision
in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, which followed the
procedure England later endorsed, was rendered nine years
after the action began and seven years after abstention was
ordered.6 3 And an order of abstention may cause a case never
to reach final decision; the added delay may moot the controversy, 64 or the plaintiff out of frustration may abandon the
65
suit.
The burden that abstention places on the litigants raises
the question whether transferring jurisdiction from federal
to state court is consistent with federal jurisdictional statutes.
Abstention for state decision of state law issues is less troublesome in this regard than abstention for state decision of federal questions. A traditional justification for Pullman abstention
is that even if federal courts should not decline congressionally
accorded jurisdiction, 66 this kind of abstention "does not . . .
62 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
Suit was brought in 1957. Id. at 413 & n.1. Abstention was ordered in 1960. 180
F. Supp. 121 (E.D. La. 1960). Final decision came in 1965. 246 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.
La. 1965).
1 63 Suit was apparently brought in 1942. See Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 47 F. Supp. 671, 673 (D. Conn. 1942). Abstention was ordered in 1944.
323 U.S. 101 (1944). Final decision came in 1951. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
64See United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381 U.S. 413 (1965), which was
dismissed as moot 11 years after the litigation commenced and 8 years after abstention was ordered. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. U.S., 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Leiter
Minerals Inc. v. U.S., 329 F. 2d 85 (5th Cir. 1964).
65 See Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm'n, CIO v. Windsor, 353
U.S. 364 (1957), remanding a case to state court a second time, after which the
plaintiff abandoned suit, having failed to obtain a decision on the merits after four
years of litigation, including one trip to the Alabama Supreme Court and two to
the United States Supreme Court. Abstention was ordered in 1953. 116 F. Supp.
354 (N.D. Ala. 1953). See 353 U.S. at 365-66.
66See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).
See also Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1909). In Pullman Justice Frankfurter found authority for abstaining in the equitable discretion of the
chancellor and in the policy of avoiding "needless friction with state policies."
312 U.S. at 500. Yet there is no statutory basis for declining jurisdiction in this situation out of a "regard for public consequences," as there is under the Tax Injunction
Act and the Johnson Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42 (1970). Moreover, at the time of
the Pullman decision, the federal question statute provided that federal courts should
have jurisdiction over "all civil actions, at law and in equity, wherein the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," with no indication that in equity cases the courts were free in their discretion to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction thus granted. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, par. 1, 36 Stat.
1091, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). And in another context Justice Frankfurter has denied that courts' equitable discretion allows them to remand to the states
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involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the
postponement of its exercise. 6 7 Under the England procedures, federal questions can eventually be resolved by federal
tribunals. 6 8 The postponement that abstention entails and its
requirement that the parties undergo two trials may, however,
effectively deter litigants from exercising their right to federal jurisdiction. 6 9 One possible rationale for the rules the federal courts have formulated delimiting pendent jurisdiction
over state claims7 0 is that the right to choose a federal forum
should not be burdened by the necessity of either abandoning
related state law claims or vindicating them in a separate lawsuit. The practical effect of abstention seems inconsistent with
that rationale.
Nevertheless the courts have deemed it within their power
to "restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous regard for
the rightful independence of the state governments' and for
the smooth working of the federal judiciary". 7' Even if one
can accept federal court power to abstain for state court decision of state issues, there remains the difficulty of deciding
how the competing interests should be reconciled. In view of
the costs of abstention, it should be strictly limited to situations
cases Congress has placed within federal jurisdiction. Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n.
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 355 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result).
But see id.at 345-51; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943); Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1943); Pennsylvania
v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935).
67 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959), quoted with approval in England
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964).
11 The assumption is that federal decision of the federal issues in a case is a
sufficient exercise of jurisdiction. The federal question statute is not explicit in
conferring jurisdiction to decide state issues, though the Supreme Court has consistently so interpreted the federal question power. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). And
federal courts' renunciation of decision of state issues theoretically should not affect
the substance of the .ultimate decision since they are bound to follow state courts'
reading of state law. Abstaining can therefore be viewed as a means for allowing
federal courts better to decide cases rather than as a renunciation of their power
to decide.
69 There are two .levels on which the deterrent effect may operate. The possibility of being remanded to state court may cause the litigants at the outset to forego
their right to a federal forum. Or litigants remanded to state court may decide to
present all of their claims, state and federal, to that court rather than undergo the
additional delay and expense of a subsequent hearing on the federal issues.
7' Pendent jurisdiction exists if "'considered without regard to their federal or
state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding .. " UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
71 Railroad Comm'n. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (citing DiGiovani
v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n. 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935)).
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in which real harms are likely to result from federal exercise
of jurisdiction and in which deferring to state adjudication is
likely to avert those harms. The Supreme Court has made
clear that state courts should not be given an opportunity to
rule on state issues in every case,7 2 or even in all cases involving challenges to state enactments they have never construed.7 3
The standards the Supreme Court has adopted for limiting
the situations in which Pullman abstention can be ordered are
that state law must be unclear and that it must be subject to an
interpretation that will avoid the federal constitutional question.7 4 There is little judicial analysis, however, of how unclear
state law must be,7 5 though without resolving that question
we know little indeed about the scope of abstention.7 6 If a state
72 See, e.g., Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970); Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 248 (1967); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965); Propper
v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
'3 See note 78 infra.
71 See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972); Reetz
v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35
(1965). Though cases applying the Pullman doctrine consistently enunciate these
requirements, the Chief Justice's .dissent in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971), indicated that he and Justice Blackmun may wish to depart from current
standards for abstention, not only in allowing it so that state courts can pass first
on federal issues, see note 35 supra & accompanying text, but also by not requiring
ambiguity in state law; the Chief Justice referred with approval to the abstention
in Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1910), although he thought that the state provisions there "could not have been more plain, or less susceptible of a limiting construction." 400 U.S. at 442.
In addition to the requirement of an unclear state law on which a federal constitutional issue depends, there must be available an adequate state remedy for ob.taining a resolution of the state law issue. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496, 501 (1941). That requirement is discussed infra, text accompanying notes
199-204. For other possible requirements, see text accompanying notes 155-66,
177-98 infra.
11 Similarly there is little analysis of how great the likelihood of avoidirlg the
federal constitutional question must be. The likelihood of avoiding the constitutional
issue in these cases will, however, turn on the clarity of state law; there is more likelihood in Pullman cases of avoiding the constitutional question if a state issue is very
ambiguous than if the state issue is less ambiguous.
7'6The indications of the necessary probabilities in the cases range from the
totally uninformative formulations of the recent decision in Lake Carriers' Ass'n v.
MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972), ordering abstention because the unconstrued state
provisions at issue were "susceptible of 'a construction . . . that would avoid or
modify the . . . constitutional question,' " id. at 510, and because the Court was "satisfied that authoritative resolution of the ambiguities in the [state] law is sufficiently likely
to avoid or significantly modify the federal questions . . . to warrant abstention,'
id. at 512 (emphasis added); to the statement in Harman v. Forssenius. 380 U.S. 528,
534-35 (1965), that "[i]f the state statute in question, although never interpreted by
a state tribunal, is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary
or substantially modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the fed-
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issue were considered "unclear" whenever there was any possibility that the' state judiciary might resolve the issue in a
way other than that which appeared most likely to the federal
court, that requirement could allow abstention almost automatically in cases containing a federal constitutional claim that
is dependent upon the resolution of state law.7 7 Or, at the
opposite extreme, the requirement could limit abstention to
cases in which the state law issue is utterly ambiguous. 7 8 To
eral court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction" (emphasis added); to the
statement in Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1970), that the federal court
should abstain because "a state court decision here . . . could conceivably" avoid the
necessity for the federal courts to decide the federal constitutional issues (emphasis
added).
77 The verbal formulations of the abstention prerequisites that the Court uses
would, in fact, most often indicate that the amount of state law unclarity needed is
slight indeed. In Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 44 (1970), the Court ordered abstention because it was "conceivable" that the Puerto Rican statute "might be
judicially confined to a more narrow ambit which would avoid all constitutional questions" (emphasis added); and in Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959), the
Court abstained because it was "unable to agree that the terms of these three statutes
leave no reasonable room for a construction by the [state] courts which might avoid in
whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least
materially change the nature of the problem" (emphasis added). See also cases quoted
in note 76 supra. Since there is almost always a possibility that a state court in a Pullmantype case might construe state law to affect or avoid the federal constitutional issue,
the above language could be deemed to impose a rule of exhaustion of state remedies
on state law issues.
For stricter formulations of the degree of unclarity required, see Chicago v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 84 (1958); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
339 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
71 Favoring such a reading are statements that abstention is proper "only in
narrowly limited 'special circumstances,'" Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967),
cited with approval in Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970), and the many Supreme
Court cases not ordering abstention despite the presence of state law issues that the
state judiciary could resolve, see, e.g., Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 690 (1964).
The abstention doctrine could also be applied so that enactments that the state
courts have never construed are deemed necessarily "unclear." Such a rule could
explain cases like Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), and Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167, 178 (1959), in which unconstrued enactments seemed relatively unambiguous. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 442 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (discussing the clarity of the state provisions in Reetz). See also Lake Carriers'
Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 512 (1972). Other cases, however, make clear that
there is no special rule for unconstrued enactments. In Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965), the Court said, "The [Pullman] doctrine . . . contemplates
that deference to state court adjudication only be made where the issue of state
law is uncertain. If the state statute in question, although never interpreted by a state
tribunal, is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or
substantially modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the federal
court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). See also Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485,
487 (1956); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). In any event, it would appear
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be functionally justifiable, the prerequisites to abstention should
reflect a special need for state court input on the state issues
involved. Properly applied, the requirements the Court has
adopted can, in large part,7 9 accord with that rationale.
B. The ProperApplication of Existing Requirements That
State Law Be Unclear and Be Susceptible to an Interpretation
That Will Avoid a FederalConstitutionalQuestion
1. The Importance of a Significant Lack of
Clarity in the State Law Issue
The Pullman doctrine is impelled by a fear that federal
court decision of some state law issues risks improvident interference with a valid state program or unnecessary decision
of a federal constitutional question, or both. It is important
to notice that such risks can arise only when the federal court
would err in deciding a state issue in the sense that the highest state court would contradict its holding.80 Consequently,
a federal court should abstain only when the chance of error
is reasonably great. Even then, it should order abstention only
if that course significantly reduces the likelihood of error
occurring.
It is usually the case that the federal judiciary is capable
of determining state law with accuracy. If there are precedents,
the court can read and construe them. If there are none, but
there are analogous decisions, it may be able to determine
more in keeping with the Pullman standard to differentiate between issues according
to whether they have passed through the state judicial system than to differentiate
between enactments that state courts have or have not construed, since a state court
may have considered an enactment without reaching the specific issue facing a federal
court.
79 The exception is treated in my proposal to abandon the requirement of a
federal constitutional issue in cetain cases. See text accompanying notes 169-76 infra.
80 In fact, not even every case in which the federal court makes such an error
will result in one of these two consequences. In a case, like Pullman, in which the
state law contention is that a particular provision is not authorized, one abstention
policy-avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking-is transgressed if the
federal court holds the provision authorized when the state courts would disagree.
And if the federal court mistakenly holds that state law does not authorize the provision in question in a case in which, if the federal court did reach the constitutional
issue, it would hold the provision constitutionally valid, it violates the other abstention policy by unjustifiably interfering with a legitimate state program. If, however,
in the latter instance the federal court would in any event hold the state program
violative of the Federal Constitution, the result it reaches, though the grounds are
erroneous, is the proper one, and the federal mistake has not caused the court to
transgress either policy behind the abstention doctrine.

19741

ABSTENTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES

from them the way a state court is likely to rule. 8 ' Even if there
is no case law to guide the court, the wording of an uncon82
strued statute may be sufficiently clear on the point at issue.
Of course, there is always a possibility that the federal
court will err in deciding the state law issue. Even if the issue
is referred to the state court system, however, there is a possibility of error. The tone of abstention discussions seems frequently to reflect an assumption that if a state issue is remanded to the state courts, their disposition will necessarily
be the correct one. 83 This attitude is supported by the fact that
the "correct" disposition in this context means the one that
the state judiciary would make. The standard, however, refers
to the highest court of the state. 84 And many lower state court
decisions will not be reviewed by the state's highest court. Since
that tribunal alone has "the last word" 85 on state law, such
decisions will be tentative in much the same way that federal
determinations are. 86 If in Pullman, for example, the lower
81Cf Mason y. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957)
(state court indicated its intent in dictum).
82 See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965). But see Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 178 (1959).
83 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30
(1959); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); Meredith
v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943) (dictum); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316
U.S. 168, 172 (1942).
84 See Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941); West v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); IA MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309,
at 3327 & n.5 (1965); cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198,
211 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank,
362 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1966).
85 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
86 Even apart from the possibility of review by the highest state tribunal, state
courts are arguably more likely than federal courts to decide state law. in accordance
with what the highest tribunal would rule. Federal judges may be less adept with state
precedent and practice than are members of the state judiciary, since a lesser part
of their work concerns state law and a greater familiarity with federal law is expected
of them than of state court judges. Cf. text accompanying note 46 supra. In some state
systems an offsetting factor may be that the holders of positions on the highest state
court are more like federal judges in background and training, than they are like
lower state court judges. Cf. Mishkin, supra note 46, at 158-59. Moreover, most federal district judges are drawn from the local bar of the area in which they usually
sit, a factor noted by Justice Frankfurter in Pullman. 312 U.S. at 499. See also Propper
v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87, 489 (1949); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 22728 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). This factor is also responsible for frequent deference in federal appellate decisions to the experience of the district judge on local
matters. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956);
Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944); MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assur.
Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942). Nevertheless abstention was ordered in Pullman and
in Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), where two members of the three-judge panel
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Texas courts held the Commission's order authorized and the
highest state court did not review the decision, but several
years later in another case held the order unauthorized, its
determination would control, and the federal court in Pullman
would have had needlessly to decide the federal constitutional
87
question.
Even if a remand to state tribunals does increase the likelihood of correct disposition of state issues, there is no sharp
dichotomy between the state and federal systems in this regard; both systems face the possibility of error, and both are
capable of arriving at "correct" decisions in most cases. One
might conclude that the increment in the likelihood of arriving at a correct conclusion by abstaining is simply not great
enough to justify abstention's costs. That conclusion would
be correct, I submit, if the abstention doctrine were applied
indiscriminately to obtain the state courts' state law solutions
in all cases in which state enactments were attacked as violative
of the Federal Constitution. One can, however, narrow the
pool of cases for abstention in such a way that the difference
in likelihood of correct adjudication between state and federal
judicial systems increases.
Limiting abstention to cases in which the state law issue
is extremely unclear accomplishes that result. The more unclear the state issue is, the more likely federal error would
appear to be. Of course, the same ambiguity would contribute
to a likelihood of error on the part of the lower courts in the
state judicial system. And theoretically the relevant criterion
for abstention should not be the intrinsic likelihood of federal
error but the likelihood of federal error in relation to the likelihood of state error. The chances of state error are related
in large part, however, to the chances of review by the highest
state court, which normally will be incalculable at the time the
federal court is deciding whether to abstain. The authoritative
state tribunal may be more likely to exercise its discretion to
review "important" cases, if they can be selected out, than
others. But the decisions that the lower state courts render
will also be influential; when an important state program is
which decided the case under state law "feeling sure of its grounds on the merits"
were former Alaska lawyers. Id. at 86.
87 Indeed, there may be some uncertainty whether a ruling is definitive even when
the highest state court does speak, especially if the court is closely divided or if the
area of law is a rapidly evolving one.

ABSTENTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES

1974]

held invalid, the chances of review are probably greater than
when it is upheld.
When the likelihood of review by the highest state tribunal is not calculable, the federal court should decide whether to abstain on the assumption that the likelihood of state
review is constant, and should base its decision solely on the
likelihood of federal error in the particular case. This approach is justifiable because the factors that maximize the
chances of federal and lower state court error-that the state
law is unclear and has never been construed by the highest
state tribunal, for example-probably do not decrease the
chances of full state review. Consequently, it is justifiable to
assume that the ambiguity of state law increases not only the
intrinsic likelihood of federal error but also the degree to
which the state judicial system is more likely to reach a correct
result than are the federal courts. The greater the ambiguity,
the greater is the difference in the capacities of the state and
federal systems to reach the "correct" result, and the more
warranted is abstention.
Even if abstention is limited to instances in which state
law is extremely unclear, the question must be faced whether
increasing the chances of obtaining the correct state law result is worth abstention's costs. The answer is a function not
only of the likelihood of federal error but also of the seriousness of its two possible consequences-interference with a legitimate state program and unnecessary federal constitutional
adjudication.
2.

An Analysis of the Reasons for Abstaining for
State Court Decision of Unclear State Issues

a. Avoiding Interference With a Legitimate State Program
It may be argued that when state enactments are challenged as federally unconstitutional, federal error in deciding
a state law issue cannot lead to serious interference with a
state program. If a federal court holds that state law does not
authorize the state statute or order under attack, or if it construes a state enactment differently than the highest state court
would, state officials who believe that the federal court's state
law decision is erroneous can usually 88 correct the federal
88In situations in which no state ruling is available, the absence of abstention

1094

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1071

holding by obtaining a state ruling on the question in dispute. 8 9
Despite principles of res judicata, a federal court will reopen
the controversy and modify the decree in accordance with the
state court's decision. 90 Such a procedure bears a marked
will harm the state most conspicuously, for the federal courts will have not only the
preliminary but also the permanent decision on questions of state law.
89 If the issue is the validity of a particular statute or order on its face, as it
was in Pullman, but the federal court has enjoined its enforcement only against the
party who brought the action challenging it in federal court, the state attorney general can obtain a state ruling on the issue by bringing an enforcement proceeding
against another party in state court. It is not settled whether a federal judge should
confine an injunction to the named plaintiff-whether an individual or a class-or
should derive the scope of an injunction from the substantive issues in a case and
allow it to apply to parties other than plaintiffs. Compare Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S.
219, 223 n.4 (1959) with Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288-90 (5th Cir. 1963). See
generally 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 484-509 (1972). If a federal judge follows the latter
approach and issues an injunction against enforcement of the statute generally, the
attorney general would seem to risk contempt of court by bringing an enforcement
proceeding. He should, however, be able to proceed under a state declaratory judgment procedure, naming as defendant any person against whom he wishes to enforce
the statute.
The most problematic situation arises when the disputed federal ruling applies
peculiarly to the plaintiffs in the federal suit. If, for example, the federal holding is
not that the statute is generally void but instead that it should be construed as inapplicable to the particular plaintiffs, there may be no similarly situated person against
whom the attorney general can bring a proceeding to test the issue. In that situation
the federal court, in order to avoid assuming for itself the final authority, to decide
the state law issue, should permit the attorney general to name as defendant, in a
state declaratory judgment proceeding, the successful plaintiff in the federal suit.
Such a procedure does force a party to face two lawsuits because he has chosen to
litigate in federal court; therefore it should be permitted only when no other means
of obtaining a state forum are available to the attorney general. In that situation,
however, the burden on the litigant may be justifiable. He is less prejudiced than
when abstention is ordered: Though he must bear the cost of a subsequent state
proceeding, he does not suffer the delay involved in abstention, for he obtains a federal ruling pending the state determination of its law.
Similar reasoning might support allowing an enforcement proceeding against
the same party involved in the federal action in those few states lacking a declaratory
judgment procedure or a procedure for issuing advisory opinions, in situations in
which no other means of obtaining a state ruling exists. But such a procedure should
not be allowed, since it would fully deprive the party of the benefits of his federal
court victory. It seems preferable to require states to provide a declaratory judgment procedure as the price of correcting federal errors on state issues in cases in
which there is no appropriate defendant other than the person who was plaintiff in
the federal suit. Cf. text accompanying notes 143, 202-04 infra.
90 When a federal court rests its decision on a state question and thereby avoids
a federal constitutional question, the decree will often include a provision expressly
authorizing reopening in the event that the question of state law is subsequently
decided differently in the state court. See Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934); Wald
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 602 (1933); Glenn v. Field Packing Co.,
290 U.S. 177 (1933). Even if the federal judge neglects to, insert such a provision,
the decree can be modified when the state court has authoritatively spoken. It is this
possibility of modification that led Justice Frankfurter to fear in Pullman that a federal ruling on the state issue would be "tentative." See 312 U.S. at 500.
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resemblance to abstention. There are two law suits, possibly
between the same parties, and each forum speaks with final
authority on its own law. It may involve as much delay as abstention before the controversy is ultimately resolved, but
nonetheless it should be preferable to the claimants. Under
such a procedure, the federal court will rule on the validity
of the challenged state enactment before any state court ruling,
and any relief may issue immediately, to be disturbed only
after a corrective state judgment. Under the abstention procedure, relief cannot issue until the state court has ruled. 9 1
For precisely that reason, however, a refusal to abstain
can be much more harmful to state interests than is abstention, even though the state can ultimately correct an erroneous
federal ruling on state law. Depending upon the speed of the
state judicial system, it may take several years to correct an
erroneous federal interference with a state program. The delay will be exacerbated if the federal court is unwilling to modify its decree until the state's highest court has passed upon
the issue. 9 2 During this period the state will lose the benefit
of the program it enacted, and, depending on the nature of
the program, the damage to state interests may not be compensable- if the program is ultimately ruled valid. 93 Indeed,
the state program may be such that the postponement involved
effectively defeats the interests that the program was designed
to protect. A program limiting fishing rights with the purpose
of preventing a particular species from becoming extinct, for
91Another reason the claimants should prefer this procedure is that in many
circumstances they will not have to be party to the lawsuit that the state commences.
See note 89 supra.
92 The Court's disposition in Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970),

suggests that federal courts may so act. Lower Puerto Rican courts had spoken on
the state law question at issue but the United States Supreme Court ordered absten-

tion because the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico had not authoritatively construed
the statute.

93 See generally Lockwood, Maw & Rosenberry, The Use of the Federal Injunction
in Constitutional Litigation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1929). A procedure whereby the
federal court at the outset of the case grants interlocutory relief to a party it feels
will ultimately prevail on the merits can have the same effect. As in abstention cases
and those involving erroneous federal decision of state issues, the potential harm
is the damage that is done to the claimants or to the state pending ultimate resolution of the issue. If the interlocutory relief is issued in favor of the party who ultimately prevails, no harm is done. But if the interlocutory relief is later held to
have been erroneous, state programs might already have suffered irreparably. See
generally Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. REv. 795, 803-05 (1934);
Note, The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 299 (1963).
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example, may have its object defeated by a few years' delay.
A lake may become polluted beyond the possibility of a recreational use while the federal court postpones enforcement of
a state's anti-pollution program designed to preserve the lake
for recreational purposes.
The interference with state programs that an erroneous
federal decision can cause therefore usually takes the form
of delaying the state program, not ultimately forbidding it.
A court should take special care to avoid such interference
when dealing with a program that is of some importance to
the state and that serves purposes which are especially vulnerable to delay. Conversely, if the program is of minimal importance or if the delay an erroneous decision would cause
would be compensable after the fact, the interests in making
certain that the federal court does not erroneously void it
sharply decrease.
b. Avoiding UnnecessaryDecision of Federal ConstitutionalIssues
If the only consequence feared from failure to abstain
were improper interference with state programs, abstention
would seem unnecessary in cases in which state law appeared
to validate the challenged state action. Indeed, a federal court
could abstain in fewer cases still by simply presuming in favor
of the state on the state law issue and proceeding directly to
the federal constitutional question. 9 4 In cases in which the
federal constitutional issue was dispositive-where the state
action presumed valid under, state law would be federally unconstitutional-the issue of abstention would not need to be
reached, and the parties would enjoy immediate relief. In
cases in which the federal court held it was not dispositive,
the court could then decide whether it should abstain or should
itself rule on the state law issue. 95
Neither approach has been utilized because either would
94 The suggested approach would reduce significantly the occasions for abstention
although it could operate in far fewer cases in which the meaning of the challenged
state enactment is at issue than it could in those in which the state issue is whether
state law authorizes the challenged state action. See text accompanying notes 129-31
infra.
95 Continued presumption in favor of the state on the state issue in lieu of abstention would seem undesirable. It would deprive the private litigants of the usual
rules of pendent jurisdiction, allowing them to have their state as well as federal
claims decided in federal court, and would thereby deter some from invoking federal jurisdiction.
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transgress the other policy that underlies the abstention doctrine-that of avoiding unnecessary decision of federal constitutional questions. That long-standing federal policy 9 6 affects
the disposition of Pullman abstention cases in two ways. First,
it prevents a federal court from presuming initially in favor
of the state in order to avoid a possibility of erroneous interference with a state program and instead encourages it first
to decide the state law question. Second, the policy encourages
a federal court that would decide the state issue in such a way
that the federal constitutional issue would remain to abstain
97
in order to ensure the correctness of its view of state law; if
abstention would alter its state law ruling, the constitutional
question might not have to be reached.
The policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions is not, however, absolute; while "usually" pursued, a
court can depart from it for "important reasons."9 8 It might
therefore be argued that the policy does not sanction Pullman
abstention at all on the ground that the burden that abstention
places on the parties constitutes an "important reason"Y for
not applying the rule of avoidance. But even if one believes
that it sometimes can be more important to avoid the constitutional issue than to respect the parties' interests, it should
be recognized that the balance does not always favor avoidance
and that it is more important to avoid unnecessary pronouncements concerning some constitutional issues than others. Some
of the Court's language in Pullman suggests the propriety of
abstaining to avoid only "sensitive" constitutional issues, 99 but

96 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). The purpose of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication, while less self-evident than the purpose of not striking down valid state
enactments, derives from the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison and the essentially antidemocratic nature of judicial review. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 51, at 111-33.
In its classic form at least, the policy of avoiding constitutional decisionmaking speaks
only to the desirability of avoiding that basis for decision when other grounds for
decision exist; it does not support avoiding decision of the case itself. See Gunther,
supra note 51, at 16-17, & 22. But see A. BICKEL, supra at 69-72, 127-33, & 174.
97 The first effect of the policy, but not the second effect, has little operation
when the state law issue is the challenged enactment's meaning instead of its validity.
See text accompanying notes 129-31 infra.
9sSiler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). But see A. BICKEL,
supra note 51 at 127-33.
99Although the case involved several constitutional challenges, Justice Frankfurter's explanation of why the district court should not have acted referred to the
need for avoiding only one issue, that involving racial discrimination, which Frank-
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other decisions have not articulated any such limitation. 10 0 It
is difficult, of course, to ascertain with any confidence which
constitutional issues are "sensitive," but one can imagine factors that might be relevant: 10 1 the question might be sufficiently novel that the court is uncertain of the answer it would
give; the issue might have particularly far-reaching consequences, not all of which the court is satisfied it foresees; the
decision might be one that congressional action will soon make
unnecessary; or the court might not be satisifed that the particular controversy presents the issues in a realistic light. Conversely, if a constitutional issue is a particulary easy one that
does not involve any of the above factors, the interests in
avoiding its decision may be sufficiently minimal to warrant
relief to the parties from the delay and expense that abstention entails.
Although the Supreme Court did not articulate this rea02
soning in its recent decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,'
that case might be explained in terms of the absence of reason
to avoid the particular constitutional issue involved. The case
concerned the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that
provided for a one-year prohibition of the sale or gift of intoxicating liquor to any person who by "excessive drinking"
had exposed himself or his family "to want," injured his health,
endangered the safety or property of another, or become
"dangerous to the peace of any community."' 1 3 The local chief
of police applied the statute to Ms. Constantineau by posting
a notice in all retail liquor stores in her community forbidding
all persons to sell or give her liquor for one year. The statute
contained no provision for notice or hearing prior to the posting, and Ms. Constantineau had not in fact been given those
procedural protections. 0 4 A three-judge court enjoined enforcement of the statute on the ground that it violates federal
due process so to expose an individual to "public embarrassment and ridicule" without giving him "notice of the intent
furter said "touches a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts
ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open." 312 U.S. at 498.
"I See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967); Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S: 167, 177 (1959); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168, 173 (1942).
101 For a thorough discussion of possible factors, see A. BICKEL, supra note 51,
at 345-48.
102 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
103 See Wis. STAT. §§ 176.26 & 176.28 (1967) (repealed 1971).
104 400 U.S. at 435.
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to post and an opportunity to present his side of the matter."'10 5
The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the Wisconsin
statute was unambiguous in its failure to provide for notice
and hearing, and that "abstention should not be ordered mere06
ly to await an attempt to vindicate the claim in a state court."'
It did not address the dissenting assertion of the Chief Justice
that a provision of the Wisconsin constitution might be sufficient to dispose of the case.10 7 Instead, it ruled on the dispositive federal constitutional issue without invoking the policy
in favor of avoiding such issues, which would have encouraged
it first either to decide the state issue itself or to refer it to
state courts by abstaining.
The opinions did not discuss whether the state constitutional provision invoked by the Chief Justice was sufficiently
clear, or the case law respecting it sufficiently developed, that
the federal court could itself have applied it; or whether, instead, the state issue would have required abstention. 0 8 When
105Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
106 400 U.S. at 439.

400 U.S. at 440-43. There was another abstention issue as well in the case,
which is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 128-43.
108 The majority simply ignored the state constitutional provision. The Chief
Justice did not have to address whether abstention would be proper on the basis
of the classic Pullman requirements because it was his view that the state courts
should necessarily have the first opportunity to pass on state law. See note 107 supra
& accompanying text.
It would not in any event have been proper to abstain for state court decision
of the state issue the Chief Justice found in Constantineau because of the reason the
Chief Justice gave for believing the Wisconsin constitution would invalidate the
challenged enactment. This ground for abstention was not mentioned by the parties
but was raised by the Chief Justice on his own initiative because he discovered a
state constitutional provision that had "been held by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
to be substantially equivalent to the limitation on state action contained in the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." 400 U.S. at
440 n.l. If the Chief Justice was correct in believing that the Wisconsin courts would
invalidate the challenged enactment under their constitution because it was the
equivalent of federal constitutional guarantees, that fact should not support abstention. As a general rule, a federal court should not abstain to let state courts determine
whether a challenged enactment is authorized under state law when the state law
provision that is claimed to invalidate the enactment is identic with a federal counterpart. An identic state law provision in this context may or may not be identical in
its wording to the federal counterpart. Its important characteristic is that state courts
interpreting it are motivated primarily by a desire that it conform to the federal
counterpart. Cf. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
It may be difficult for a federal court to determine when a state provision is in
fact identic in this sense. When it appears probable that it is, however, the federal
court should not abstain so that the challenged state enactment can be invalidated
under the state provision, since by hypothesis the federal court will be more adept
at arriving at the correct result than a state court would be. Moreover, when the
107
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state law is truly clear and when ruling on it would dispose of
the case, it would seem appropriate for the federal court to
rule on the state issue even if the federal constitutional question also is clear and nonsensitive. But if the state issue is not
so clear that federal courts deciding it can be confident of
their result, or if it is less clear than the federal constitutional
issue, or if the state law ruling the federal court would make
would not be dispositive, then a federal court is justified in
proceeding directly to a decision of the federal constitutional
issue if that issue is nonsensitive, clear, and dispositive. 10 9 In
that situation, the interests in favor of avoiding the federal
constitutional issue are minimal; they do not warrant either
making the parties suffer the costs of abstention or taking a
risk that the federal court through a state law ruling will erroneously interfere with a state program.
The Court apparently considered the dispositive federal
constitutional issue in Constantineau a clear and nonsensitive
one. 1 0 On that hypothesis, as long as the state issue was not
more clear than the federal one, the Court's failure to consider
the state constitutional provision was justified."' But the greatstate enactment in question is a constitutional provision that the federal court deems
identic to a federal constitutional provision, the court should -decide the federal
question before the state question, since an initial decision on the state issue is necessarily a decision on the federal issue, and thus will not avoid federal constitutional
decisionmaking.
It is true that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had termed the state provision the
Chief Justice invoked only "substantially," but not precisely, equivalent to the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 400 U.S. at 440
n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But that does not support abstention because the only
reason the Chief Justice gave for believing the state provision might be relevant at
all was that holding on the part of the Wisconsin court; there was nothing to indicate
that any nonidentic aspect of the state provision might invalidate the challenged
ordinance. Moreover, one might argue that federal application of a "substantially
equivalent" state provision raises no greater risk of federal error than the application of any state enactment which is substantially unambiguous.
109The proper treatment of cases involving federal constitutional issues that are
clear and nonsensitive but not dispositive is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 121-24.
110Every member of the Court agreed that notice and hearing must be provided
in the circumstances involved, and no Justice appeared to regard that federal decision as groundbreaking or as one that there was any special need to avoid.
111 The clarity of a dispositive federal constitutional question could, however,
support an argument in favor of abstention, for it may increase the likelihood that
state tribunals, if given an opportunity to pass on state issues, will dispose of them
in a manner that will avoid the constitutional infirmity; if abstention had been ordered in Constantineau, the very clarity of the federal constitutional issue would increase the likelihood that Wisconsin courts would prohibit the challenged procedure
under their law, thereby making decision of the federal issue ultimately unnecessary
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er the sensitivity of a federal constitutional question, the more
important it is first to decide a state issue that might be dispositive, and the more justifiable it is to abstain to ensure the
accuracy of an uncertain reading of state law that leaves the
1
federal issue to be decided.' 2
3.

The Operation of These Policies in "Authorization Cases"
Since each of the foregoing reasons for abstention is operative only in some situations, a court should ascertain whether
the reasons can operate before it abstains in a particular case.
Otherwise the parties may needlessly be subjected to the delay
and expense of a second lawsuit. There are differences in the
ways the abstention policies operate between cases in which
the state issue is whether state law authorizes the challenged
state enactment and those in which the state issue is, instead,
the meaning of the challenged state enactment. I will refer
to the case. Even so, that fact should not encourage abstention. Abstaining out of
confidence of thereby avoiding a federal constitutional decision when the reason for
that confidence is that the outcome of the federal decision is clear to all is hardly
a wise allocation of the resources of either the parties or the courts, at least when
no affirmative reason appears for avoiding the particular federal constitutional decision. In a situation like Constantineau in which the outcome of the case was certain,
it would seem unreasonable to require the institution of a second lawsuit when the
most that abstention could accomplish is that the challenged enactment would be
stricken under state law instead of under settled federal doctrine. Cf text accompanying notes 135-39 infra. But cf. text accompanying notes 140-43 infra.
12 Arguably, a federal court should abstain in cases involving extremely sensitive constitutional questions, even if it is relatively certain that the question will have
to be reached. It is always possible that the state court will dispose of the case on
state law grounds, or that the case will be mooted or settled before it returns to
federal court; and even if the federal question must ultimately be reached, the postponement of sensitive adjudication can serve the same delaying function as avoiding
it altogether in a particular case.
The argument that it ,would be proper to abstain to postpone federal constitutional adjudication though it appears ultimately unavoidable in the particular case
is distinct from the two reasons for abstaining discussed in the text and states a
third rationale which departs from the premise that abstention is a device to guard
against federal error on state law issues; that reason would apply though the federal
court views state law just as the highest court of the state would. But abstaining for
the purpose of delaying adjudication of the particular case seems unfair and improper. If delay is the purpose, a federal court could effect it with less cost to the
parties merely by postponing its decision. The inappropriateness of the abstention
device is made apparent, moreover, by the arbitrariness of delaying because of sensitive constitutional issues only in those cases which happen to embrace as well issues
of state law. If delay in constitutional decisionmaking is ever by itself a valid judicial
objective, see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
Rav. 1, 7-8 (1959), it should be limited in cases containing state issues, as in other
cases, to doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and political question,' which isolate
particular deficiencies in the constitutional questions at issue or in the pleadings of
the parties. See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 51, 111-98.
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to the first category as "authorization cases" and to the latter
as "construction cases" and will discuss separately the operation
1 3
of the abstention policies in each category. "
a. The Importance of Identifying the Policy That Abstention
Will Serve in the ParticularCase
In cases in which the state issue is the validity of a challenged enactment, an order of abstention will serve only one
of the two policies behind the abstention doctrine. When a
state statute is challenged as invalid under both the state and
federal constitutions, for example, 1 4 and the federal court
considers the state issue unclear, the policy that abstaining
furthers necessarily depends upon the nature of the state law
error the federal court seeks to avoid. If, in the absence of
abstention, the federal court would hold that state law authorizes the statute, it would reach the issue of the statute's constitutionality under federal law, and if its state law holding
were erroneous, the federal constitutional decision would be
unnecessary. Whenever a federal court abstains, instead of
itself upholding the state law validity of a challenged enactment, it therefore does so in service of the policy to avoid
unnecessary federal constitutional adjudication. But if the
federal court, in the absence of abstention, would rule that
the enactment were not authorized, abstention serves instead
113 Of course a case can contain issues concerning both the state law validity of
a challenged enactment and its meaning. And a case can contain several authorization
issues or several construction issues. But each authorization or construction issue
should be analyzed separately to see whether a federal court is warranted in abstaining for state court decision of that issue.
114 It need not be a state statute that is challenged for a case to be an authorization case; the same analysis applies when any state enactment is challenged on
grounds that some provision of state law-whether or not it is the state constitution
-renders it invalid. Moreover, this Article takes the position that the analysis of
attacks on state action other than enactments should be similar. See text accompanying notes 146-51 infra. Pullman is an authorization case; the state issue was whether
the Commission's order was within its statutory powers; the issue was not the meaning of the enactment being attacked but rather the meaning of the provision claimed
to invalidate it. See notes 14-23 supra & accompanying text. And the issue the Chief
Justice raised in Constantineau, see notes 107-08 supra & accompanying text, was an
authorization issue, though the case contained a construction issue as well, see text
accompanying notes 128-29 infra. The Chief Justice's authorization issue should not
in any event warrant abstention, however, because the state constitutional provision
that might possibly have invalidated the challenged statute was deemed to derive
its content from federal constitutional provisions. See note 108 supra.
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to avoid erroneous interference with a state program. 1 5 In
this situation, the court would not reach the federal constitutional question even if it were in error; but if in error, it would
invalidate the statute though it is in fact valid under state law,
and the state program might suffer without justification.
In any given authorization case, then, a judge who knows
how he would rule on the state law issue can identify which
of the policies behind abstention he would serve if he abstained. Such a determination can prevent pointless abstention. For example, a case may arise in which it is crucial not
to interrupt the state program erroneously," 6 but only minimally important to avoid a pronouncement on the federal
constitutional issue at stake. If the federal judge would hold
that the state law program were authorized, so that the interest abstention served would be avoidance of the constitutional
issue, abstention would not seem worth its costs; but if the
federal court would hold the program unauthorized, abstention might be justifiable to avoid erroneous interruption of
7
the state program.1

The advantages of first determining what policy abstention would serve in a particular case are thus evident. But
difficulties arguably exist in a rule requiring the federal courts
to determine before abstaining which way they would rule on
questionable state law issues. The propriety of such a requirement will be discussed shortly,"18 but the extent of the difficulties it imposes can be better evaluated after analyzing precisely how the factors thus far articulated would interact if the
federal court did prejudge each abstention decision in the
functional manner suggested.

115 This in fact was the only policy abstention could serve in Pullman itself, for
the district court had held that the Commission lacked power to issue the challenged
order and the Supreme Court, pointing out that the district court included "an able
and experienced circuit judge of the circuit which includes Texas and . . . two capable district judges trained in Texas law," said that if there were "no choice in the
matter but to decide what is the law of the state, [the Court] should hesitate long
before rejecting their forecast of Texas laiv." 312 U.S. at 499.
116See examples given, text accompanying note 93 supra.
117 Conversely, a case might involve sensitive constitutional issues concerning a
state program that interruption would not irreparably harm; if so, there would be
more justification for abstention if the federal court would otherwise hold the statute authorized.
"' See text accompanying notes 125-27 infra.
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Cases in Which Abstention Serves to Avoid Disruptinga
Legitimate State Program
If the federal court would otherwise hold that state law
does not authorize a challenged state program, abstention
should not be ordered unless the state program could be expected to suffer irreparable harm from delay. That rule does
not furnish precise guidance for the decision of most cases,
however, for delay will often involve at least some degree of
irreparable harm, and the amount of damage caused by an
erroneous interruption of a state program will vary with the
facts of each case. Moreover, the amount of threatened harm
that is required for abstention should vary with the degree of
ambiguity of the state issue and, thus, with the likelihood that
a federal court deciding the issue would err. A federal court
might not be willing to run even a fairly slight risk of erroneously holding that state law does not authorize a program
if the error would seriously frustrate important state policy;
it might abstain in that situation even though the state law
were clear enough not to warrant abstention if the consequences of error were slighter.
Conversely, if the amount of harm from error is not tremendous, but is of some consequence, and the chances of
error are very great, a court might justly abstain. It may abstain even though it would not do so in a case in which the
same amount of harm could be caused by an erroneous ruling
but the chance of error were slighter. It should be noted,
however, that if a federal judge is in good faith attempting
to decide state issues as he believes the highest state court
would, then the chances of error as the federal judge perceives
them cannot exceed fifty percent. If the federal judge sees
the state law as absolutely ambiguous, so that it is wholly unclear to him whether the state judiciary would hold the challenged enactment authorized or not, he runs a fifty-fifty chance
of deciding the question correctly. If state law is not wholly
ambiguous, so the federal judge sees some indication that the
highest state court would agree with his holding, the chances
of error decrease. Since the chances of federal error cannot
exceed fifty percent, and since even when federal error is most
likely it is also possible that the state system will erroneously
dispose of the state issue, 119 the potential error must threaten
"19See notes 83-87 supra & accompanying text.
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significant harm to the state program for abstention to warrant
its costs.
c. Cases in Which Abstention Serves to Avoid Unnecessary Federal
ConstitutionalAdjudication
Similarly when, absent abstention, the federal court would
hold the challenged enactment authorized, so that the interest
abstention serves is avoiding federal constitutional adjudication, a significantly sensitive federal constitutional question
should be requisite to abstention, and the more sensitive the
constitutional question to be avoided, the more likely abstention is to remain warranted as the uncertainty of the state
issue-and thus the chance of federal error--decreases. Even
when the federal question is extremely sensitive, however,
there may be reason not to abstain when it is fairly clear that
state law authorizes the challenged state provision. Of course,
as state law becomes increasingly clear in whatever direction,
abstaining becomes increasingly purposeless, for the likelihood
of federal error decreases; a significant lack of clarity is thus a
general prerequisite to abstention.1 2 0 But slightly less ambiguity arguably is required when an enactment appears to be unauthorized than when it appears to be authorized, even if the
policies underlying abstention-avoiding erroneous interference with a state program in one case and avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication in the other-are implicated
to an equal extent. One reason is the greater likelihood of obtaining a definitive state answer to the state law question when
indications are that the challenged enactment is unauthorized
and that lower state courts would strike down the program;
overturning a state program probably maximizes the likelihood
of a definitive answer from the authoritative state tribunal. A
less speculative and more fundamental reason is that the costs of
abstention may be less when state law suggests that the enactment is unauthorized: If the federal court is correct that abstention will result in the state court definitively disposing of
the case on the state issue-and the clearer the state law is, the
more likely it is that the court is correct-no return to the federal court will be necessary because the federal constitutional
issue will not have to be reached. If the federal court believes
120 The one possible exception to this principle is discussed at text accompanying notes 135-39 infra. That exception, however, is qualified by the principle discussed at text accompanying notes 140-43 infra.
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correctly that the enactment is authorized, however, the case
will return to the federal court in precisely the same posture
as when it was sent to the state court, and the federal court will
have to decide the federal constitutional issue. Abstention will
have fulfilled none of its objectives.
This analysis suggests simply a slight difference in the
degree of state law ambiguity requisite to abstention between
the situation in which an enactment appears authorized and
that in which it appears unauthorized. Alternatively, if the
degree of ambiguity is constant in the two situations, it suggests a slight difference in the degree to which the relevant
policy must call for abstention: The federal court should abstain
slightly less readily in authorization cases involving the avoidance of constitutional questions than in those involving the
avoidance of harm to state programs.
d.

Cases Involving Clear and Nonsensitive Federal
ConstitutionalQuestions

As was discussed earlier, there is no important interest
in avoiding adjudication of clear and nonsensitive federal
constitutional questions; accordingly if such an issue is dispositive-if the challenged enactment is clearly unconstitutional-abstention is improper.' 21 Even when the federal constitutional issue does not call for avoidance, however, considerations of efficient decisionmaking may cut in favor of abstention
in some cases in which that federal issue is not dispositive-in
some cases, that is, in which the federal court would uphold
the constitutionality of the challenged enactment: When the
federal court believes a case to contain a clear and nonsensitive, nondispositive federal constitutional issue, and in addition
the state issue is sufficiently unclear for abstention, but in the
absence of abstention the federal court would hold the challenged enactment unauthorized, the court should not first
decide the federal constitutional issue. 122 Since the state issue
121See text accompanying notes 108-09 supra.
12 The facts of Constantineau can be varied to provide an example in which the
challenged state enactment is quite clearly constitutional (rather than clearly unconstitutional) and in which the federal court, though uncertain concerning state law,
would hold it does not sanction the challenged provision. Suppose the provision relating to posting the names of "excessive drinkers" clearly does provide for notice
and hearing and that the federal constitutional challenge is, instead, that it violates
due process and equal protection for the state to deprive "excessive drinkers" of
liquor. Let us assume as well that "excessive drinkers" is defined with sufficient pre-
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is appropriate for abstention in such a case, ruling first on the
constitutional issue would require abstaining after the constitutional ruling-a course that in all likelihood would prove
more costly to the litigants than abstaining on the state issue
at the outset. Since, by hypothesis, the state issue is more likely
to be dispositive of the controversy than is the federal issue,
abstaining at the outset would settle the case more expeditiously
than would having the litigants first go through the federal
system on the nondispositive federal issue. 123 If, however, the
cision to escape charges of unconstitutional vagueness and, further, that it seems to
the federal court that the constitutional challenge, while not frivolous, is fairly clearly
erroneous on the merits. The challenged posting provision is not a state statute but
a city ordinance, and the state issue is whether the city may enact such an ordinance
despite state legislative regulation of the distribution of liquor, which is arguably
preemptive. A perusal of relevant state law leaves the federal court without confidence concerning the proper resolution of the state question. This hypothetical states
a case in which, if the federal court, absent abstention, would hold the ordinance
preempted, judicial efficiency would call for abstaining at the outset, before decision
of the federal constitutional question.
123 The soundness of this analysis is clearest if the district courts' orders of abstention will not in the normal course be appealed through the federal system. If
they will be appealed, it might not significantly increase the costs of abstention for
the district judge to decide the clear and nonsensitive constitutional question concurrently with the abstention issue and for the appellate courts to review the correctness of both rulings. Such a procedure would require more time at the district court
level in cases in which factual findings were necessary to the constitutional ruling
but not in other cases.
The appealability of orders to abstain is not definitively settled. In Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962) (per curiam), the
Court held reviewable an order of abstention, but in that case the district court,
contrary to the later announced England procedure, had referred the federal as well
as state issues to state court. The Supreme Court's explanation of the appealability
of the order-that the order was final because the "'[a]ppellant was effectively out
of court', id. at 715 n.2 (quoting 289 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1961))-is not necessarily applicable in situations in which the district court, under the England procedure, retains jurisdiction. In Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498
(1972), the Court, without discussing appealability, reviewed a district court decision
to abstain; in that case as well, however, the district court had dismissed the complaint and had apparently referred federal along with state issues to state courts.
336 F. Supp. 248, 253-54 (E.D. Mich. 1971); see NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471
(1959) (per curiam) (vacating, without discussion, pre-England order to abstain);
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959). In Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), the Supreme Court compounded the confusion by reviewing an order of abstention although it limited its
grant of certiorari to exclude the question of the appealability of the order! Id. at
26 n.1. No federal issues were involved in that case, but the district court had retained
jurisdiction, and the Court indicated that a state issue might return to the federal
forum. Id. at 29; see notes 219-20 infra.
The American Law Institute apparently concludes from the case law that abstention orders are not reviewable, for it explains its failure to provide expressly
for appellate review in its abstention proposals to Congress by saying "[s]uch review
is ordinarily undesirable .... In the unusual case where appellate relief from an absten-
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federal court in the absence of abstention would hold the enactment authorized, but all other facts were the same, the court
should not order abstention at the outset or at any later stage.
Neither of the purposes of abstention could be served in such
a case. There is no significant interest in avoiding decision of
a clear and nonsensitive federal constitutional question, and
12 4
the state program, since it will be upheld, cannot be harmed.
4.

The Justification for Requiring Federal Decision of the
State Law Issue Prior to the Abstention Decision
This interplay of the abstention factors reveals that abstention will not be limited to instances in which state law is
entirely ambiguous, a fact that is relevant in assessing the burden to federal courts of identifying in advance the policy abstaining would serve. In many cases in which a federal court
knows which way it would rule on the state issue, the court
will nevertheless consider abstaining because it is not confident
that its conclusion is correct and because the harm error would
entail is sufficiently great. In those situations it places no burtion order is required, there should be no difficulty in working out a remedy under
the All Writs Statute ......ALI STUDY, supra note 33 at 291-92. The hardship to
litigants wrongfully ordered into state court militates against a conclusion that appeal
is available only in extraordinary cases; instead the undesirability of review would
seem to support the need for clear standards for abstention, a need met neither by
current law nor by the proposals contained in this Article.
The inequities to litigants in not being able to have erroneous orders of abstention
overturned may well render abstention orders "final" and appealable under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. Cf. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964); Mercantile
Nat'I Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 557-58 (1963); Construction Laborers v. Curry,
371 U.S. 542, 548-52 (1963); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 54547 (1949); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848). But cf. Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S. 454,
456 (1935). Moreover, in cases in which interlocutory injunctions are requested, cf.
Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471 (1970), an order of abstention might be reviewable under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as a refusal of an interlocutory injunction. See Glen Oaks Util., Inc.
v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1960). The same reasoning could allow
Supreme Court review of three-judge court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
And, of course, certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and mandamus or prohibition
under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, would in any event be available in cases to which they are
applicable. If abstention orders generally are considered appealable-as they would
be if the finality rationale were applied despite the absence of a dismissal and despite
the possibility of return to the federal court-then judicial efficiency would be served
by not first deciding the federal issue in the cases discussed in the text only if the
federal constitutional issue were significantly more likely to be appealed than the
abstention issue, or if the constitutional issue required significant factfinding.
124 When the federal constitutional issue is clear, nonsensitive and nondispositive,
and the state issue is clear enough not to warrant abstention, abstention is also improper since a significant lack of clarity in the state issue is a consistent prerequisite
to abstention. See text accompanying notes 80-87 supra; cf.note 120 supra.
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den, whatsoever on the federal court to take account of its
view of the state issue in making its abstention decision.
When it is not clear to the court which way it would rule
on the state issue, however, the suggested approach requires
it to make that decision in order to identify which policy abstention Wiould serve. To some extent even the current approach to abstention requires a federal court to address the
merits of state issues in order to make an abstention decision,
for the court is supposed to abstain only if state law is unclear.
Since current decisions are uninformative concerning exactly
how unclear state law must be, 1 25 that standard may not, in
practice, require the court to make an exacting determination.
The absence of an ascertainable standard should not, however,
be deemed a virtue; a federal judge operating conscientiously
under current doctrine should first decide how unclear state
law is supposed to be for abstention to be ordered and should
then determine whether the state issue before it is that unclear.
The extent to which that process will reflect a determination
of the merits will depend upon how much ambiguity is requisite to abstention. If it were required that state law be utterly
ambiguous for abstention to be ordered, the federal court
would have to decide whether there were any indications concerning the outcome of the state issue before deciding whether
to abstain. The federal court in effect would thereby decide
how it would rule on the merits in the vast majority of the
cases-that is, in all cases other than those which were utterly
ambiguous.
If current standards do permit abstention only in cases of
utter ambiguity, the suggested approach, then, would require
an advance ruling on the merits only in a relatively small
number of additional cases: those in which the state issue is
utterly ambiguous. But to the extent that current standards
sanction abstention when the state issue is less than altogetherambiguous, the number of cases increases in which the suggested approach requires a pre-abstention decision of the state
26
issue that the current approach does not require.1
See notes 76-78 supra & accompanying text.
The following diagrams illustrate the point. In each the state issue is charted
from clearly authorized to clearly unauborized with utter ambiguity at the midpoint.
If, as in Diagram #1, ihe court is required to decide the issue unless it is utterly ambiguous, then in placing the case on the spectrum it effectively decides all state issues
except the utterly ambiguous ones. But if, as in Diagram #2, it can abstain when
125
126
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Even when the state issue is entirely unclear, it is not
troublesome to require the federal court to identify the policy
abstention would serve by determining how it would rule on
the unclear state issue. The. notion of requiring prior determination of an issue in order to analyze functionally the proper
forum for its ultimate decision has analogues in modern conflict-of-laws analysis, which often requires a prior determination of one forum's law in order to analyze whether the law of
the forum governs.' 27 In the abstention context the suggested
procedure is justified because it enables the federal court to
avoid abstention in cases in which it would not serve a valid
purpose. As a general matter, then, the added burden of
making the advance determination seems justified by the burdens it would avoid.
There may be individual cases, however, in which the
balance of advantage differs. If the state issue is such that the
federal court cannot know how it would rule without undertaking a complex factual hearing, it may sometimes be wiser
to forego the advance determination and simply to abstain.
Since, by hypothesis, the state issue is extremely unclear in
such a case, less harm to a state program and a less sensitive
federal constitutional question are necessary to justify abstention than when state law is less ambiguous. If the federal court
can determine that an error would cause the requisite amount
state law is not wholly unclear, the court is not required to determine the placement
on the spectrum of cases falling within the circle demarcating the area appropriate
for abstention. Hence, it need not determine its ruling on the merits in that group
of cases. The less ambiguity required, the fewer rulings on the merits the federal
court will need to make as part of its abstention decision.

T_

clearly authorized

utterly ambiguous
clearly unauthorized

appropriate
for
abstention

clearly authorized

utter"yambiguous

1
-, i o/

-

a
clearly unauthorized

Diagram #1
Diagram #2
Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws takes the position that the
state with the dominant interest on each particular issue should generally have its
law applied on that issue. It recognizes that "the content of the relevant local law
rule of a state may be significant in determining whether this state is the state with
the dominant interest. So, for example, application of a state's statute or common
law rule which would absolve the defendanr from liability could hardly be justified
on the basis of this state's interest in the welfare of the injured plaintiff." I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 at 15 (1971).
127 The
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of each of the harms then, of course, there is no need to
decide the state issue before abstaining. Even if only one of the
policies underlying abstention calls for abstention, however, it
is conceivable that the resources expended on determining
whether abstaining would serve that policy would be greater
than the resources expended by abstaining. If such a case
arose, abstention should be ordered although it could only
serve one policy and that policy might not be at issue in the
case.
The Application of the Abstention Principles to
"Construction Cases"
In construction cases the state law issue is the meaning of
a challenged state enactment, rather than its validity. For
example, Constantineau involved an issue of construction as
well as an authorization issue. While the challenged statute
did not on its face provide for notice and hearing, Justice
Black took the position in a dissenting opinion that "notice
and hearing might be provided by principles of state administrative procedure law similar to the federal Administrative
Procedure Act." 128 He agreed with the other members of the
Court that the statute would be unconstitutional if it did not
allow for notice and hearing, but he thought the Wisconsin
courts should be given an opportunity to construe the statute
so as to avoid both state and federal defects. The case is somewhat unusual for a construction case because the ambiguity
was not evident on the face of the challenged statute but rather was found by Justice Black in other state law; that distinction, however, does not affect the abstention analysis.
Construction cases involve the same policies as authorization cases, but they operate in somewhat different ways. In
construction cases it is generally not possible for the federal
court to determine what constitutional issue to decide without
passing upon the state law issue. Moreover, it may be much
less obvious than in authorization cases which of the abstention
policies abstaining in a particular case may serve. And there
is a possibility in construction cases that does not exist in
authorization cases: In certain cases an erroneous federal decision will not seriously threaten a state program because of
the state's ability to correct it without any delay.
5.

128 400

U.S. at 444.
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a. The Need to Decide the State Law Issue Priorto the Federal Issue
Whether the ambiguity in the challenged state enactment
arises from its language or from other state legislation, a
federal court in the usual construction case must pass on the
issue of the enactment's meaning-or abstain to have the state
system do so-prior to adjudicating the federal constitutional
question. This provides an important difference from authorization cases, in which it is possible for the federal court to
decline to decide the state law issue and proceed to the federal
one, as the majority did on the. authorization issue in Constantineau. The Court did not purport to pass upon the construction issue in Constantineau any more than the authorization one;
it did not mention that either point was "at issue" at all. But the
opinion for the Court did say that on its face the statute did
not require notice and hearing, and the Court had to pass on
the construction issue, whether it recognized it as an issue or
not, simply because the federal constitutional question posed
was dependent upon that issue's prior resolution: If the Court
had adopted the view that Wisconsin law did require notice
and hearing, it would hardly have held the statute unconstitutional for failure to provide those procedural safeguards.
It is the very rare construction case in which the state issue
need not be resolved first. The federal constitutional question
will not require prior resolution of the state issue only if all
possible meanings of the challenged state law are alleged to
violate the same federal constitutional provision in precisely
the same way.1 29 In that situation there is no interest in a ruling
on the state issue, either by the federal court or by state courts
through abstention, prior to a ruling on the federal constitutional question. Much more commonly, however, the possible
state law meanings will pose different federal constitutional
questions, whether under the same constitutional provision or
not; 130 or one or more possible meanings will pose a significant
129 Even if both of two possible meanings present questions under the same constitutional provision, the issues may be different: For example, if both are attacked
as violative of equal protection, the equal protection argument against each meaning
may differ.
130An example based on Constantineau illustrates the situation in which two
possible meanings pose different constitutional problems. Suppose that the state
alleged there was a Wisconsin enactment requiring notice and hearing that should
be read with the posting provision, but it required notice of only five days and explicitly stated that there was no right to present witnesses at the hearing. If the
posting provision were construed to mean that no notice and hearing were necessary,
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constitutional issue while the other or others do not. 13 ' In
those situations it is necessary to decide the state law issue prior to the federal one, implicitly if not explicitly, because the
constitutional question will be dependent upon the resolution
of the state law question.
b.

The Interaction of the Abstention Policies in Construction Cases

In many construction cases it is not possible to isolate in
advance one policy to be served by abstaining. If in Constantineau the construction issue is the one Justice Black describedwhether Wisconsin law provides for notice and hearing-and
a constitutional issue is raised only on the theory that it does
not so provide, then if the federal court would rule that notice
and hearing are not provided but abstains because it is unsure
of that view, abstention will serve the interest of avoiding a
federal constitutional question. But such abstention may also
avoid illegitimate interference with a state law program, since
if the federal court's holding that state law does not require
notice and hearing is erroneous, the court may possibly strike
down as violative of federal due process a state enactment
that properly construed is constitutional. A state court holding
that notice and hearing are required, therefore, would avoid
the federal constitutional issue and might, as well, prevent
the state statute from being stricken down erroneously.
In some factual contexts, however, abstention in construction cases will serve only one of the abstention policies. If in
Constantineau the federal court would rule that the statute
does require notice and hearing, and if no constitutional issue
were raised with respect to the adequacy of notice and hearing, the federal court would avoid the only constitutional question without abstaining. In that case the only policy that abstaining could serve would be avoiding unwarranted interference with the state program. If the federal court were in
error in holding that state law provided for notice and hearing,
and if its decision were taken to mean that the state must therethe federal constitutionality of the failure to provide notice and hearing would be
at issue. If, on the other hand, it were read in conjunction with the notice and hearing provision that the state argued for, the federal issue would be the constitutionality of the particular notice and hearing provided.
131 Constantineau itself was a case in which there was a serious constitutional
problem if one meaning of the statute was adopted, and no constitutional problem
-at least none that was raised-if the other meaning (that notice and hearing were
necessary) was chosen.
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after provide them, the federal decision might unduly and
illegitimately interfere with a state program. For if the state
statutory scheme in fact did not so require and if that statutory
scheme were constitutionally proper-and we cannot assume it
would not be proper since we have, by hypothesis, avoided deciding that federal constitutional question-then the federal
court would have imposed an unwanted and unwarranted condition upon the statute's operation.
In the Constantineau example, therefore, a federal judge
can learn something about which policies abstention may
serve by ascertaining which way he would rule upon the state
construction issue. As in authorization cases, abstention will
serve no purpose unless he is wrong on his state law holding.
If he would erroneously rule that notice and hearing are not
required, he may serve both policies behind abstention by
abstaining or he may serve only the policy against needless
constitutional adjudication. If he would rule that notice and
hearing are required, abstention can serve only the policy
against illegitimate interference with state law programs.
The above analysis of Constantineau is typical for construction cases in which one possible construction of the state law
at issue presents a constitutional problem while the other possible construction presents none. If, instead, each of the possible constructions presents a constitutional issue, then it is
less likely that determining which way he would rule on the
construction issue if he did not abstain will significantly advance
a judge's inquiry into what policy he may serve by abstaining.
Whichever way he rules he may, if in error, illegitimately
limit a state program or unnecessarily decide a federal constitutional question, or both.
As in cases in which only one construction presents a
constitutional issue, a state program may suffer illegitimately
whichever way the federal court rules on a state construction
issue, if its ruling is erroneous. The court may erroneously
construe the state provision to raise a constitutional question
under which it is invalid. Or it may erroneously construe the
provision to avoid the constitutional issue when even if otherwise construed, it would pass constitutional scrutiny, thereby
imposing upon the state program unrequired conditions.
Whether the imposition has serious consequences for the program depends upon the magnitude of the federal court deviation from what the state court would hold; the importance
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of the matter on which it deviates; and the vulnerability of
the program's objectives to delay.
Moreover, when each of two possible constructions raises
a different constitutional issue, a federal constitutional question
will be decided unnecessarily if the federal court rules erroneously in either direction. Once the federal court decides the
state law issue erroneously, it will decide the wrong federal
constitutional question-one that could have been avoided
by correct decision of the state law issue-though it will avoid
for the time being decision of the other constitutional issue,
the one that is actually implicated in the case. Unnecessary
decision of a federal constitutional question can still be avoided
by prior correct decision of the state law issue, therefore, in
the sense that any particular federal constitutional question
can be avoided.' 32 When each of two possible constructions
raises a constitutional issue, federal error on the state issue
will not result in unnecessary federal constitutional adjudication only when both possible meanings are alleged to violate
the same constitutional provision in precisely the same way,
and that is the unusual situation in which it is unnecessary to
133
decide the state issue prior to the federal one.
The impossibility in many construction cases of isolating
one policy that abstention may serve necessarily affects the
process by which a federal judge should analyze whether to
abstain. But even in cases in which either or both abstention
policies may be served whichever way the federal judge rules,
the judge can profit by determining before abstaining which
way he would rule if he did not abstain and by deciding from
that perspective whether the likelihood of abstention serving
a purpose is sufficient to justify its costs, If there are two possible constitutional issues in a case, one raised by meaning X
of the state enactment and one raised by meaning Y, the one
raised by Y may be a sensitive issue that is important to avoid if
at all possible, whereas the one raised by meaning X may not
be sensitive at all. In such a case it would be more important,
for the purpose of avoiding federal constitutional adjudication,
for a federal judge to abstain if in the absence of abstention he
would rule that Y were the state law meaning than if he would
rule it were X. Of course since either ruling could also adversely
132But

cf. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964).

133 See note 129 supra & accompanying text.
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affect a state law program, the fact that the constitutional issue
is not a sensitive one should not in this setting be controlling.
If meaning X is not sensitive because it is clearly unconstitutional but it is not at all clear whether meaning X is the correct meaning, abstention might avoid invalidation of the statute. 1 34 Or

if meaning X is likely to be found constitutional but that meaning may narrow the statute in an important respect that the
state may not have intended, the illegitimate interference with
a state program that adopting that meaning would cause might
justly lead the federal court to abstain.
As in authorization cases, it may be justifiable in construction cases to abstain somewhat more readily when it appears
that the case will turn ultimately on the state law issue and
need not return to the federal forum than when it appears
that a constitutional question will survive the state court adjudication, since in the former cases abstention is likely to be
less expensive to the parties than in the latter. When each of
two possible constructions is attacked as unconstitutional,
however, this distinction cannot operate; in all such cases a
judge should be slightly less ready to abstain. When one is
attacked as unconstitutional and the other is not, a judge should
be slightly more ready to abstain when he believes indications
are that the state judiciary would choose the meaning that
does not raise the constitutional issue than when he believes
the state judiciary would rule in such a way that the constitutional issue remains. Of course, the clearer it is that the
state judiciary would choose a particular meaning, the less
necessary is abstention, for the federal judge need fear less
that he would be in error. Moreover, if the judge considers
state law utterly ambiguous, the suggested distinction should
not operate, since, in cases of utter ambiguity, the ruling he
would make is in no way predictive of whether the state
judiciary would dispose finally of the controversy. As in authorization cases, it is only when state law is neither clear nor
utterly ambiguous that a federal judge should abstain more
readily when indications are that state courts will dispose finally of the controversy than when indications of equal weight
suggest that a constitutional question will survive the state
adjudication.
'

34

But cf. text accompanying notes 140-43 infra.
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c. Abstention in Cases of Clear Federal Unconstitutionality to
Allow the State to Save Its Program
In Constantineau the suggestion that Wisconsin state courts
could construe their statute to require notice and hearing was
put forward by Justice Black even though the state had not
argued that its statute could be so construed and even though
Justice Black knew of no particular state provision that might
provide the needed procedural safeguards. He thought nevertheless that, given the chance, the Wisconsin courts would correct the statute by finding the safeguards in "the body of
other state law" simply because without those safeguards the
statute was blatantly unconstitutional. 135 Even though clear
federal unconstitutionality should not support abstaining so
that state courts may hold that state law does not authorize
a challenged enactment, 136 clear federal unconstitutionality
might arguably support abstention in construction cases. For if a
federal court correctly predicts that the clear unconstitutionality of one construction of the state enactment will lead the
state court to adopt the other construction, abstention would
appear to serve the interest of 'saving a statute that would
otherwise be ruled in violation of the Federal Constitution.
It probably is true that when a state enactment is obviously
unconstitutional if read one way and can survive if read
another, a state court is likely to give it the constitutional
reading. In construction cases involving a choice between two
possible meanings of a state enactment, each of which seems
relatively plausible, the element of clear federal unconstitutionality of one meaning probably, therefore, justifies the
federal court itself deciding that the state courts would adopt
the constitutional meaning, instead of abstaining for that state
decision. But when the construction that quite clearly appears
federally unconstitutional also quite clearly appears to be
correct-either on the face of the enactment or on the basis
of state law generally-difficulties inhere in federal court
decision of the state issue. A state court in that situation might
well choose to strain the meaning of the state enactment in
order to preserve its constitutionality.' 37 The incentive to do
135 400 U.S. at 445.
136 See note 111 supra.

137For a case in which a state supreme court "performed a remarkable job of
plastic surgery upon the face of the ordinance" by giving it "an extraordinarily nar-
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so will, of course, be greatest when the enactment concerns
a program of importance to the state and one that would
suffer much from interruption. 13 8 It seems preferable for a
federal court to abstain to allow the state judiciary to adopt a
relatively implausible construction than for the federal court
to render that result itself. There may well be limits on the
extent to which state courts will strain the meaning of statutes
to adopt a constitutional construction, and the federal court is
apt to lack guidance concerning the range of those limits. It
would be an illegitimate interference with state policy to require a statute to conform to constitutional requisites if state
officials would prefer no statute at all. And even if a federal
judge confidently believes that the state court would adopt a
constitutional construction, it may be difficult to document
that belief on the basis of traditional legal evidence, evidence
he may feel is particularly important when he is interpreting
state law to bear a meaning other than its evident one. Finally,
it may be difficult to predict the manner in which the state
judicial system will construe state law when a strained construction is necessary; a federal decision on a different ground
than the state decision would be may have a scope quite different than the state decision it precludes. Even if a federal
court confidently believes that the state judiciary will construe
a challenged state enactment very freely in order to preserve
it against constitutional attack, therefore, it may justifiably
conclude that the state instead of the federal judiciary should
39
reach that result.'
d. The State's Ability to Correct Some Erroneous Decisions
Through AdministrativeAction
Although a federal court may feel unable itself to adopt
a strained construction even when it believes state courts would
do so, in some situations it may be possible instead for it simply to adopt the apparent and unconstitutional reading of the
row construction," see Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150, 153 (1969).
138 Other factors increasing the incentive would be that the strained construction
that must be adopted either (I) allows the maximum that is constitutionally permissible for the state so that it does not unnecessarily limit the state program or (2)
does not deviate in any way that seems of great importance to the state from the
apparent construction or at least from the closest thing to it that is constitutionally
permissible.
139 This reasoning may conceivably support the decision to abstain in Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
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state enactment without causing any significant harm to state
interests. Constantineau is a case in which abstention for the
purpose of saving the state enactment or avoiding interference
with its operation would have been inappropriate because it
wasAinnecessary; even if the federal court was in error in its
state law ruling, the state should have been able to correct the
error without delaying the enforcement of its posting statute.
It is generally the case that a state can save its statutory
program when a state statute may be construed to be either
constitutional or unconstitutional and a federal court erroneously adopts an unconstitutional construction. One obvious
method is legislative enactment of another statute in which
the construction the legislature desires is explicit, a method
that is available whether the federal court's reading of the
earlier statute was correct or erroneous. A second method is
to take the issue of the statute's meaning to state court. Both
methods, however, require the elimination of the state program pending the corrective measures; it is wrongful interference during that period that abstention is designed to prevent.
If after the federal decision in Constantineau, however, the
state attorney general believed, with Justice Black, that the
Supreme Court was wrong in holding that state law did not
require notice and hearing, or even if he believed simply that
a plausible argument could be made to that effect, he should
have been able to effectuate those requirements without delay
by simply informing those enforcing the statute not to invoke
it without providing notice and hearing. 140 In a situation like
Constantineau, there is no federal-law bar to having state officials thus save the statute by operating under it without its
140The possibility of a state through administrative action correcting an erroneous federal court ruling without delay exists only in construction cases. In authorization cases state officers cannot ever wholly remedy a federal court error on state
law without judicial or legislative proceedings. Even when the federal court erroneously invalidates a state enactment because of a provision that can be removed
without abandoning the entire statutory program, the federal court's error illegitimately limits the state's program. Suppose, for example, that the issue is the legality
under state and federal law of a posting procedure that does not provide for notice
and hearing, and that the federal court avoids the federal constitutional issue by
ruling that the state constitution invalidates the procedure. If the federal court is
in error in construing the state constitution to require notice and hearing, then even
though state officials can save the state program by providing those safeguards, the
federal court has illegitimately imposed those procedures upon the state. Only if
the Federal Constitution as well requires the procedures-an issue the court has by
hypothesis not decided-has the court not wrongfully limited the state program.
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constitutional defects. The injunction issued pursuant to the
federal decision of unconstitutionality should not extend beyond prohibiting enforcement of the statute without notice
and hearing; if it does, the order should be amendable on
the motion of the proper state official. Admittedly, the Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional and not simply
the police chief's conduct, but the only reason it did so was
that it deemed state law to be correctly reflected in the actions
of the state officials, and state officials need not accept the
federal interpretation.
Of course, erroneous construction decisions are not always
correctible at an administrative level; there are instances in
which it would offend a federal interest for a state to continue
to enforce in any way a statute that the federal system has
held unconstitutional. 14 1 Whether a program is administratively correctible will often be a difficult issue in itself. In making
that determination, a court must ask whether, on the facts of
the particular program, any person may be detrimentally affected by state alteration of the federal construction at an
administrative instead of a judicial level. Constantineau appears
to satisfy that criterion because no federally protected interest
is impinged upon by having a statute that does not reflect that
notice and hearing will be provided if in fact those safeguards
142
are provided.
Whenever a program is administratively correctible-not
simply in situations of clear federal unconstitutionality-abstention should not be ordered for the purpose of avoiding inter14' An obvious example
unconstitutionally overbroad
regulated. See, e.g., Cramp
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310

is a federal court holding a statute regulating speech
because it proscribes some activities that cannot be so
v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961);
U.S. 88 (1940). When the overbreadth inheres in the

wording of the statute, it is unlikely that state officials could constitutionally save

the statute by enforcing it simply where the regulation was permissible; nor, indeed,
in all probability, could the state judiciary save the statute by construing it to apply
only to the nonprotected conduct. As a matter of federal constitutional law, there
is an interest in not having on the books an enactment that appears to regulate first
amendment activity that it is not permitted to regulate, thus "chilling" constitutionally protected conduct. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87, 494 (1965).
142 The only argument that administrative instead of judicial correction in Constantineau might violate procedural due process is that persons aware of the Supreme
Court's apparent voiding of the statute would not have notice that any posting procedure remained. Even if a state could not constitutionally have a posting procedure
without embodying it in statutory form, however, the argument fails, for if persons
are deemed to have notice of the Supreme Court decision they should also be deemed
to have notice of the limits of the decision's effect, and one of those is its ability to
be corrected at an administrative level.
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ference with the program, since an erroneous federal adjudication does not necessitate its interruption. But there is the
difficulty that state officials may not feel free so to act on the
interpretation of state law that the federal court has rejected.
They may be unaware that federal law leaves them that option;
or state law may in fact preclude correction of a federal error
except through the state judiciary or legislature. State officials'
ignorance can be handled by enlightenment, but state law preclusion of administrative correction presents a more difficult
problem. Such state provisions causing the federal decision
to have a disruptive effect might be ignored by the federal
system as matters of state choice. 1 4 3 When a federal court is
aware, however, that as a practical matter its decision, if wrong,
could seriously hamper an important state program, that reality may influence it to abstain.
6.

The Application of the Abstention Policies in Cases
Apparently Involving Construction in Which
Conduct Under Authority of the Ambiguous
Provision Is Also at Issue
The discussion of construction cases has concerned the
situation in which a plaintiff challenges a state enactment
under the Federal Constitution and it is not clear what that
enactment means. When in addition conduct has occurred
under the authority of the enactment and the plaintiff's constitutional challenge is leveled at the enactment on the theory
that its meaning is consistent with such conduct, the analysis
changes. Constantineau again provides an example. Assume
that Justice Black was correct in believing that the body of
Wisconsin law did not clarify whether the challenged statute
contemplated a notice and hearing procedure or not. It was
nevertheless clear that the chief of police had acted without
providing notice and hearing in Ms. Constantineau's case, affecting her rights just as if his interpretation of the statute
were a correct one. Because he had acted in the manner alleged to be unconstitutional, abstention was less appropriate
than if no such action under the enactment had taken place.
Of all the types of cases considered in this Article, the
143 Since the interest protected by abstaining for this purpose is solely that of
the state, it is not problematic for the state to have within its control the ability to
waive that protection. See text accompanying notes 196-204 infra.
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argument for abstention is most persuasive when the meaning
of the challenged enactment is ambiguous and no action taken
under the enactment is challenged. In those cases, even if the
plaintiff's argument as to federal unconstitutionality is a correct one, it is not certain that any unconstitutional state action
has taken place. 144 If in Constantineau, before the police chief
had taken any action, the plaintiff had attacked the statute's
constitutionality because of its apparent failure to provide
procedural safeguards, there would be no unconstitutional
state action, even assuming the plaintiff's constitutional contention was sound, if the plaintiff was wrong on her state law
point that the statutory scheme did not provide notice and
hearing. If in that situation the federal court made an erroneous state law ruling, it would render a totally hypothetical
federal constitutional decision-one relating to a state law situation that simply did not exist. That cannot result in cases
in which a state official has acted in accordance with the challenged meaning. In Constantineau as it actually occurred, there
is no doubt that if it is unconstitutional not to provide notice
and hearing, unconstitutional state action had taken place.
The only unknown is whether the unconstitutional action is
attributable to the state legislature or solely to the chief of
145
police.
An argument can be made that in the situation in which
the police chief has acted a court should necessarily pass upon
the constitutionality of that action instead of abstaining. In
that situation, the argument runs, one or the other of two hypotheses is true, and under neither is abstention proper. If
the interpretation of the enactment that the police chief acted
on does in fact reflect the enactment's meaning, abstention
is unnecessary because a federal court passing on the constitutionality of that interpretation by hypothesis will make no
' Many such cases may accordingly involve issues of ripeness or standing. It is
not necessary, however, for a case to be justiciable, that the challenged enactment
have been acted upon. Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
'14 The same point may be conceptualized as a difference in the ambiguity of
the challenged state action in the two instances. In both the case in which the suit
is brought before the police chief's action and the one in which it is brought after
the action, the state enactment is ambiguous as to whether notice and hearing are
required. In the latter instance, however, though the statute is ambiguous, there is
state action that is the subject of attack as to which there is no ambiguity: the conduct of the chief of police, who invoked the procedure without the procedural
safeguards.
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error in interpreting state law. And if instead the police chief's
action does not reflect the statute's meaning, abstention is
improper, according to the argument, because the constitutional attack is not levied against the enactment but simply
against conduct by a state official. If Pullman abstention is
improper when it is an individual state official's action that
is the object of the constitutional attack, a per se rule against
abstention in the category of cases under discussion would
therefore follow.
The Pullman doctrine has not generally been invoked
when it is an individual official's conduct that is challenged,
and a case can be made that the doctrine is concerned with
constitutional attacks on state enactments and not simply on
unconstitutional conduct by state officials. 14 6 But any such
limitation on the doctrine would be irrational. Its rationale
could not be simply that, the state official having acted, no
ambiguity concerning the allegedly unconstitutional state action exists; 147 that rationale would distinguish such cases from
construction cases in which no conduct under the challenged
enactment has occurred, but it does not distinguish them from
authorization cases. In authorization cases as well, the chal146 Such a limitation does exist in the jurisdiction of three-judge courts. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 2281-82 (1970). Supreme Court cases do not discuss whether it is a limitation on Pullman abstention as well, but they almost invariably involve challenges to
enactments or administrative orders and not solely individual officials' action. Some
commentators refer to Pullman abstention as applicable to challenges to "state legislative or administrative action." See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 33, at 282, 284;
Wechsler, supra note 29, at 229. But "administrative action" may well embrace the
actions of individual officials. If abstention were permissible for constitutional challenges to individual actions, it should perhaps have been considered in a case like
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in which the plaintiffs, who sought damages
under the Federal Civil Rights Act against Chicago police officers, might have raised
similar claims under the Illinois statutes and constitution. Id. at 172. Either abstaining or deciding state issues might have enabled the federal court to avoid constitutional decisionmaking if the state damage remedy was as extensive as the federal
remedy and if the two were exclusive of each other. Yet without mention of the possibility, the Court proceeded to the federal issues. That the petitioners raised only
federal issues is insufficient to explain why abstention was not considered, for in
other contexts abstention has been considered on the Court's own motion when no
claim under state law was made. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971) (dissenting opinions); cf. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See text accompanying notes 196-98 infra. The fact that
the suit was for damages rather than an injunction likewise does not explain the
failure to consider abstaining. See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970),
and text accompanying notes 177-95 infra. And no exception to the Pullman abstention doctrine exists for actions brought under the Civil Rights Act. See Harrison v.
NAACP,
360 U.S. 167 (1950); notes 162-66 infra & accompanying text.
7
14 See note 145 supra.
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lenged state action-though it is a state enactment rather than
an individual official's action-may be perfectly clear and the
uncertain question of state law is whether that action is authorized. Cases attacking an individual official's conduct can thus
be conceptualized as authorization cases; the state law issue is
whether the official's conduct was consistent with state law or
inconsistent with it.
If there is to be a difference in treatment between the cases
under discussion and authorization cases that are appropriate
for abstention, it must center solely on the fact that it is an
individual state officer's action which is attacked as unconstitutional in one category of cases and which may or may not be
consistent with state law, while in the other category of cases
it is a state enactment which is attacked as unconstitutional and
which may or may not be consistent with state law. It may
appear plausible to maintain this differentiation for abstention
purposes because one objective of the Pullman doctrine is to
protect against improvident interference with ongoing state
programs that reflect state legislative policy. While state statutes and administrative orders represent ongoing programs
and reflect state legislative policy, an individual official's action,
14 8
if not sanctioned by statute, does not rise to that level.
But this difference would affect the way that the abstention policies operate in the two categories of cases only if it
meant that, in cases challenging individual officials' actions,
an ongoing state program that reflected state legislative policy
could not be harmed by an erroneous federal court ruling. If
that were true, it would mean that, in cases involving individual officers' conduct, the only policy that abstention could
serve would be avoidance of unnecessary federal constitutional
adjudication, whereas in cases involving state enactments either
policy behind the abstention doctrine could be served. It is
unclear why, even if that were true, abstention should be precluded, since in any particular authorization case abstention
will serve only one of the policies behind the Pullman doctrine.' 4 9 But in any event, it is not correct that a state legislative program cannot be adversely affected in an illegitimate
way by an erroneous state law decision in a case involving a
148Cf Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941), applying the similar limitation in the three-judge court act. See note 146 supra.
149See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra & text accompanying notes 169-76
infra.
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constitutional attack on an individual state official's action.
If the federal court erroneously decides that the official's conduct is not authorized, it thereby interprets state law to be
narrower than it is and binds the state by that adjudication to
the same extent as in other authorization cases.' 5 0
Of course, when individual conduct is the subject of challenge, if the federal court rules that the conduct is inconsistent
with state law and it is correct in that ruling, no state legislative
policy will suffer; only a deviation from that policy on the part
of an individual officer, or a group of individual officers, will
be stricken down. Cases like Pullman in which state enactments
are at issue differ. In those cases, state legislative policy will
be stricken down even if the federal court is correct in its state
law ruling, though by hypothesis it will be a state legislative
policy that, for other reasons of state law, it was illegitimate
for the enacting body to make. But this difference between
cases involving state enactments and those involving individual
officials should not affect the application of the abstention
doctrine, since that doctrine's purposes are accomplished only
in the event that the federal court is incorrect in its state law
holding.
In short, abstention should be ordered in cases involving
challenges to individual officials' actions on the same basis that
it is ordered in authorization cases; in both these categories
the case for abstention is weaker than in construction cases
151
in which conduct has not occurred.
150 To use the Constantineau example, a federal court that avoided the federal
constitutional question and held that state law precluded the police chief from acting
without notice and hearing would, if it was wrong about the meaning of state law,
narrow the meaning of the state statute. Unless the state statute happened in any
event to be federally unconstitutional, it would thereby illegitimately narrow the
state program.
15t While the hypothetical character of a federal decision makes abstention most
appropriate in construction cases where conduct has not occurred, see text accompanying notes 144-45 supra, on that ground it is roughly equally appropriate in
authorization cases and in construction cases where conduct has occurred. Perhaps
as a category, the last group is slightly less appropriate for abstention than authorization cases, for in construction cases in which conduct has occurred, by definition,
a state official has necessarily affected the plaintiff in the same way as if his action
were authorized. In authorization cases, that may or may not be the situation. On the
facts of Pullman, for example, porters might or might not be already affected by the
state action challenged as unconstitutional, depending upon whether it had already
been put into effect.
The effect on the parties of delaying adjudication should be taken into account
in an abstention decision, but more is involved than simply inquiring whether the
allegedly unconstitutional action currently affects them. It should also be relevant
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7. Summary of Suggested Rules for Applying Current
Requirements That State Law Be Unclear and That It Be
Susceptible to an Interpretation That Would Avoid a
Federal Constitutional Question
a. Authorization Cases
Before abstaining in an authorization case, the federal
judge should ascertain whether abstaining will serve any purpose by determining which way he would rule on the state law
issue in the absence of abstention. If he would hold the program unauthorized, so that abstention might prevent interference with a state program, he should ascertain also whether
the program would suffer irreparable harm from interruption.
The greater the harm, the more this factor weighs in favor of
abstention; but in any event a significant degree of harm
should be required. Similarly, if the judge would hold the
program authorized, so that abstention might avoicd unnecessary constitutional adjudication, he should determir whether
the constitutional question is one that it is especially lesirable
to avoid adjudicating. The more desirable it is to avoid, the
more this factor weighs in favor of abstention.
When a constitutional question is not particularly difficult
or sensitive and would dispose of the case, the federal court
should not abstain regardless of how unclear state law is and
how it would rule on the state law issue. Instead (unless the
state issue is even clearer than the federal issue and also is
dispositive), it should rest its decision on the federal issue. But
the rules may differ if the federal issue, though clear and not
sensitive, is also not dispositive. In that case, it may be permissible to order abstention if the state issue is unclear and the
federal court would hold the enactment unauthorized, 152 but
not if the issue is clear or if the court would hold it authorized.
how important is the respect in which it affects them and how much swift adjudication
will ameliorate their situation. For those reasons and because authorization cases
can involve completed state conduct, it seems desirable in deciding whether to abstain to inquire in each case whether the parties' situation is or is not one in which
swift adjudication is particularly desirable to them, rather thaA to make abstention
more readily available in authorization cases as a class than in cases involving completed conduct by individual officials. Similar reasoning supports not limiting 'abstention to construction cases in which conduct has not occurred. See note 173 infra.
152 The permissibility of abstention in this situation depends largely upon the
appealability of abstention orders. See note 123 supra.
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The above factors usually require a federal judge to determine how he would rule in a particular case before he decides
the abstention question. Even if state law is entirely ambiguous,
so the judge lacks any confidence that his ruling is correct,
by making the determination he can eliminate purposeless
abstention. The judge can avoid prejudging the state issue
if he decides that the facts of the case warrant abstention to
fulfill either abstention policy. Or, in the very rare case, he
may conclude that the costs of determining the state issue
prior to abstaining outweigh the costs of a possibly purposeless abstention.
While the necessity of prejudging the state issue generally
obtains no matter how unclear that issue is, there is another
abstention factor that is relevant only when the state issue
though still unclear is not wholly ambiguous: In cases involving
such a state issue, the argument for abstention is somewhat
stronger if the enactment appears unauthorized than if it
appears 'athorized. If the indications of how state courts
would r(' are strong, however, abstention is improper because th. likelihood of an erroneous federal result is slight. 15
153The following diagram suggests some of the factors relating to abstention
decisions in authorization cases:
State Law

Constitutional question
Fed. CL would hold
authorized

clearly authorized

Fed. CLwould hold
unauthorized

dearly constitutional
basis of established
not otherwise sens~w

Abstention
possible
only
when
case
falls
in gray area on
both issues. (if

-the

tsate
pr- ran from
delay
no harm great harm

dearly unL_ authorized

clearly unconstitutional on
the basis of established law
and not otherwise sensitive

lighter area,
the case for abstention is aided
if the other is
rin
the darker
area. If both
issues are in
the fringe areas
abstention may
be improper.)

Cases involving state law authorization are placed on the "state law" spectrum according to how clear the state law issue appears to the federal judge. The spectrum
extends from clearly authorized to clearly unauthorized state enactments, with the
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b.

Construction Cases
If there are two possible readings of the state law at issue
and if both meanings are alleged to violate the same federal
constitutional provision in precisely the same way, abstention
is inappropriate, and regardless of the ambiguity of the state
law issue, the federal court should proceed immediately to the
federal constitutional question. In the usual case in which the
court must first decide the state law issue, however, it should
abstain only if that issue is very unclear. Even then the federal
court should not abstain if two conditions both exist: first, if
the state law meaning the federal court would adopt is either
clearly unconstitutional or clearly constitutional on the basis
of established and nonsensitive federal constitutional doctrine;
second, if the state program is such that an erroneous federal
court construction can be corrected without delay, or if the
program will not suffer any irreparable harm from any delay
caused by the error limiting or invalidating it. In that situation, though there may be error on the state law issue, it cannot
significantly affect any interest that the abstention doctrine is
designed to protect. It should be noted that where the federal
issue is clear and not sensitive, no differentiation is made
among cases according to how the constitutional issue would be
decided. Construction cases are unlike authorization cases in
this respect because in construction cases, whichever way the
federal court rules on the federal issue, its ruling will dispose
of the controversy.
Abstention should be permissible when state law is highly
ambiguous and the above conditions are not present. The
degree of ambiguity required may be less as the sensitivity
of the federal constitutional issue increases, or as the harm to
the state program that an erroneous federal construction might
cause increases; but in any event substantial ambiguity is
1 54
required.
Abstention is slightly more justifiable when it appears
that the state court decision will be dispositive-that it will
cases where state law is utterly ambiguous on the authorization issue falling in the
middle. The federal constitutional issue-whether the challenged state enactment,
authorized by state law or not, violates the Constitution-is placed on a similar spectrum according to the degree to which it appears clear and/or sensitive to the judge
making the abstention decision.
154 The following diagram embodies the principles thus far articulated:
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choose a state meaning to which no constitutional challenge
is made-than when it does not. Finally, when a state program
appears clearly unconstitutional in some respects but is a program that a strained construction of state law might save and
that would be important to state interests to save, abstention
may be proper to enable the state judiciary so to save the program, if the program is one that cannot be corrected at an
administrative level.
Construction Cases in Which Conduct Under the Ambiguous
Enactment Is Also at Issue.
Abstention should operate in the same manner in these
cases as in authorization cases.

c.

C. A CountervailingFactor-TheRelevance of a Public Interest
in Swift Adjudication of the Federal ConstitutionalIssue
Even when the factors suggested above would mandate
abstention, the nature of the federal constitutional issue should
Constitutional question
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When constitutional issue is in gray area, abstention is permissible
only when state law issue is in gray area.
When constitutional issue is in black-bordered area, abstention is permissible
w,,henstate law issue is anywhere in black-bordered area.
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sometimes preclude it. There is some recognition in the case
law on abstention that the impact of a delay in the adjudication
of federal rights should be a separate factor in a decision
56
55
whether to abstain. In Baggett v. Bullitt1 and Zwickler v. Koota,1
for example, the Court held abstention improper not only on
the ground that the statutes there involved were not reasonably susceptible to a construction that would avoid the constitutional questions at issue, but also because "in [first amendment cases] . . . to force the plaintiff who has commenced a
federal action to suffer the delay of state court proceedings
might itself effect the impermissible chilling of the very constitutional right he seeks to protect."'157 And Harman v. Forssenius15 s involved an attack on the constitutionality of newly
promulgated state voting provisions requiring, as a condition
of voting in federal elections, that a person either pay a poll
tax or file a certificate of residence six months before the
election. The Court said it was proper not to abstain, not only
because the state statutes were clear, but also because the deprivation alleged was "fundamental," the "civil rights of a broad
class of citizens" were affected, and the forthcoming election
made the problem an immediate one. 5 9
Since there were independent reasons not to abstain in
all the cases suggesting the nature of the federal question as
a factor in abstention decisions, it is not definitively settled
that such a factor exists. In any event the factor should be
recognized; harmful public consequences resulting from abstention should be weighed in the balance against the public
injury that the abstention is designed to prevent. Clearly, when
the interest abstention would serve is avoiding federal constitutional adjudication, a court should consider, facts affirmatively
calling for swift constitutional decision in deciding whether
to abstain. The same should be true when-the other abstention
policy is at stake. Just as there may be an especially strong
state need in a particular situation not to have the status quo
erroneously changed, so in some situations there may be par155377 U.S. 360 (1964).

156389 U.S. 241 (1967).
157 389 U.S. at 252. See also 377 U.S. at 379 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 151 (1959)).
158 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
59
lId. at 537. See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90, 491-92
(1965), discussed in note 166 infra.
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ticular need to change the status quo rapidly, when that is to
be the ultimate and the correct disposition; in that event the
federal interest in expeditious decision should be balanced
160
against the state interest.
The question remains which federal issues show particular
need for swift adjudication. The answer depends in part upon
the factual situation in each particular case just as the factor
of harm to a state program does. First amendment issues and
issues pertaining to racial discrimination may be the most obvious candidates for especially expeditious treatment, as Baggett, Zwickler, and Harman might indicate. Some commentators
have considered the need for speedy decision of particular
federal issues sufficiently great that they have recommended
to Congress a per se rule precluding abstention when those
issues are raised. 16 1 And some language in McNeese v. Board
of Education 62 could support an argument that section 1983
(civil rights) actions are a court-imposed exception to the abstention doctrine. 1 63 That interpretation would create an enormous exception to Pullman abstention, for today virtually all
constitutional challenges to action under color of state law can
160It may, of course, happen that some issues calling for swift adjudication are
also "sensitive," so that the nature of the constitutional issue theoretically cuts both
for and against abstention in the same case. Or possible harm to a state program that
might be avoided by abstaining may cut in favor of abstention though an interest in
deciding the federal constitutional question cuts against it. These observations militate against a per se rule and in favor of decisions on a case-by-case basis, in which
all relevant factors can be balanced.
161 When advocating a general rule that the presence of an adequate state remedy should require a litigant to use the state rather than the federal forum, Professor
Wechsler also suggested an exception for "the rights of action specially conferred by
Congress in the Civil Rights Laws," because "Congress has declared the historic
judgment that within this precious area, often calling for a trial by jury, there is to
be no slightest risk of nullification by state process." Wechsler, supra note 29 at 230.
The American Law Institute has made an exception to its abstention proposal, discussed in note 33 supra, for "actions to redress the denial, under color of any State
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of the right to vote or of the
equal protection of the laws, if such denial is alleged to be on the basis of race, creed,
color, or national origin," ALI STUDY, supra note 33, § 1371(g), at 50, because "there
is an especially strong national interest in a federal forum for such cases." Id. at 297.
162 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
163 In McNeese the plaintiffs, who were black, claimed they were racially segregated in the Illinois public schools, and sought to enjoin such segregation. The
state provided an administrative remedy for racial segregation, which the plaintiffs
had not exhausted. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could come directly
to federal court, bypassing both state administrative and judicial remedies. Justice
Douglas said for the Court:
Where strands of local law are woven into the case that is before the
federal court, we have directed a District Court to refrain temporarily from
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be brought under the Civil Rights Act.' 6 4 The language in,
McNeese seems too slight a peg on which to hang the exception,
and other cases do not support a per se exception either for
exercising its jurisdiction until a suit could be brought in the state court. See
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496; Thompson v. Magnolia Co.,
309 U.S. 478; Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167. Thus we have stayed the
hands of a Federal District Court when it sought to enjoin enforcement of
a state administrative order enforcing state law, since any federal question
could be reviewed when the case came here through the hierarchy of state
courts. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315. The variations on the theme have
been numerous.
We have, however, in the present case no underlying issue of state law
controlling this litigation. The right alleged is as plainly federal in origin and
nature as those vindicated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. Nor
is the federal right in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must
be untangled before the federal case can proceed. For petitioners assert
that respondents have been and are depriving them of rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is immaterial whether respondents' conduct
is legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 171-187.
Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts. Monroe
v. Pape, supra, at 183; Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, affirming 142 F. Supp.
707; Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271. Cf., e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649; Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933, affirming 81 F. Supp. 872; Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350.
373 U.S. at 673-74 (footnote omitted).
As Pullman analysis, the reasoning seems faulty. The Pullman requirement is
more than that "strands of local law are woven into the case that is before the federal
court." And McNeese does not escape being appropriate for Pullman abstention for
the reason Justice Douglas gives. It is not true in the Pullman sense that there was
present "no underlying issue of state law controlling [the] litigation," simply because
the right the plaintiffs invoked was federal. The state issue was "controlling" in the
same way as in Pullman: if it was decided in a particular fashion, it would dispose
of the controversy and make decision of the federal constitutional question unnecessary.
The fact that McNeese did consider it "immaterial whether respondents' conduct
is legal or illegal as a matter of state law" might, however, be taken to state a rule
of Pullman abstention that is peculiar to civil rights cases. It might be taken to mean
that in civil rights cases a federal court should never invoke Pullman abstention if
the state law issue is whether the state rule complained of is authorized. Or McNeese
might be taken to state the still broader rule that in any case in which there is jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, abstention should not be ordered, for state
law is deemed not controlling and immaterial; the right to the federal forum is
absolute. Under either of these approaches, abstention could have been avoided in
the Pullman case itself if only the parties had invoked the Civil Rights Act as a ground
of jurisdiction. (The difference between the cases-that in Pullman the plaintiffs
raised state as well as federal claims while in McNeese they raised only federal claims
-should not be dispositive. See text accompanying notes 196-98 infra.)
164See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). Prior to that
decision it appeared that suits could be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the statute
conferring jurisdiction over civil rights actions, only if they involved "personal" and
not "property" rights. It is unclear whether that limitation of § 1343(3) applied to
§ 1983 as well. See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 565 n.8 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.).
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all section 1983 cases16 5 or for any more delimited category
165 In Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964), a suit under the Civil Rights Act
questioning the apportionment of the Virginia legislature, the usual Pullman principles appear to have been applied in deciding whether to abstain. Both the district
court and the Supreme Court declined abstention not because of any absolute rule
for cases under the Civil Rights Act but because the statute was not ambiguous.
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), also under the Civil Rights Act, engaged in
typical Pullman analysis, and Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), in which
abstention was ordered, was brought under the Civil Rights Act. In Harrison, Justice
Douglas, without success, espoused the position that Pullman abstention was inappropriate in civil rights actions. 360 U.S. at 180-81 (dissenting opinion). Admittedly,
though, the cases are not conclusive. Only Harrison squarely contradicts the existence of a civil rights exception in Pullman cases, and Harrison was decided prior to
McNeese. McNeese's reasoning could be deemed to have overturned it.
Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), a post-McNeese civil rights case, does
support to some degree the proposition that no civil rights exception to Pullman
abstention exists. The case involved a claim that Florida's system of financing public
education discriminated against school children of property-poor countries, thereby
violating equal protection. The district court enjoined the program, refusing to
defer in favor of proceedings in state courts that had been instituted subsequent to
the federal suit, and saying that under McNeese and Monroe v. Pape "[t]he fact that
a state remedy is available is not a valid basis for federal court abstention." 401
U.S. at 478. In a unanimous per curiam opinion (after oral argument) the Supreme
Court vacated the decision of the three-judge court and remanded the case to that
court so it could exercise its discretion, governed by the usual Pullman principles,
whether to abstain. It said:
The reliance upon Monroe v. Pape and McNeese was misplaced. Monroe v.
Pape is not in point, for there "the state remedy, though adequate in theory,
was not available in practice." 365 U.S., at 174. McNeese held that "assertion
of a federal claim in a federal court [need not] await an attempt to vindicate
the same claim in a state court." 373 U.S., at 672 (emphasis added). See also
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). Our understanding from the
colloquy on oral argument with counsel for the parties is that the Christian
case asserts, not the "same claim," that is, the federal claim of alleged denial
of the federal right of equal protection, but primarily state law claims under
the Florida Constitution, which claims, if sustained, will obviate the necessity of determining the Fourteenth Amendment question. In such case,
the line of decisions of which Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), is a recent
example, states the principles that should inform the exercise of the District
Court's discretion as to whether to abstain.
401 U.S. at 478.
One factor that may be deemed to detract from whatever significance Askew
might otherwise have is the existence of ongoing state court litigation which, though
begun subsequent to the federal action, may have influenced the decision. Cf. Scott
v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965). See note 256 infra. Nevertheless, Askew's treatment of McNeese is significant in that it apparently abandons McNeese's implications
of a § 1983 exception to Pullman principles. Askew correctly says that McNeese's statement that a litigant need not await decision of the same claim in state court did not
cover the situation in Askew. But as indicated in note 163 supra, it did not cover the
situation in McNeese either, a fact that Askew does not point out. Repudiating that
language repudiates the basis on which McNeese arguably creates a civil rights exception in Pullman cases. The Court in Reid v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 238, 242 (2d Cir.
1971), seems thus to have read Askew to show that abstention in § 1983 actions is permissible. (Askew's distinction of Monroe is also erroneous. See 365 U.S. at 172, 183.)
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166

D.

Conclusion Regarding Proposed Application of Existing Factors
Relating to Unclear State Law and the Nature of the
Federal ConstitutionalIssue
The suggested abstention criteria provide a framework
for applying the Pullman requirements that state law must be
unclear and susceptible to an interpretation that would avoid
a constitutional question. They provide more guidance than
current statements of the requirements, which do not indicate
with any consistency whether or not extreme ambiguity in state
issues is required and which generally do not disclose the other variables in an abstention decision. But like current standards, the suggested criteria leave much room for individual
judgment. Among the imprecise factors are the degree of unclarity of state law; the extent to which error might harm a
state program; and the extent to which the federal constitutional issue is sensitive or, instead, calls for swift adjudication.
For each of these inquiries there is obviously no principle by
which one can pick any particular point of exactly how unclear, potentially harmful, sensitive, or in need of adjudication
an issue must be to be determinative. Moreover cases can fall
at all points along each relevant spectrum, and the spectra do
not solve what may be the most difficult problem in many
cases, which is where on a particular spectrum a particular
issue should be placed; the solution to those problems will
To find no support for a civil rights exception to Pullman abstention is not, of
course, to deny that exception to the administrative abstention doctrine, which will
be discussed in text accompanying notes 250-53 infra.
166 Rather than an exception for all § 1983 cases, there could be one limited to
particular types of actions, as the ALI apparently suggests. See note 161 supra. The
one square holding of abstention in a § 1983 case-Harrison v. NAACP, admittedly
decided prior to McNeese-would probably fall within any exception that would be
devised, as would most probably the facts of Pullman itself. The only suggestion by
the Supreme Court of any absolute exception is language in Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965). There the Court, apparently discussing the propriety
of Pullman abstention on the facts of that case, said "we hold the abstention doctrine
is inappropriate for cases . . . where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their face

as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected
activity." See also id. at 491-92. While that language would seem to suggest a per se
rule against abstaining because of the nature of particular issues, in fact the reason
abstention is inappropriate in that context, as the ensuing discussion in Dombrowski
demonstrates, is that, in the Court's view, the basic requirements cannot be satisfied:
The decision of the state issues cannot avoid the constitutional question. Accord.
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). On whether the Court is correct in believing
that the constitutional issue could not be avoided, see the cases cited in note 261 infra.
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depend on the particular substantive issues involved. A further
fact preventing the suggested factors from showing with any
precision a single correct course in each particular case is that
there is no precise way to quantify the factors in order to relate
them to each other. Accordingly, the suggested criteria would
not result in consistent application of the abstention doctrine
and indeed would permit judges to depart from the standards,
intentionally or otherwise, without their departure being manifest. Intentional departures might result from judges wishing
to take account of factors going to the merits of the cases but
not embodied in the abstention criteria 67 or simply from a distaste or disdain for the intellectual acrobatics involved in applying the suggested rules.
While a judge might justly recoil from applying the suggested standards, if their distinctions and subdistinctions are
not deemed worth the energy they require, then Pullman abstention should not be perpetuated at all. For it simply does
not seem worth imposing abstention's costs on the parties to
order it more broadly than when functional analysis, applied
in good faith, would suggest it is likely to serve a significant
purpose. If the rule is to be simply that abstention may be
ordered whenever a federal court believes state law is "unclear,"
then the chances of different state and federal results and the
chances of any significant detriment resulting from a federal
court decision do not seem great enough to warrant the delay
168
and expense.
167While such an assertion is difficult to prove, there is some evidence in Supreme Court case law that the current lack of consistency in the degree of state law
ambiguity required for abstention, see notes 76-78 supra, is attributable to the Justices'
views of the merits. In Lake Carriers' Ass'n. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972), a suit
by owners of Great Lakes bulk cargo vessels to enjoin various sections of Michigan's
Watercraft Pollution Control Act, Chief Justice Burger joined an opinion dissenting
from the Court's order of abstention on the ground that the Michigan law, though
unconstrued, was not ambiguous; that the plaintiffs have a right to choose a federal
forum; and that they would be hurt by delay. Id. at 513-17. The dissenting position
appears directly inconsistent with the Chief Justice's position in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), that the state should have the first opportunity to
pass on its statute without regard to whether it was ambiguous. Similarly, some of
the Justices in the MacMullan majority have seemed far less receptive to the abstention doctrine when the claimants challenge statutes allegedly abridging individual
liberties than in the case in which an environmental protection statute was at issue.
Compare Justice Brennan's opinion denying abstention in Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241 (1967) with his opinion for the Court in Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498 (1972).
168 Another criticism that might be levelled at the suggested rules is that they
could be wasteful in situations in which an appellate tribunal disagrees with a trial
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E. A Proposalto Abandon the Requirement That the Case Must
Contain a Federal ConstitutionalIssue
The above suggestions for limiting Pullman abstention to
cases in which it is likely to serve a valid purpose tend to narrow the range of cases within the authorization and construction categories that are appropriate for abstention. But the
analysis of how the Pullman requirements apply in authorization cases reveals other respects in which Pullman abstention
should not be as limited as it has been heretofore. As noted
above, 16 9 it suggests that the doctrine should not be limited
to challenges to state enactments to the exclusion of state officials' conduct, if in fact it is so limited today. Moreover, it is
logically inconsistent to abstain in authorization cases and at
the same time to insist on the traditional Pullman requirement
that, for abstention to be considered, decision of the unclear
state issue must have the potential of avoiding a federal constitutional issue. There is no doubt that under current law Pullman abstention is impermissible in cases containing only state
issues,' 7 0 and "[w]here a case involves a nonconstitutional federal issue . . . the necessity for deciding which depends upon
the decision on an underlying issue of state law, the practice
in federal courts has been, when necessary, to decide both
issues" even though "[t]he state law question [is] .. .concededly
difficult and unsettled; [and] its decision admittedly control[s]
the existence of a federal question .... ,,'.7
The only apparent
rationale for this limitation is that a purpose of Pullman abstention is to avoid, where possible, adjudicating federal constitutional issues and that abstention is proper only when it
judge's application of the rules and orders abstention after the trial judge has heard
the case. But this problem is independent of the substantive standards for abstention. It exists under current law, as should be clear from Pullman where abstention
was ordered after a three-judge court had passed on the merits. The problem is
inherent if there are to be definitive standards and if a decision not to abstain is
not reviewable until the conclusion of trial. See note 123 supra. It could be cured by
allowing immediate review of such a decision (though that might itself be wasteful)
or by allowing trial tribunals discretion always to hear a case in which abstention
could have been ordered. The latter approach could be adopted consistently with
retaining limits on the cases in which the district court could abstain.
169 See text accompanying notes 146-51 supra.
170 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Post-Pullman cases in which
the Court has abstained despite the absence of any federal issue are explicable on
grounds other than the Pullman doctrine. See text accompanying notes 174-76 &
206-53 infra.
171Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490 (1949).

1974]

ABSTENTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES

may serve that purpose. But that rationale is at odds with those
authorization cases, like Pullman itself, in which despite the
presence of a federal constitutional question, the purpose of
abstaining could not be to avoid it, because the. district court
had invalidated the challenged enactment under state law. If
abstention is permissible in authorization cases in which the
only purpose it can serve is to avoid interference with a state
program, it would seem to follo. that when that risk is present, a federal court should be permitted to abstain despite the
absence of any constitutional issue in the case. 17 2 Retention
of Pullman abstention in authorization cases, therefore, calls
73
for a rethinking of the general parameters of that doctrine.
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,17 4 abstention was ordered despite the absence of any federal issues.
The city in that case sought to expropriate the land, buildings
and equipment of the Louisiana Power & Light Company. It
sued in Louisiana court, but the company, which was incorporated in Florida, removed the case to federal court. One issue
was whether under Louisiana law a city possessed the power
of eminent domain; a Louisiana statute appeared to confer the
power upon cities but a Louisiana attorney general had concluded that the power did not exist. The Supreme Court held
that on those facts the district court did not err in staying the
federal proceeding while the state courts were given an opportunity to construe the doubtful statute.
Thibodaux is a case in which it appeared that an erroneous
federal decision on the unclear state issues might seriously
affect the state. Its holding might suggest that abstention is
172 The interest in avoiding federal constitutional adjudication does not extend
to federal question cases in which the federal issue is not constitutional. In such
cases, therefore, the federal court can proceed directly to the federal issue, particularly if it is dispositive, just as in cases involving clear and nonsensitive constitutional
questions. Although Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949), is to the contrary, abstention should be permissible on the state issues in such a case if they are unclear and if
in the absence of abstention the federal court would limit or invalidate a state program.
1' An alternative to broadening Pullman abstention is limiting it to construction
cases in which conduct has not occurred, not an unreasonable approach since the
hypothetical quality of federal decisions in that category of cases makes it the most
appropriate category for abstention. See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra. Individual authorization cases, however, may warrant abstention more than particular
construction cases in which conduct has not occurred, even those in which abstention
is justly ordered. That fact cuts against differentiating the availability of abstention
according to the appropriateness of categories instead of on a case-by-case basis.
See note 151 supra.
174 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
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in fact available on a showing simply that state law is unclear
and that there is a danger that a federal court deciding the
issue might harm an important state program. The Court did
not adopt that rationale, however; rather than treating Thibodaux as a Pullman abstention case, it seemingly created an additional variety of abstention, limited perhaps to eminent domain
cases. And since Thibodaux it has reiterated as a requirement
of Pullman abstention that the state issue must be susceptible
to a construction that would avoid a federal constitutional
question. 1 75 While it is not clear precisely what contours the
Court intended to place on "Thibodaux abstention," a subject
to be discussed further, 17 6 the Pullman rationales would make
abstention available on the facts of that case as readily as in
Pullman itself. Abstention should be equally available if the
federal court would, in the absence of abstention, invalidate
the challenged provision; if the unclearness in the state law
(and the consequent likelihood of federal error) is as great;
if the program is as important to the state as the program in
Pullman; and if the state could be equally harmed by delay
caused in it. In both cases abstaining serves only the policy
against wrongful interference with state programs, and that
policy can be served equally whether or not there is any federal constitutional issue in the case.
F. Possible Additional Pullman Requirements
1. A Requirement That the Suit Be One
to Enjoin State Action
The prototype Pullman abstention case involves an attempt
to enjoin state action as unconstitutional. A limitation of Pullman abstention to suits to enjoin state officials would seemingly
proceed on a theory that erroneous decisions in such suits
T75E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). It is not possible to interpret
Thibodaux as allowing abstention simply when state law is unclear and to preserve
this Pullman requirement without rendering the entire Pullman category superfluous.
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968), is another case in
which the Supreme Court stayed its hand when no federal constitutional issue was
present, without making clear how its holding fit within traditional Pullman requirements. The case may be an example of "Thibodaux abstention," or of administrative
abstention, to be discussed later, see text accompanying notes 206-53 infra, or it may
be explainable by the fact that a suit that would settle disputed state issues was pending in state court. See note 256 infra.
1'7 See text accompanying notes 206-17 infra.
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could be especially harmful to the states. 7 Any such limitation should, therefore, not apply when the interest to be served
by abstaining is the federal interest in avoiding constitutional
adjudication. Just as abstention should be permissible without
regard to the presence of a constitutional issue if state law is
unclear and a federal court ruling on it would disrupt a state
program, so should the policy of avoiding unnecessary federal
constitutional adjudication be sufficient for abstention in cases
in which the federal court would decide unclear state issues
in such a way that difficult or otherwise sensitive constitutional
issues would remain.
The appropriateness of a requirement that the suit be
one to enjoin state action in cases in which a purpose of abstaining is to avoid wrongful interference with the state depends
upon whether erroneous federal court decisions will actually
harm the state more in suits to enjoin state action than in
suits in which no state official is a defendant, or even a party,
177 Under another theory, one could require an injunctive suit, but not require
that state officials be the defendants. The federal courts' power to abstain in the face
of congressional jurisdictional grants has often been deemed founded on the discretion inherent in equity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 31718 (1943); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01; Harlow v. Ryland, 172 F.2d 784 (8th Cir.
1949). Such a rationale for abstention, though not an entirely satisfactory explanation, see note 66 supra, could limit it to injunctive suits. The Court has not adopted
the limitation, however. It has abstained in simple damage actions without discussion
of the issue. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam without
argument); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962) (per
curiam after argument). It addressed the issue in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). There, in response to the objection that abstention was not proper because no equitable relief was sought, the Court said that
[a]lthough an eminent domain proceeding is deemed for certain purposes
of legal classification a 'suit at common law', Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367, 375-76 (1876), it is of a special and peculiar nature . . . [I]t is intimately
involved with sovereign prerogative . . . A determination of the nature and
extent of delegation of the power of eminent domain concerns the apportionment of governmental powers between City and State. The issues normally
turn on legislation with much local variation interpreted in local settings.
The considerations that prevailed in conventional equity suits for avoiding
the hazards of serious disruption by federal courts of state government
or needless friction between state and federal authorities are similarly appropriate in a state eminent domain proceeding brought in, or removed
to, a federal court.
360 U.S. at 28. If, despite later application of the Pullman doctrine in damage suits,
this were taken to imply that a suit must be in equity except when it is as analagous to
an equitable proceeding as Thibodaux was, it would be difficult to see how far the
exception to the equity requirement would extend. For the factors the Court relied on
to draw the analogy to equity are not peculiar to eminent domain cases. Perhaps a
declaratory judgment action, "essentially an equitable cause of action" in that a federal
court exercises a discretion whether to grant relief, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
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or in which injunctive relief is not sought. Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. Thibodaux17 8 would suggest that abstention is not limited to suits seeking injunctions against state action since the
city was the plaintiff, not the defendant, in that case, and no injunction- was sought. Moreover, the Court has invoked Pullman
abstention when the state was not a party at all,' 7 9 though it has
given the issue little if any attention. 180 Similarly, without discussing the issue, it has twice ordered Pullman abstention in actions
for damages between private parties in which no injunctive relief was sought. 8" Both were cases in which abstaining could
serve the purpose of avoiding constitutional adjudication as
well as protecting state interests, 82 but the Court did not rely
on that fact. And it seems that even when, as in Thibodaux, the
purpose of abstaining is solely to avoid harm to the state, it is
probably correct not to require that the suit be one to enjoin
183
state action.
It may generally be true that a state will suffer more
interference from a federal pronouncement erroneously invalidating or limiting a state program if it is rendered in litigation
in which the state is a defendant than when the state is either
v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300 (1943), would be sufficiently equitable. But in any
event, abandonment of the equity requirement, as Fornaris and Ideal Cement suggest,
would seem appropriate unless, as is explored in text, a suit in equity were more
harmful to interests that abstention is designed to protect. A strict law-equity dichotomy, which would allow the plaintiff in his choice of remedy to affect decisively the
abstention question, would not seem functional, since the abstention doctrine does
not exist to protect plaintiffs' interests.
178 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
179 E.g., Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970); United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); cf. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch
Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (state court proceeding on disputed issue pending); Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (certification). Lower courts also have abstained
in actions between private parties. E.g., Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 444 F.2d
38 (5th Cir. 1971); Warren v. Government Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 443 F.2d 624
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971).
180 Justice Brennan did advert to the issue whether the suit was one to enjoin
state action in his Thibodaux dissent, 360 U.S. at 34-35, and to the injunction issue
in his opinion for the Court in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.
185, 190 (1959). One should compare his concurring statement in Kaiser Steel, 391
U.S. at 594-95, and note that he joined in the Court's per curiam decisions in Ideal
Cement and Fornaris.
181Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962).
182Fornaris and Ideal Cement are construction cases in which it appears abstention
could serve either or both abstention policies.
13
" But see ALI STUDY, supra note 33, at 286: "In a suit between private litigants,
a mistaken determination of state law by the federal court, obviating consideration
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plaintiff in the action or is not a party at all. The state is directly
bound by a judgment to which it is a party as it is not when
litigation is between private parties. And when the state is a
defendant in an action, the court's judgment may be so broad
as to delay state enforcement of a program against more than
the parties to the suit; the judgment
also may shield persons
4
situated similarly to the plaintiff.'1

The lines between the three situations in which the state
may find itself-a defendant, a plaintiff, or, not a party-are
not, however, absolute. Although a state as plaintiff will be
bound 8 5 only in relation to the party to the suit, it is readily
conceivable that the very suit may involve extremely important
state interests. If immediate expropriation of the Power &
Light Company's property was important to the city in Thibodaux, for example, then erroneous delay in that expropriation
could seriously affect ,it
even though the erroneously enunciated rule of law was not elsewhere applied. And when the
state is in a defensive posture, the issues can be sufficiently
peculiar to the particular controversy that there is no serious
probability of a federal order affecting its relations with other
than the plaintiff in the case. That may have been the situation
in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,' 8 6 a suit against the
state involving the eminent domain power, in which diversity
was the basis of federal jurisdiction; the Supreme Court decided Mashuda the same day it decided Thibodaux, but in Mashuda it declined to abstain. The plaintiff in Mashuda contended
that the county had taken its property for a private use, which
was illegal under state law. If a ruling that Mashuda's property
was taken for a private use rested on grounds peculiar to
that company's controversy with the county,18 7 then whether
the state subdivisions could be more harmed by an erroneous
federal ruling on state law in Thibodaux or in Mashuda would
turn solely on whether the condemnation in one case was
of the constitutional issue, is not of great importance. In litigation to which the
state is a party, it is of more significance."
184 See note 89 supra.

185 Bound, that is, until a corrective state ruling is obtained and the federal
decree is reopened to reflect its result.
186 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
187 Justice Brennan's opinion

for the Court indicates that the ruling might well
rest on such grounds, for it says that the only issue in the case is the "factual" one.
360 U.S. at 190.
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more important to the state subdivision than in the other. It
would be unaffected by the fact that the state subdivision was
plaintiff in Thibodaux and defendant in Mashuda.
Similarly a state can be harmed by an erroneous federal
court ruling in a case involving only private parties, even
though its officials are not bound by the judgment. 188 United
8 9 for example, concerned
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 1'
the construction and federal constitutionality of a state taxing
provision. 90 If a federal court erroneously struck down that
tax, a hiatus in its payment might leave the state as harmed
as in many cases in which it is defendant. Accordingly, it is
more sensible to have a rule to be applied on a case-by-case
basis that for abstention to be ordered there must be a risk
that an erroneous federal ruling would severely hurt the state's
interests, than it is to have any absolute requirement that the
state must be party to, or defendant in, the suit. 19 1
Nor is it clear that the state's interests are necessarily
more harmed if an injunction, instead of some other kind of
188 This is especially likely in cases in which private party litigation is an important means of enforcement of a scheme designed to protect state interests.
189 369 U.S. 134 (1962).
190 The plaintiffs sought contractual reimbursement for city taxes they had paid
pertaining to sales to the defendants, and the defense focused on the federal unconstitutionality of the city tax in question.
191 The Court has not necessarily limited abstention in cases between private
litigants to circumstances in which states' interests could suffer from erroneous
state law rulings. In Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970), the issue between
the parties did not risk delaying a state program in a way that would greatly harm
the state if the federal court erred, but in any event abstaining there, as in United
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962), served the purpose of
avoiding constitutional adjudication as well as avoiding interference with the state.
In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968), a nonconstitutional
case involving only private parties in which the Court deferred to state adjudication,
the Court noted that the case involved water, "a vital state resource," 391 U.S. at 594,
but it is difficult to imagine that the state would be seriously harmed in a manner
that a federal court should take cognizance of if the federal court erred. One company which had been given water rights by the state claimed a right to use the plaintiff's land as an incident to exercising those water rights. The plaintiff company
claimed that so to condemn its land for the use of another private company would
violate state constitutional commands that condemnation is legitimate only if for
"public use." While the suit involved water, the issues in the suit did not therefore
pertain to the allocation of that "vital state resource." 391 U.S. at 594. An erroneous
federal ruling would either wrongly deprive the private company of its access to
water or would wrongly limit the state's ability to condemn for the benefit of private
companies-an interest probably not so central to the state that a hiatus would do
the state severe harm. Kaiser can be explained, however, by the fact that a state
proceeding on the condemnation issue was pending. See note 256 infra.
For a case in which the court in abstaining noted that the effect on state economic
policy of an erroneous ruling would be great, even though the case involved private
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relief, is sought. 1 92 Even limiting the cases to those in which
the state is a defendant,' 93 it is not clear that the state, or its
official or agency, is significantly more limited by an injunction
than by a declaratory judgment. 1 94 Although declaratory relief
is not of itself coercive and does not carry the contempt sanction, the parties will ordinarily heed it, and it is issued on
that supposition. If it is violated, an injunction should ordinarily follow without a retrial on. the merits since the earlier litigation, through res judicata or collateral estoppel, would
95
seemingly govern the issue.'
2.

The State's Consent As a Precondition to Abstention

A Requirement that State Officials Consent to Abstaining in
the ParticularCase
In Thibodaux and in some Pullman abstention cases,' 96 the
federal court has raised the issue of abstention sua sponte.
Indeed, in Thibodaux the city opposed abstention and the party
that had sought the federal forum supported abstention before

a.

litigants, see Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 118
F. Supp. 541, 550 (E.D. Ark. 1954).
192Injunctive and declaratory proceedings will be the principal forms of unconsented relief against the state. Suits for damages to be paid out of state funds cannot
be maintained against state officials without the state's consent, Edelman v. Jordan,
94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 52 (1944),
and the state can limit any consent to suit in state courts, Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S.
436, 445 (1900). Although cities and counties are subject to federal court suit without their consent, Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893); cf. Workman v.
City of New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900), they are immune to the extent that state law
is determinative of liability, e.g., Broward County v. Wickman, 195 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1952), and they are not liable in damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Suits for return of specific property in custody of the
state but claimed to belong to the plaintiff can be maintained against state officials
without the state's consent. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947). The measure of the
harm to the state's interests in such cases is the value of the property to be retrieved.
193Only in those cases would the existence of a request for an injunction seem
even arguably to affect the degree to which an erroneous ruling might harm the state.
194The Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts that a declaratory judgment can interfere with a state program in the same way an injunction does. Samuels
v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-74 (1971); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,
319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943). But see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-16, 122-28
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Mitchell v. Donovan,'398 U.S. 427,
429-30 (1970); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1963).
'9 See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971). But cf. Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, 125 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
196E.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964). Several Justices in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), similarly raised the issue of abstention in dissenting opinions.
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the Supreme Court. 197 When the purpose abstention is to
serve is avoiding federal constitutional adjudication, it seems
appropriate that abstention be considered at the request of
198
either party or on the motion of the federal court itself.
But when the purpose of abstaining is to protect state interests,
the state should be able to waive the protection. If, as it
appears, that was the purpose of abstaining in Thibodaux, it
was error to do so over the state's protest.
b. A Requirement of Adequate State Remedies
It is settled that a federal court can order abstention only
if the state provides the parties with adequate means to adjudicate the controverted state law issue. 199 (The case law is
less than clear, however, as to which remedies are adequate.) 20 0
One situation in which state remedies may be deemed inade197 360 U.S. at 42-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Delay-and accordingly abstention
-benefited the defendant company, which retained possession of its property during
the proceedings. Cf. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
329 (1964).
198 A private litigant might be indulging simply in a strategy of delay or might
have a genuine interest in state court decision of state issues, on the assumption
that the outcome would benefit him and would differ from a federal court's result.
But when in an authorization case the only interest to be served is avoiding constitutional adjudication, a state raising the abstention issue would be serving only purposes of delay, because it would be arguing against the validity of the enactment it
was defending. The state's failure in Wisconsin v. Constantineau to request abstention
on the ground that the challenged provision might violate the state constitution is
thus explicable as a recognition by the state that its interests in preserving the challenged statute would be no better served by its invalidation under state than under
federal law.
Because legitimate state purposes do not argue for abstention in such a context,
a federal court, in order to serve the federal purpose of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication, must have power to consider abstention on its own motion.
The power must extend to considering a state law ground for invalidation of a challenged enactment although the plaintiff has not raised that issue at all; otherwise
the plaintiff, whose interests abstention is not designed to serve, would control abstention by his pleading. Thus in both Constantineau and England the parties had not
raised the state law claim; the court had to raise the issue sua sponte, if abstention
was to fulfill its federal purpose. Cf McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
Presumably having raised the state law claim, the district court can itself decide the
suit on that ground, if the state issue is sufficiently clear or is otherwise inappropriate for abstention.
'99 As early as Pullman the Court emphasized in abstaining that "[t]he law of
Texas appears to furnish easy and ample means for determining the Commission's
authority." 312 U.S. at 501.
200 The state procedure should be deemed inadequate whenever it is so cumbersome that the individual litigant suffers substantial prejudice in addition to that
necessarily accompanying the abstention procedure. There are many ways in which
the state procedure for resolving the state law issue may so cause the litigant preju-
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quate, so that the parties will
action in federal court, is where
the disputed issue subject to
doctrine would impose on their

be permitted to pursue their
the state courts will not decide
the limitations the abstention
adjudication. In Pullman cases,

dice. Even if the state has a declaratory judgment procedure which allows access to
state adjudication whenever there is a justiciable controversy, there may, for example, be peculiarly long delays involved which could support an allegation that the
remedy is inadequate. The state remedy may also be inadequate if no declaratory
relief is available. In such a case, the inquiry would be whether the parties are significantly prejudiced by whatever alternative does exist. Pullman indicates that the
fact that the plaintiff in the federal action will be in the defensive position in the
state litigation is not alone sufficient to render the state remedy inadequate. One
of the proceedings the Court there noted in saying Texas afforded "adequate relief"
was an "action on the part of the State to enforce obedience to the order." Id.
The Court also apparently presumed in favor of the adequacy of the state remedy,
placing on the objecting party the burden of coming forward with a showing that
the available means "cannot be pursued with full protection of the constitutional
claim." Id.
Despite this language, it is questionable that a litigant should be required to
undergo a criminal proceeding or otherwise risk heavy penalties under the Pullman
abstention doctrine. Certainly if he has not already acted to make himself criminally
liable, he should not be required to do so as a precondition to state adjudication,
and a state "remedy" that requires him to do so should be deemed an inadequate
substitute for federal adjudication; a central purpose of the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970), is "to avoid accrual of avoidable damages
to one not certain of his rights and to afford him an early adjudication without waiting until his adversary should see fit to begin suit, after damage has accrued," E.
Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 680 (1937). See note 288 infra & accompanying text. Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 489-92 (1965), would indicate, however, that in the case of a litigant
who is already criminally liable, abstention under the Pullman doctrine in favor of
a state criminal proceeding may be proper. There the Court discussed the possibility
of abstention-seemingly referring to Pullman abstention-when the contemplated
state proceeding was a criminal prosecution. It seemingly declined to abstain there
because the state issue was such that the constitutional question could not be avoided
and not because criminal proceedings were an inappropriate forum for the state
adjudication. But if the issues had been appropriate for abstention, one wonders
whether the Court would have ordered it in that setting in view of the England procedure, which clearly gives a federal plaintiff the right to resepve federal issues for
the federal court. Surely those issues could not constitutionally be excised from a
criminal proceeding. The only way to preserve the plaintiff's England rights and
also abstain for litigati6n of state issues in a criminal proceeding would seem to be to
allow the federal plaintiff to litigate all issues in the state prosecution and then to
relitigate federal issues in federal district court. It is not clear whether England sanctions that approach, see 375 U.S. at 421-22 & n.12, but it does not seem substantially
to prejudice the federal plaintiff over and above the prejudice he generally suffers
in Pullman abstention. Moreover, the federal relitigation would seem in keeping
with usual federal habeas corpus practice, being broader only in extending a right to a
factual hearing in federal court without regard to the adequacy of the state court
hearing. Cf England, 375 U.S. at 417 n.8. In any event, Pullman issues may never be
reached in many cases in which a federal plaintiff, by the time of his federal suit, is
already liable to criminal sanctions, because of the other type of "abstention" at issue
in Dombrowski v. Pfister, which will be discussed below at text accompanying notes
254-328 infra.
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the England procedure arguably forbids state courts to decide
federal issues without the parties' consent; 20 1 in Thibodaux they
are left only the unclear issue of state law. Some states, however, adhere to limitations which prohibit their courts from
ruling on state law issues unless they have jurisdiction of the
entire controversy.2 0 2 Under existing doctrine it would seem
improper for a federal court to abstain in favor of state courts
that under such a limitation will not hear the controversy;
instead, the federal court should proceed with its own adju2 03
dication.
Such a rule would allow the states to veto abstention by
failing to provide necessary procedures even when the purpose
of abstaining is to serve the federal interest against unnecessary constitutional adjudication, in apparent contradiction of
the rationale suggested above for sua sponte abstention. It
may not be inconsistent, however, to hold that while a state
cannot always bar abstention by declining to raise the issue at
trial, it can always block it by declining to provide the requisite
201See 375 U.S. at 421-22 n.12. An alternative reading is that state courts may
decide federal issues, but if they do so without the parties' consent, the parties may
religate them de novo in federal court.
202See United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965);
cf. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961); In re
Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966). See also 48 IowA L. REv. 185 (1963); 40 TEXAS L. REv.
1041 (1962).
The problem is that some state courts have interpreted a restriction on their
jurisdiction to the decision of "cases and controversies" to mean that they cannot
decide a case unless they have power to dispose of it. When the federal court abstains
for decision of state issues, the state court cannot necessarily dispose of the case. In
Pullman, for example, the Texas courts would dispose of the case only if they held
the Commission's order was not authorized. If they held it authorized, the disposition of the controversy would depend upon the resolution of the federal constitutional question. Since England it has been clear that, absent a waiver by the parties,
they have a right to have that issue determined in the federal forum.
103 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22
n.12 (1964). Cf ALI STUDY, supra note 33, at 286, 294-96 (certification). The alternative of litigating the federal issues in both the state and the federal fora is discussed
in note 200 supra. It is worth noting that if federal courts adopted the alternative and
abstained in favor of state courts that had announced they would decline to decide
state issues alone, persons claiming federal constitutional violations should never consent to have them heard in the state court that nevertheless would hear them. By refusing their consent, those litigants would retain the right wholly to litigate their claims
in two separate fora and thus would increase their chance of victory.
In Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 444 F.2d 38, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1971),
Judge
Wisdom implies that the correct approach for a federal court faced with a case where
state courts will not confine themselves to state issues but which otherwise warrants
Pullman abstention is to abstain but dismiss the case rather than retain jurisdiction.
Presumably that would solve the state courts' problem only if the difference in disposition were deemed to allow the state courts to pass upon federal claims. Dismissing
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procedures. For the federal system to tell the states that they
must provide a procedure for the adjudication of single issues
would be a fairly radical interference with state decisionmaking. 2° 4 Since state- procedural limitations affect more than
abstention cases, it may be thought that the state interest in
deciding what those limitations should be outweighs any federal interest in avoiding federal constitutional adjudication
in particular cases.
This analysis would indicate a different result, however, if
the state does not have a general principle against deciding
less than an entire case but unreasonably delays or otherwise
hampers the adjudication of a particular case. When that is
the sense in which the state provides inadequate procedures,
only federal reluctance to subject state courts to compulsion
can explain declining to require them to proceed expeditiously
in cases in which the purpose of abstaining is to serve the
federal interest.
PART TWO: THE RELATION OF PULLMAN
ABSTENTION TO OTHER TYPES OF ABSTENTION
The term "abstention" is used indiscriminately to refer
to several quite distinct doctrines, 20 5 only one of which is Pullman abstention. Partly because of the confusion of terminology,
and partly because the limits of the other categories of abstention are largely incoherent, the relationships between the
various categories are less than clear. Whether it is proper to
treat any particular case in accordance with the Pullman docPullman cases does seem to contravene England. But see 444 F.2d at 45 n.3. Nevertheless,
in Barrett there was an independent reason both for dismissing rather than retaining jurisdiction and for leaving federal as well as state issues to the state system: that
the case qualified for administrative abstention as well as meeting Pullman requirements. See text accompanying notes 221-23 infra; note 242 infra & accompanying
text.
204 Moreover,
the federal system should be rather sympathetic to such state
limitations, both because article III of the Federal Constitution contains similar
restrictions and because the purpose of such restrictions appears to be improving
the quality of judicial decisionmaking. Indeed it may be that federal constitutional
limitation which is primarily responsible for the absence of a counterpart to the
Pullman abstention doctrine for cases litigated in state courts which contain very
unclear federal issues that are potentially controlling. Another explanation for the
absence of any procedure whereby state courts could refer such issues to federal
court lies in the possibility of Supreme Court review of erroneous federal determinations; but the pressures on the Court's docket and the consequent difficulty of obtaining review may make that explanation insufficient.
205 C. A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 196 (1970).
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trine or instead to place it within another abstention category
is not always obvious, although that decision can be of enormous consequence to the determination of the proper forum.
Moreover, the rationales behind the other.categories of abstention are in some respects inconsistent with the Pullman rationales. This section will attempt briefly to delineate the scope
of the various abstention categories; to show the respects in
which the coexistence of the various categories is inconsistent
with the limits upon Pullman abstention; and, finally, to address the question how, if all the categories of abstention are
to persist, a court should decide which doctrine comes into
play in any given situation.
I.

"THIBODAUX ABSTENTION"

Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux 20 6 is the
controlling case in this category, a category that would be rendered superfluous if the previously suggested approach of
eliminating the requirement of a constitutional issue were
adopted for Pullman abstention. The Court in Thibodaux did
not take this approach, however, but purported to create a
supplemental Thibodaux category of uncertain scope. The difficulty in determining its scope is compounded by the decision
the same day reversing a district court dismissal in County of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.207 While much in Thibodaux
suggests a rule of abstention peculiar to eminent domain
206 360 U.S. 25 (1959); see notes 174-76 supra & accompanying text.
207 360 U.S. 185 (1959); see notes 186-87 supra & accompanying text. It is not
surprising that the cases are difficult to reconcile, since seven of the nine Justices
sitting on the two cases disagreed with the holding of one of them, and the author
of each opinion dissented in the other. In fact Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court in Mashuda bears a marked resemblance to the vigorous dissent he voiced in
Thibodaux. Only Justices Stewart and Whittaker joined in both majority opinions,
and only Stewart gave an explanatory statement. He said he concurred in Thibodaux
because it "was clearly within the District Court's allowable discretion" for it to defer
"immediate adjudication of this controversy pending authoritative clarification of a
controlling state statute of highly doubtful meaning." He went on to say:
This case is totally unlike County of Allegheny v. Mashuda Co., decided
today . . . except for the coincidence that both cases involve eminent domain
proceedings. In Mashuda the Court holds that it was error for the District
Court to dismiss the complaint. The Court further holds in that case that,
since the controlling state law is clear and only factual issues need be resolved, there is no occasion in the interest of justice to refrain from prompt
adjudication.
360 U.S. at 31.
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cases, 20 8 abstention was refused in Mashuda, which also involved eminent domain, and language in Mashuda states that
there is nothing special about eminent domain for abstention
purposes.2 0 9 Mashuda and Thibodaux might be reconcilable on
the ground that the state's interests would be more adversely
affected by an erroneous ruling against the state in one instance than the other, 21 0 but the Court's opinion does not rest
on any such distinction. Another distinguishing feature is that
state law was unclear in Thibodaux and it was relatively clear
in Mashuda.211 But that is the rationale that cannot alone explain Thibodaux abstention without rendering superfluous the
Pullman category with its requirement of a constitutional ques208 The Court referred to the problem involved in the case as one generic to
eminent domain cases when it said, "We granted certiorari . . . because of the importance of the question in the judicial enforcement of the power of eminent domain
under diversity jurisdiction." 360 U.S. at 26. It went on to mention that the Court
had been closely divided in the decision in which, in 1905, it allowed eminent domain
cases in federal courts at all under the diversity jurisdiction. Madisonville Traction
Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905). It quoted with approval from
Justice Holmes' dissent in that case concerning the plenary power of the state over
eminent domain and emphasized "the distinction between expropriation proceedings
and ordinary diversity cases." 360 U.S. at 26. The Court then said abstention was not
precluded because the suit was not in equity, because it was an eminent domain suit.
See language quoted in note 177 supra. See also note 213 infra.
One could, however, interpret the Court's discussion of eminent domain in
Thibodaux as relating solely to whether a suit must be in equity for abstention to be
permissible, see note 177 supra, and not suggesting that eminent domain was a factor in
any other sense in a decision whether to abstain.
209 "[T]he fact that a case concerns a State's power of eminent domain no
mpre justifies abstention than the fact that it involves any other issue related
to sovereignty. Surely eminent domain is no more mystically involved with
'sovereign prerogative' than . . . a host of other governmental activities carried on by the States and their subdivisions which have been brought into
question in the Federal District Courts despite suggestions that those courts
should have stayed their hand pending prior state court determination
of state law."
360 U.S. at 191-92; see id. at 192-96.
210 See text accompanying notes 186-87 supra. Moreover, the fact that the state
law issue in Thibodaux was more generalized than that in Mashuda, and thus less
likely to affect only the particular litigants, may have made state court discrimination
against out-of-staters less likely in Thibodaux than in Mashuda. Accordingly, the breach
in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction would seem less problematic in Thibodaux.
211 A variant on this explanation is the suggestion made in Justice Stewart's
Thibodaux concurrence and in Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Mashuda
that the only issues in Mashuda were factual. Whether that is a correct characterization of the Mashuda issues is, however, open to doubt. The facts concerning the use
to which the condemned property had been put in Mashuda were fairly clear. The
question to be decided was whether Pennsylvania law would characterize that use
as "public" or "private".
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tion.2 ' 2 Probably the most satisfactory way to explain the two
holdings is to conclude that Thibodaux abstention is proper in
eminent domain cases to elucidate unclear issues of state law;
neither eminent domain nor unclear state law is sufficient for
abstention, but the two in combination are.2 1 3 The reconciliation is not problem-free, however. Mashuda's language that
there is nothing peculiar about eminent domain proceedings
is contradicted. 21 4 And the only statement given by a Justice
212 One might argue that unclear state law is determinative in Thibodaux and that
it still does not displace Pullman by saying unclear state law is sufficient for abstention
only in cases not involving any federal issue. But that position is either irrational in
its limitation to non-federal question cases, or it constitutes a direct undercutting of
the diversity jurisdiction by deeming private litigants' interest in not having their
case determined according to an erroneous view of state law sufficient to displace
federal jurisdiction in diversity cases alone. In a pre-Thibodaux case, Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), the Supreme Court said that such a position
would be contrary to the diversity jurisdiction. Cf Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Alabama PSC v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341,
351 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But cf. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co.,
391 U.S. 593 (1968); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933) (alternative holding). See
also Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, in Thibodaux the Court seems to have denied any such
general undercutting of the diversity jurisdiction when it spoke of "the distinction
between expropriation proceedings and ordinary diversity cases." 360 U.S. at 26.
Much has been written on whether difficult questions of state law are sufficient to
justify abstention in cases not involving any federal issue, see, e.g., C. A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 202-03 (1970); Currie, The Federal Courts and The American Law Institute,
36 U. Cm. L. REV. 268, 313-14 (1969); Liebenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England
Case, Its Effect on the Abstention Doctrine, and Suggested Solutions, 18 WESTERN RES. L. REV.
157, 158 n.2, 183-95 (1966); Comment, Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Abstention, 1965 DUKE L.J. 102; Comment, Abstention Under Delaney: A Current Appraisal, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 247 (1971); Comment, Abstention and Certification in Diversity
Suits: "Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964); a question on which the courts of appeal are in conflict. Compare United States Life Ins. Co.
v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964) (abstaining) with Martin v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1967) (not abstaining) and In re Mohammed,
327 F.2d 616, 617 (6th Cir. 1964) (not abstaining). The bulk of authority ispunfavorable
to abstention which serves only the interest of protecting private litigants against
the risk of an erroneous state law ruling by a federal court in their particular case.
The existence of diversity jurisdiction does not, however, affect the propriety
of other categories of abstention; the issue regardless of diversity is whether the
abstention requirements are met. See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement
Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). This is true
even though an argument could be made that abstention is per se improper in a case
in which the parties are diverse because state courts' bias against out-of-staters keeps
them from being more likely than the federal system to reach correct results, despite
their general superiority in interpreting state law.
213 The language of the Court's holding in Thibodaux supports this reading: "The
special nature of eminent domain justifies a district judge, when his familiarity with
the problems of local law so counsels him, to ascertain the meaning of a disputed state
statute from the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively-the courts of the
State under whose statute eminent domain is sought to be exercised-rather than
himself make a dubious and tentative forecast." 360 U.S. at 29.
214 Moreover, in seeking to distinguish Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228
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voting with the majority in both cases de-emphasized the role
of the eminent domain factor, calling it a "coincidence" that
both cases involved that power, and focused instead on the
difference in the clarity of state law in the two cases. 21 5 At
any rate, since it is difficult to see what in the eminent domain
power warrants such special treatment for abstention purposes, it is difficult to predict what other subjects of state
power, if any, will be deemed to fall within an abstention
category where ambiguity of state law is sufficient for abstention."t 6
(1943), the leading case for the rule that uncertainty in state law does not by itself
justify abstention, the Thibodaux Court did not rely on the special nature of an eminent domain proceeding. 360 U.S. at 27 n.2. For the distinction it did adopt, see note
215 infra.
215See Justice Stewart's opinion quoted in note 207 supra. Justice Stewart seems
to stress also two other points: the district court's discretion on the abstention isstie
and the difference in the dispositions of Mashuda, where the district court dismissed,
and of Thibodaux, where the court retained jurisdiction. The same two reasons were
used by Justice Frankfurter in his opinion for the Court in Thibodaux to distinguish
the Supreme Court's holding in Meredith v. Winter Haven. 360 U.S. at 27 n.2.
Though the Court often speaks of abstention decisions as involving discretion, e.g.,
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 537 (1965), it seems difficult to explain
abstention decisions by discretion on the part of the district judge, when the Supreme
Court reverses both district court orders granting abstention, e.g., Mashuda; Griffin
v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S.
350 (1962), and district court denials of abstention, e.g., Pullman & Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), and does not seem in any cases to allow the trial court's
result to stand simply because the trial court so ruled. Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363
U.S. 207, 223 n.17 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). Conceivably, discretion to abstain
or not if state law is unclear could be the rule in "Thibodax abstention" though not
in Pullman cases, but any rationale for allowing it would seem to apply in one category
as much as the other.
Stewart's and Frankfurter's focus on whether the district judge retained jurisdiction also seems misplaced. If the only way the district judge had erred in Mashuda
or Meredith was in dismissing the action rather than retaining jurisdiction pending
state proceedings, the Supreme Court should have simply changed that disposition
without implying that the district court should proceed to adjudicate the entire case.
216 There is one suggestion in the Court's opinion of a category larger than
eminent domain. In stating the proper law the Court said:
[W]e have held that the mere difficulty of state law does not justify a federal
court's relinquishment of jurisdiction in favor of state court action. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236. But where the issue touched upon the
relationship of City to State, Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168,
or involved the scope of a previously uninterpreted state statute which, if
applicable, was of questionable constitutionality, Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 220, 229, we have required District Courts, and not
merely sanctioned an exercise of their discretionary power, to stay their proceedings pending the submission of the state law question to state determination.
360 U.S. at 27-28 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
The category suggested-that of cases involving the relationship between cities
and the state-does not seem any more rational than a category of eminent domain
cases alone. Of course, the state has plenary power over that subject matter, but it
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In the end, one is left with an impression that the limits of
"Thibodaux abstention," as a separate category, are indiscernable. 21 7 The proper resolution of this confusion, as suggested
above, 218 would be to merge Thibodaux and Pullman abstention,
making unclear state law sufficient in all cases in which a state
program may be significantly harmed by an erroneous federal
decision.
Even if it continues to be treated as a separate abstention
category, however, the limits of Thibodaux abstention are not
of importance to persons invoking Pullman abstention, for the
consequences of each type of abstention are similar: In Thibodaux, as in Pullman, the Court ordered that jurisdiction be
retained and eventually exercised on all but the unclear state
issue. 2 19 Accordingly, even if there were some seeming overlap
between the categories-if, for example, Thibodaux were deemed
to apply to eminent domain cases with unclear state issues
has such power over all the subjects in question in these cases as long as it does not
act unconstitutionally. The category is vulnerable also to the other criticisms Justice
Brennan leveled against a category of eminent domain cases in his Thibodaux dissent
and in Mashuda. One case that may possibly be explainable as a non-eminent domain
version of Thibodaux abstention is Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593
(1968). See note 175 supra.
217 The use lower courts have made of Thibodaux confirms this impression. There
are cases adopting the reading of Supreme Court case law that Thibodaux abstention
applies to eminent domain proceedings, and its propriety there depends upon whether state law is clear or ambiguous. See Mayor & City Council v. National Dairy Prod.
Corp., 193 F. Supp. 556 (D.Md. 1961) (abstention not ordered because state law
clear); Myrick v. Union Oil Co., 418 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1969) (abstention not ordered
because state law clear); Crawford v. Courtney, 451 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971) (abstention ordered). Other cases indicate that Thibodaux abstention can be ordered in areas
"intimately involved with sovereign prerogative," 360 U.S. at 28, other than eminent
domain. John L. Burns, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 268 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ga. 1967), thus
applied Thibodaux to allow abstention in a suit for a tax refund involving an uncertain
issue concerning the scope of the state tax. While that use of Thibodaux may be justifiable. DuVall v. Moore, 276 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Iowa 1967), indicates a tendency to
apply the same Thibodaux language so broadly that an uncertain issue concerning
any subject of state regulation would be subject to abstention. The cases discussed
in note 212 supra define Thibodaux abstention still more broadly by suggesting unclear state law as a sufficient condition for its exercise. And in some cases the limits
the court places on Thibodaux are largely indiscernible. See, e.g., United Medical Labs,
Inc. v. CBS, 256 F. Supp. 570, subsequently dismissed 258 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ore. 1966);
Richey v. Sumoge, 257 F. Supp. 32 (D. Ore. 1966); Portland Paramount Corp. v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 258 F. Supp. 962 (D. Ore. 1966), rev'd on merits
sub nom Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 363 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1967); David v.
London Shirt Co., 259 F. Supp. 848 (D. Ore. 1966); B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Torgerson, 234 F. Supp. 214 (D. Mont. 1964).
218 See text accompanying notes 175-76 supra.
219 There were two state issues in Thibodaux, one the unclear one concerning the
city's condemnation power and the other an issue concerning the amount of compensa-
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when a federal constitutional issue was also at stake-the categorization would have no effect: If a case falls within the
Pullman category, however that is defined, the abstention will
not vary according to whether it also falls within the Thibodaux
category, however that is defined. 22 0 In that respect, "Thibodaux
abstention" differs from the two categories of cases next to
be discussed.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE ABSTENTION

"Administrative abstention" cases differ from Pullman
cases in that neither the existence of unclear state law nor the
presence of a federal constitutional question is necessary for
abstention. Moreover, abstention is ordered in administrative
cases to enable state courts to decide federal issues as well as
state ones, and under the administrative abstention doctrine
a case must pass through the state judicial system even if all
its issues are clearly federal. Accordingly, administrative abstention does not merely postpone original federal jurisdiction
but actually displaces it,2 21 removing entirely from the original
tion, to be decided if the condemnation were sustained. Justice Frankfurter said that the
second issue, if reached, would be decided by the federal district court, and accordingly
claimed that Thibodaux abstention "does not constitute abnegation ofjudicial duty. On the
contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is.only postponement of
decision for its best fruition." 360 U.S. at 29. Even if he is correct that the compensation
issue in Thibodaux itself would, if reached, return to the federal court, see note 220 infra, it
is questionable whether there would usually be an issue in "Thibodaux abstention cases" to
make abstention simply a postponement of jurisdiction. It would seem perfectly plausible
that the only issue in the case would be the disputed one. In Mashuda, for example, the
issue of damages had been litigated in a prior state proceeding. If abstention had been
ordered on the unclear state issue, a return to federal court would not seem a possibility.
Thus in at least some Thibodaux cases, state jurisdiction may replace federal jurisdiction,
unlike Pullman abstention.
220 There is one possible argument that the disposition of the categories
does
differ and if it were adopted, the categorization would sometimes be important.
While the Court in Thibodaux indicated it would abstain only on the unclear state
issue, leaving clear state issues for the federal forum, see note 219 supra, language in
Pullman cases often implies, without explicit mention of the issue, that if abstention
is ordered state issues generally will be left to state courts, with only federal issues
reserved for original federal adjudication. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). While a case can be made for either the
Thibodaux or the England approach on this point, nothing in the two categories of
cases would warrant a different solution for each of them. Presumably when the issue
is explicitly addressed the Court will either leave all state issues to state tribunals
when it abstains under either category, or else will in both categories leave only the
unclear issue.
221 The same can be true of at least some Thibodaux abstention cases. See note
219 supra.
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federal jurisdiction cases that fall within federal jurisdictional
grants; 222 a state court will dispose of all the issues in the case,
subject to possible Supreme Court review, and whether or not
from having
such review is granted, res judicata will bar a party
223
the federal district court decide the issue anew.
The scope of administrative abstention, like Thibodaux
abstention, is ambiguous largely because the reasoning that
supports the abstention is not clear. The doctrine is defined
224
primarily by reference to two cases: Burford v. Sun Oil Co.
and Alabama PSC v. Southern Ry. 2 25 In Burford, a diversity and
federal question case, 226 the Sun Oil Company sought to enjoin a Texas Railroad Commission order granting Burford a
permit to drill certain wells in East Texas. The Supreme Court
held that the suit should be dismissed. Writing for the Court,
Justice Black emphasized that the order in question was "part
of the general regulatory system devised for the conservation
of oil and gas in Texas, an aspect of 'as thorny a problem as
has challenged the ingenuity and wisdom of legislatures' ";
that the "regulation of the industry by the state administrative
agency" involved "basic problems of Texas policy"; and that
several state law problems at issue were "of no general significance."2 27 Perhaps most important, he noted that allowing a
222

Largely for this reason, one commentator takes the position that this group

of cases should not be termed "abstention" cases at all. Liebenthal, supra note 212,
at 159.
223See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
415 n.5 (1964); Alabama PSC v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 350 (1951) ("whatever
rights appellee may have are to be pursued through the state courts"); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943) ("... [I]f the state procedure is followed from
the Commission to the State Supreme Court, ultimate review of the federal questions
is fully preserved here"); C.A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 200 (1970).
224 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
225 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
226It is a point of some debate whether Burford should be deemed a federal
question case as well as a diversity case. Compare Note, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1162 (1943)
with H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
872-73 (1953). See also Liebenthal, supra note 212, at 161. Hastings v. Selby Oil
& Gas Co., 319 U.S. 348 (1943). Federal question jurisdiction in Burford could technically have been based on a federal due process challenge to the order, which was
challenged primarily on state grounds. The federal issue was not, however, prominent
in the case, and the Supreme Court said nothing of avoiding federal constitutional
adjudication in support of its decision to abstain.
227 319 U.S. 318, 331-32. Justice Frankfurter dissented, saying that since state law
was clear, the federal forum was duty-bound to exercise its jurisdiction. He deemed
the federal forum necessary for the reason it generally is provided in diversity cases
-the
need for a neutral forum-and he contended that the Court's dismissal of
jurisdiction contradicted the premises of diversity jurisdiction.
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federal forum to entertain the suit would lead to "conflicts
in the interpretation of state law, dangerous to the success of
state policies ....
-221 The standard the state applied for the
spacing of oil wells was settled, 22 9 but it left much room for
variation in its application. Moreover, the state had taken pains
to minimize judicial variation in applying the rules; it had
concentrated review in the state district courts of a single
county.2 30
In Alabama PSC v. Southern Ry., also founded on both federal question and diversity jurisdiction, the Southern Railway
sought to enjoin a Public Service Commission order refusing
to allow discontinuance of two passenger trains routed principally but not exclusively within Alabama. 231 The railroad sought
to challenge the order on both state afid federal constitutional
grounds as unjustified by "public necessity," "contrary to the
evidence," violative of requirements for just compensation,
a denial of due process and equal protection, and a burden
upon interstate commerce. The district court, finding state
law clear, 232 enjoined the order on federal constitutional
grounds. Not disputing the clarity of state law, the Supreme
Court set aside the injunction and ordered dismissal on the
basis that the regulation of intrastate railroad service was
" 'primarily the concern of the state' "; the problem was "essentially local"; and statutory appeal from a Commission order
was "an integral part of the regulatory process.

'233

The reasons for administrative abstention that one gleans
from these two cases are remarkably similar despite the fact
that Burford involved federal court decision of state law issues
while Alabama PSC involved federal decision of federal issues.
The first two Alabama PSC reasons-that the problem was local
and primarily of state concern-seem makeweight. Because
the allegation was that the order violated the Federal Consti319 U.S. at 334.
There existed a standard for minimum spacing, subject to exceptions where
necessary "to prevent waste or to prevent the confiscation of property." 319 U.S.
at 322.
230 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 6049(c) § 8 (1962); see Texas Steel Co. v. Fort Worth
& D.C. Ry., 120 Tex. 597, 604, 40 S.W.2d 78, 82 (1931). Article 6049(c) § 8 is a rule
of jurisdiction, not venue. Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Terrell, 122 Tex. 257, 265, 59
S.W.2d 364, 367 (1933).
23! See 341 U.S. at 343.
232 91 F. Supp. 980 (M.D. Ala. 1950).
233 341 U.S. at 346-48.
228
22,
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tution, it is difficult to see the issue as of interest primarily
to the state. Statements in Burford that the issues involved
Texas policy and were of no general significance make more
sense since that case involved difficult and substantial state
issues. Problems remain, however, insofar as federal constitutional issues as well were involved in Burford. More seriously,
such reasoning seems contrary to the bases of the diversity
jurisdiction, which was one basis for federal jurisdiction in
both cases.
Most rationales for allowing abstention in an administrative category of cases on terms other than those of the Pullman
doctrine seem extremely unsatisfactory, because they squarely
contradict the reasoning that limits Pullman. The difficulty
is in finding any factor in administrative cases that makes
abstention more appropriate than in cases dealt with under
the Pullman doctrine; yet without finding such a factor, it is
troublesome that abstention is ever ordered in these cases in
the absence of unclear state law and the possibility of avoiding
a federal constitutional issue. The rationale that comes closest
to justifying separate treatment for administrative cases is suggested in Alabama PSC's statement that statutory appeal of a
Commission order was "an integral part of the regulatory
process," a rationale that seems to parallel Burford's emphasis
on the Texas courts' responsibility for working with the Commission in regulating' the oil industry. It is unclear exactly
what aspect of the agency's order or its relation to the state
judiciary made the judiciary be deemed "an integral part of
the regulatory process" in either case. But it may be important
that in both cases all review of the relevant commission orders
was concentrated-in one county's courts in Burford and in
one circuit court in Alabama PSC.2 34 Such concentration of
judicial review would seem to enhance the case for deference
to the state judicial machinery in two important ways. First,
a single state court passing on agency action may truly develop
a subject matter expertise that the federal courts could not
match, and may participate more fully in formulating regulatory decisions than if the functions of judicial review were
more scattered. Second, the concentration of judicial review
suggests that the state may truly consider uniformity of deci234 The

(1958).

statute concentrating review in Alabama PSC was ALA. CODE tit. 48, § 79
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sion on these matters to be unusually important. The argument
for abstaining, at least in the absence of some pressing consideration in favor of federal decision of the particular issue
and/or controversy involved, would stress that the state concern for uniformity of decision is a legitimate one, and is not
aimed specifically against the exercise of federal jurisdiction
(since state courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction are
235
deprived of it as well).
But even the state's commitment to uniformity and expertise would not necessitate abstention without regard to the
clarity of state issues. At most it would seem that, in situations
in which the state had evidenced such a commitment, a federal
court deciding whether to abstain should be generous to state
adjudication in determining whether or not a particular state
issue was clear. The explanation may be, however, that the
state tribunals' expertise lies less in their understanding of
relevant state provisions than in their special knowledge of
a factually complex administrative scheme. In Burford itself
great variations in the application of a consistently stated standard were possible, rendering the results of individual cases
uncertain although in one sense state law was clear. That rationale for a separate administrative category has the virtue
of also providing a possible explanation for abstention obtaining for federal as well as state issues. While federal tribunals'
legal determinations of federal issues are presumptively more
reliable, conceivably a body especially equipped to analyze a
complex factual pattern would better apply the federal rules.
While this explanation might possibly make a separate
category of "administrative abstention" logically compatible
with Pullman's limitations, the administrative abstention doctrine has not been limited, in its application by lower courts,
to cases in which the state had concentrated review of an agency's determinations in a single court or group of courts, let
alone to those in which the factual situation appeared especially
complex and within the reviewing body's expertise.2 3 6 More23.5Indeed, Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Burford, asserted that in its provision confining review to courts in Travis County, the Texas legislature had not
intended to affect the jurisdiction of federal courts but only to displace the jurisdiction of state courts other than those in Travis County. 319 U.S. at 342-44. Compare
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 391-92 (1894).
236 E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of St. Petersburg, 242 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.
1957); Applegate v. Waterfront Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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over, the lack of complexity in Alabama PSC may remove even
that case from the suggested explanation.
While lower courts have not consistently adopted any one
explanation or limitation for the administrative abstention
doctrine, their rationales and limitations generally contradict
the Pullman doctrine's premises. One obvious way of delimiting
the administrative abstention doctrine, which some lower
courts have adopted, is to find administrative abstention prop237
er whenever a state administrative agency's order is at issue
and-as is prerequisite to any type of abstention-an adequate
state remedy is available to deal with the plaintiff's grievance.
Another less precise approach would demarcate administrative
abstention according to the degree to which the reviewing
court will be required to dabble in the administrative scheme
in performing its review'ing function, but without regard to
the concentration of judicial review or any special expertise
on the part of the state's reviewing court. It would call for
administrative abstention if the factors that the reviewing court
will have to consider are complex, and if they are within the
237 The concurring Justices in Alabama PSC appear to have believed this to be
the limiting principle for administrative abstention. 341 U.S. at 362. Accord, Note,
Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COLUm. L. REv.
749, 760 (1959); Comment, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 300, 306-07 (1952). Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis, however, disagrees. See 3 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §
23.18, at 382-84. See also Comment, 19 U. CH. L. REV. 361, 367 n.41 (1952).
A rule that administrative abstention would come into play whenever a state
administrative agency's order is at issue raises the difficulty of deciding how an
"administrative agency" should be defined. Any reasons for requiring that state
rather than federal judicial remedies be pursued for administrative decisions would
seem to obtain as well when a single official was the decisionmaker. Cf. Pennsylvania
v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935).
Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959), could be deemed Supreme Court authority for the proposition that administrative abstention is proper for state court review
of the decision of a single official. It is not absolutely clear, however, that Martin
should be deemed an administrative abstention case. Liebenthal suggests it is in
fact a Pullman case, see Liebenthal, supra note 212, at 165, though he recognizes that
in so characterizing it he must deem the Supreme Court in error in dismissing it
rather than retaining jurisdiction, as England, some years later, made clear was the
correct Pullman procedure.
Martin does, however, bear characteristics of an administrative abstention case:
Not only did the Supreme Court dismiss the case, but the case also involved a
complex regulatory scheme. See 360 U.S. at 224-25. Moreover, review of actions to
enjoin the head of an administrative department was concentrated in the courts
of one county. See PA. R. Civ. P. § 1503(c). Martin was such an action, although
subsequent to an abstention by the federal district court, that state court had already found it premature to decide the case prior to "viewers proceedings," see
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 670-301 et seq. (1961), review of which was not concentrated.

1974]

ABSTENTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES

1159

agency's expertise and beyond the ken of the federal court. 23 8
The imprecision of that test may, allow it best to reconcile the
case law; seeming deviants, which might include Alabama PSC,
can be explained as misapplications of the standard rather
than an alteration in the standard itself. Many commentators,
however, have declined to be even that precise in delineating
the administrative abstention requirements. Professor Wright
recognizes "Burford-type abstention" as a separate category
of abstention but never states precisely what will invoke it,
noting only that its purpose is "to avoid interference with state
activities. '2 39 Similarly the American Law Institute describes
the Burford doctrine simply as a "doctrine that the federal
court should relinquish jurisdiction where necessary to avoid
needless conflict with the administratibn by a state of its own
affairs. '2 40 Likewise Mr. Liebenthal seems to adopt an "all the
circumstances" approach. He suggests that Burford and Alabama
PSC "are merely examples of the traditional equity cases concerned primarily with the propriety of equitable relief in a
given situation in which the Court places great emphasis on
the factor of federal-state harmony"-that the doctrine of
those cases "is no more than the doctrine which the Court had
used before: No equity court will unnecessarily give extraordinary equitable relief, even though that court has jurisdic24 1
tion to do so."
238Language in Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Great Northern Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 60 (1944), concerning the scope of Burford suggests
either such a rule or a rule limited to concentrated review. The case Was not an abstention case. The Court had held that an Oklahoma statute consenting to suits to
recover taxes restricted its consent to suits brought in state courts; construing the
statute narrowly, the majority had adopted a rationale similar to the Burford reasoning. 322 U.S. at 54-55. Justice Frankfurter stated in dissent:
There is here an entire absence of the considerations that led to the
decision in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315. There it was deemed desirable, as a matter of discretion, that a federal equity court should step aside
and leave a specialized system of state administration to function. Here the
suit in a federal court would not supplant a specially adaptable state scheme
of administration nor bring into play the expert knowledge of a state court
regarding local conditions. The subject matter and the course of the litigation in the federal court would be precisely the same as in the state court.
The case would merely be argued in a different building and before a different judge. Language restrictive of suit in a federal court is lacking, and intrinsic policy does not suggest restrictive interpretation to withdraw from a
federal court questions of federal constitutional law.
Id. at 60.
239 C.A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 200 (1970).
240 ALI STUDY, supra note 33, at 283.
241Supra note 212, at 163-64.
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Any administrative abstention doctrine broader than one
related to a state's concentration of judicial review should be
rejected as conflicting with Congress' jurisdictional scheme and
with the limits upon Pullman abstention. But if a broader administrative abstention doctrine is to exist, as it unquestionably
does today, it is important to Pullman abstention to know what
the limits are because otherwise it may be unclear within which
of the two categories a particular case falls. If a case satisfies
both the Pullman requirements for abstention and the administrative ones, however those categories are defined, the case
should presumably be treated as an administrative one; in
cases falling within the administrative category, abstention is
allowed more readily, and with respect to more issues, than
in Pullman cases.2 42 It may not ever be desirable, because a
case qualifies as "administrative," to refer it to the state judicial
system for disposition on all the issues-or, indeed, to order
any abstention at all. But if that disposition of administrative
cases generally is deemed desirable or proper, the fact that
a case also meets Pullman requirements does not make it less
so. The presence of unclear state law obviously does not make
abstention less desirable. Nor does the presence of a federal
constitutional issue, under the precedents, make administrative
cases have
abstention less proper; administrative abstention
243
issues.
constitutional
federal
involved
frequently
While this treatment of a case that satisfies both Pullman
and administrative requirements may seem rather elementary,
it is not clear that courts have consistently so disposed of such
cases. It is fairly typical for a court not to advert at all to which
type of abstention is at issue or to entangle references to both
44
types of abstention as though they were interchangeable.
and Thibodaux abstention doctrines all state
242The Pullman, administrative,
conditions for removing cases from federal jurisdiction which prima facie exists;
the initial presumption in all of them is in favor of federal jurisdiction. Cf. note 265
infra & accompanying text. When the Pullman and the administrative abstention
conditions concur, therefore, it seems logical that a court should remove the case
from the federal jurisdiction in accordance with the doctrine of administrative abstention, since that doctrine removes it more completely. But see Barrett v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 444 F.2d 38, 45 (5th Cir. 1971).
243 In fact, some commentators have found it necessary to argue that the doctrine
should not be limited to cases involving federal constitutional issues. Note, 59 COLUM.
L. REv.
749, 762 (1959).
244
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968). A concurring opinion treats Kaiser as an administrative abstention case, while the majority
opinion never adverts to what type of abstention is at issue. Martin v. Creasy, 360
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Burford is a case that could be used to show that when the
requirements of both types of abstention are met, administrative abstention is ordered, for Burford arguably satisfied the
Pullman abstention requirements,2 45 and Pullman antedated
Burford.246 Other cases, however, appear to contradict that
rule and further discussion of why they are treated as Pullman
rather than as administrative abstention cases is necessary to
make the line between the two categories intelligible.
Pullman, ironically, is itself a case that under the abovedelineated factors for administrative abstention would seem
to qualify for treatment as an administrative case.2 47 Clearly
Pullman involved review of the order of an administrative
agency-the Texas Railroad Commission. Moreover, review
of that agency's orders was concentrated; indeed, it was limited
to the same county's courts that review of the Burford orders
was. 24 8 Only if abstention were limited to suits involving factually complex situations would Pullman seem to fall without that
2 49
doctrine, but on that test Alabama PSC might as well.
The troublesbme fact is that the- Court has not explicitly
addressed the issue of the line of demarcation between Pullman
and administrative abstention. Because of the difference in
disposition of the two categories of cases, the line can be cruU.S. 219 (1959), set off a debate as to the type of abstention involved which still continues. See notes 237 supra & 246 infra. In McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668
(1963), which was seen by Justice Harlan in dissent as an administrative abstention
case, the Court did not specify which type of abstention was involved-an omission
that has led to confusion concerning the possibility of abstention in civil rights cases.
See notes 162-66 supra & accompanying text.
245 A key question is whether the federal constitutional issue was genuine. See
note 226 supra.
246 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959), may also support that rule. Certainly
Martin was treated, though without explanation by the Court, as an administrative
case, for its disposition was dismissal. Liebenthal maintains, however, though his
reasoning is not explicit, that Martin was a Pullman case and that the disposition by
the Court was erroneous. Liebenthal, supra note 212, at 165. Even if Martin does
satisfy the Pullman requirements, Liebenthal should have to show also that it does
not satisfy the requirements for administrative abstention in order to prove the disposition inappropriate. The uncertainty whether Martin is an administrative case
reflects confusion concerning what the requirements for administrative abstention
are. See
note 237 supra & accompanying text.
24
'Pullman was decided prior to Burford. Burford, however, did have its precursors. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935).
248 The statutes concentrating review in the two cases bear a marked resemblance. Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 6453 (1926) (Pullman) with TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. art. 6049(c), § 8 (1935) (Burford).
249 Another case that is troublesome from the standpoint of the line between
Pullman and administrative abstention is Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970). The
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cial to parties who have a preference concerning the state or
federal forum. Since so much can turn on whether a case is
characterized as Pullman or administrative, it is strange to have
no intelligible law on the subject. If it retains an administrative
abstention category at all, the Court should hold that the line
between it and Pullman abstention is defined by the limits
placed on administrative abstention, since if a case qualifies
as administrative, whether it satisfies Pullman requirements as
well should be simply irrelevant. And if administrative abstention is retained, it is also important to the proper application
of the Pullman doctrine that the Court isolate the factors that
invoke the administrative doctrine and attend to their presence
or absence in each case.
Currently it may be of little import to Pullman abstention
what the limits of administrative abstention are and which
category predominates when a case satisfies administrative
and Pullman requirements, because there may be an exception
to the administrative abstention doctrine for suits brought
under the Civil Rights Act. As stated earlier, 50 McNeese v.
issue in Reetz was the constitutionality, under state and federal law, of Alaska provisions limiting salmon fishing licenses to particular persons. The licenses were
issued through a state administrative agency. That agency's regulations, as well
as the authorizing statute, were attacked as unconstitutional. The plaintiffs had applied
for and had been denied the fishing licenses they sought in 1968. They apparently
did not request licenses under the 1969 regulations. See Bozanich v. Reetz, 297
F. Supp. 300, 304 (D. Alaska 1969). The fact that in the litigation they were not
formally challenging the denial of licenses may justify the Court's failure to treat
the case as administrative. If so, however, plaintiffs would be able strategically to
manipulate the application of the abstention doctrines by the way they frame their
suit. That would seem out of keeping with abstention's purposes, which are to
protect interests other than the plaintiffs', and which seem unaffected by the difference between the form of the plaintiffs' suit in Reetz and the form the suit
would have taken if the plaintiffs had applied for licenses in 1969. Cf Wreiole v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 132 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Although the plaintiffs in
that case attacked a statute authorizing an administrative order rather than the administrative order itself, the Court did not allow that fact to prevent administrative
abstention.
Moreover, if in Reetz it is the plaintiffs' failure to apply for licenses in 1969
that explains the Court's treatment of the case as a Pullman case rather than an
administrative one, it is troublesome that the opinion of the Court does not reflect
that fact. Instead the possibility of administrative abstention is not alluded to, and
Pullman abstention seems simply to have been assumed as the issue. See also Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498 (1972) (administrative abstention not
contemplated).
Another case that was treated as a Pullman case but that might conceivably have
qualified for administrative abstention, depending upon the scope given that doctrine,
is Reid v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1971), in which judicial review was
not concentrated. Cf Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
25'lSee notes 162-66 supra & accompanying text.
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Board of Education2 5 1 probably should not be read to create an
exception to Pullman abstention for civil rights cases. But it
seemingly does create such an exception for administrative
cases, an exception allowing the bypassing not only of state
judicial remedies, as were involved in Burford and Alabama
2 52
PSC, but also of remedies of the administrative agency itself.
If such an exception to administrative abstention is accepted,
it could encompass all cases currently admitted to the Pullman
category. As long as a federal constitutional issue is requisite
to Pullman abstention, it would seem that all cases satisfying
current Pullman standards could be pursued under the civil
rights exception, if they satisfied the criteria for administrative
abstention as well. In that event, there would be no problem of
overlap between the Pullman and administrative categories.
The problem of overlap remains relevant, however, to the
extent that doubt remains concerning the existence of the civil
rights exception or its scope.2 53 Moreover, the problem would
recur if the suggestion were adopted that Pullman abstention
not be limited to cases containing a federal constitutional issue.
III.

THE DOMBROWSKI-YOUNGER LINE OF CASES

It is basic to Pullman abstention that the presumption is
in favor of federal jurisdiction; it takes "special circumstances"
-usually articulated as unclear state law and the possibility of
251 373 U.S. 668 (1963).

252 See language quoted in note 163 supra.
2
53 McNeese's holding is the chief authority for the exception. There is some problem even with that case as authority, for the Court announced as well a different and
sufficient ground for its decision: that the administrative procedure that the state
provided was an inadequate one. While that ground might limit McNeese, however,
the case of Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967), held that the limitation is
unintended. Plaintiffs in Damico sued under the Civil Rights Act to challenge the
constitutionality of certain welfare provisions. They brought suit in federal court
without either first pursuing administrative remedies or challenging them as inadequate. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies but the Supreme Court, without hearing argument, reversed per curiam,
indicating that under McNeese exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.
Justice Harlan alone dissented, expressing a desire to limit McNeese to cases involving inadequate administrative remedies. Damico is of interest also because while
a civil rights exception laid down by McNeese could conceivably be limited to racial
matters, the Damico holding precludes such a narrowing of the exception.
While Damico would seem dispositive of the exhaustion problem, Justice White,
writing for the Court, has recently claimed it is an open question whether McNeese
states an invariable exception to administrative exhaustion. Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973). (Two concurring Justices, however, stated it is an invariable exception. Id. at 581). Some lower courts, moreover, have declined to apply a
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avoiding a federal constitutional question-to justify referring
state law issues to the states. 2 54 There is, however, a category
of cases falling within federal jurisdictional grants in which
the presumption is in favor of state jurisdiction, and the federal plaintiff must show "special circumstances" to justify the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. 255 It is this group that will be
referred to as the "Dombrowski-Younger" group of cases. It
differs from the Pullman group also in that, as in administrative cases, a federal court decision staying its hand results in
a state proceeding wherein federal issues are adjudicated along
with state ones.2 5 6
A description of three of the leading cases in the "Dombrowski-Younger" category illustrates the difference. between
McNeese exception where the state remedy to be pursued is ain adequate one. E.g.,
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567-69 (2d Cir. 1969). In Eisen, Judge Friendly
distinguished Damico on the ground that a terse elaboration of Damico in King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.4 (1968), indicated that administrative remedies need not
be exhausted only where constitutionality was an issue and exhaustion would probably be futile.
254See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Propper v. Clark, 337
U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
255 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See also Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
256 Moreover this proceeding may be, and usually is, a state criminal prosecution,
as it is most unlikely to be in Pullman abstention cases. See note 200 supra. It is not
altogether clear, however, that the Dombrowski-Younger category is limited to suits
involving state criminal prosecutions as distinct from state civil enforcement proceedings. See note 278 infra. It does seem that only enforcement proceedings by the
state against the particular federal plaintiff will warrant the deference the DombrowskiYounger category affords. This limitation obviates the problem that a state declaratory remedy would almost always be adequate to prevent irreparable harm in the
Dombrowski-Younger sense of that term, see text accompanying notes 266-68 infra, and
thus, if it could invoke the Dombrowski-Younger change of presumption, could operate
to displace almost entirely federal jurisdiction. See notes 264-76 infra & accompanying text.
There is another important doctrine that is distinct from the Dombrowski-Younger
or any other abstention doctrine, whereby a federal court may in its discretion defer
to state declaratory or other proceedings involving the same issues as the federal
action, whether the proceedings are between the same parties or not, by awaiting
the outcome of the state proceedings before going forward with the federal suit.
Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1967); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey,
187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951); see H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1057 (1953). That doctrine, which is frequently alluded to in

cases along with one or more abstention doctrines, is supplementary to the abstention
doctrines and may explain some cases that may otherwise seem difficult to justify
in terms of the 'traditional abstention categories. E.g., Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S.
476 (1971); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968). It may be
justifiable to allow deference to an ongoing state proceeding in the district judge's
discretion without regard to whether traditional abstention requirements are met,
not only because of the state's interests but also because such deference does not
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this group and Pullman cases. Douglas v. City of Jeannette2 57 was
a suit to enjoin the city of Jeannette from prosecuting the plaintiffs for violating an ordinance prohibiting distribution of
pamphlets without obtaining a license. The plaintiffs claimed
the ordinance violated the first amendment when applied to
Jehovah's Witnesses. The district court agreed and issued an
injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance against
the plaintiffs or other Jehovah's Witnesses. In another case
decided the same day as Douglas,258 the Supreme Court sustained the plaintiffs' position on the substantive ground, holding that the ordinance could not constitutionally be applied
to religious solicitation. In Douglas, however, it reversed the
judgment of the district court, holding it error to grant an
injunction against prosecution under the invalid ordinance.
The Court said the injunction was unnecessary since the plaintiffs could assert their federal constitutional claim in defending
25 9
any criminal prosecution.
In D6mbrowski v. Pfister2 60 the plaintiffs sought declaratory
relief and an injunction restraining various state officials from
prosecuting them under a statute which they claimed violated
the first amendment because it was overbroad. They also
alleged that the threatened prosecutions would not be brought
in good faith but instead would be brought with no hope of
securing valid convictions, as part of a campaign to harass the
plaintiffs. The district court had emulated the Supreme Court's
Douglas holding and held that even if the plaintiffs' constituimpose on the parties as much as abstention often does, since it does not require
initiation of any additional proceeding.
257 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
258 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
259 A narrow but possible explanation of Douglas is that an injunction was thought
unnecessary because Murdock rendered it unlikely that the city would prosecute.
Cf. Speight v. Slaton, 94 S. Ct. 1098 (1974). The Court's language in Douglas is broader than that narrow reading and suggests that in the absence of Murdock the Douglas
holding would be the same. In Dombrowski, while the Court distinguished Douglas at
one point on the ground that Pennsylvania courts and prosecutors could be expected
to follow Murdock, 380 U.S. at 162, it dealt also with the other reasoning Douglas
suggested.
Except for the Murdock holding, the plaintiffs in Douglas had shown a likelihood
that the ordinance would be enforced against them. They had earlier been arrested
and prosecuted for distributing pamphlets similar to those they currently desired
to distribute, and state officials had threatened to continue so to prosecute them.
See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42
(1971).
260 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tional allegations had merit, an injunction against state prosecution was not warranted.
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding here special circumstances justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction: Defense of the state criminal prosecution in this instance was
not adequate to protect the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
While the Court did not clearly set forth the circumstances
that would impel the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it was
relevant that bad faith was alleged. It was also relevant that
the challenged statute regulated freedom of expression and
was attacked on grounds of overbreadth. A statute containing
that vice is unlikely to be cured, according to the Court, 26 1 in
a single state proceeding.2 6 2 Yet plaintiffs in such cases should
not have to await a series of prosecutions, for while they are
pending, the threat of prosecution may substantially chill the
exercise of first amendment rights.
Finally, in Younger v. Harris2 63 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Los Angeles district attorney from prosecuting him
for violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. He
claimed "that the prosecution and even the presence of the
Act inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free speech
and press. '264 The district court held in his favor, finding the
Act void for vagueness and overbreadth. The Supreme Court
reversed, saying that as in Douglas the state criminal prosecution was an adequate forum for raising the constitutional issue.
While federal jurisdiction was exercised in Dombrowksi and
declined in Douglas and Younger, in all three cases the Court
started from the premise that the federal courts should defer
in favor of state jurisdiction if the contemplated state proceeding was adequate to protect the plaintiffs' rights. It is that
premise, which separates these from Pullman cases, that is of
primary interest here, and not the much-discussed issue of
which cases within the Dombrowski-Younger category warrant
the exercise of federal jurisdiction and which do not. Why is
the presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction
261But see the state courts' construction of the ordinances in Shuttlesworth iv.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953);
and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941).
262 380 U.S. at 486. See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964).
263 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
264 401 U.S. at 39.
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in Dombrowski-Younger cases, requiring the plaintiff to show
the necessity of federal jurisdiction on the facts of his particular case, when those cases like Pullman cases fall within con26 5
gressional jurisdictional grants?
The explanation the Court has most prominently given
for not exercising jurisdiction in Dombrowski-Younger cases is
the plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the requirement of irreparable
harm. The Court has recalled the traditional rule of equity
that irreparable harm must be shown for an injunction to
266
issue and reasoned that that prerequisite to injunctive relief
is not satisfied if the state proceeding provides an adequate
26 7
forum for litigating the constitutional issue.
The irreparable harm requirement does not, however,
adequately explain why Dombrowski-Younger cases differ from
Pullman cases, which also typically involve injunctive relief. In
Pullman cases, however, the Court follows its usual equity practice of applying the irreparable harm requirement and the rule
of equity that no injunction should issue if there is an adequate
remedy at law, by looking to whether available remedies on
the law side of the federal court afford the plaintiff sufficient
protection. 2 68 Because of its "duty" to "give due respect to a
suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision
26- Like Pullman cases, these cases are typically brought under the general
federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970); the Civil Rights Act, id. § 1343
(1970); the Declaratory Judgment Act, id. § 2201 (1970); and/or the diversity jurisdiction, id. § 1332 (1970). In some of the cases there is an issue of 'Justiciability"
as well. E.g., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
41-42 (1971). Of course, where the case is deemed nonjusticiable federal jurisdiction
will not be exercised for that reason. What is significant is the need specially to
justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction in these cases when the standing, ripeness,
and other case-or-controversy requirements are met.
266 Though traditionally it is a prerequisite to injunctive relief, the same limitation applies in these cases when declaratory relief is sought, at least when a state
prosecution is pending. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241 (1967), indicated that is not the case when no state prosecution is pending, but the Samuels reasoning suggested that Zwickler would no longer be followed
in that respect. But see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 103-30 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The recent case of Steffel v. Thompson,
94 S. Ct. 1209 (1974), appears, however, to limit Samuels to cases involving pending
state prosecutions. But cf. notes 322-23 infra.
267 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-49, 53-54 (1971); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-89 (1965); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157,
162-64
(1943).
266
See DiGiovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935); McConihay
v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201 (1887).
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the Court does not

take into account, in determining whether the equity requirements are met, the existence of state proceedings that could
provide adequate relief.
The irreparable harm requirement cannot then explain
the difference in presumption between Dombrowski-Younger
and Pullman cases. For different irreparable harm requirements are imposed in the two classes of cases. Explanation
remains necessary for why in Dombrowski-Younger cases the
270
question asked is whether given the existence of the state forum
as a possibleforum, irreparable harm would result from a failure
to exercise federal jurisdiction, while in Pullman cases the issue
is whether irreparable harm supports injunctive relief and
not whether it supports a federal forum.
The most likely explanation for the Court's differing approach delineates the Dombrowski-Younger category as cases
involving attempts to enjoin state criminal proceedings and
then invokes, in addition to federal-state comity, a traditional equitable doctrine2 7 1 against enjoining criminal proceed269 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). Justice Brennan goes on to say
for the Court:
Plainly, escape from that duty is not permissible merely because state courts
also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the federal courts, ". . . to
guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States ... ," Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637. "We yet
like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights under the
Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and that
we have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum". Stapleton
v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55; see McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S.
at 674, n.6. Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404.
Id. Those statements are directly contradictory, however, to the practice in the Dombrowski-Younger group of cases where "adjudication of constitutional defenses in the
course of a criminal prosecution" is considered "normal," Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. at 485; where it takes a showing that being left to the state remedy will result
in irreparable injury before a suitor's choice of the federal forum will be respected;
and where the state forum will not be deemed inadequate simply on grounds of
federal-court superiority in deciding questions of federal law, see 380 U.S. at 484
-the view that presumably lies at the basis of Congress' grant of federal question
jurisdiction, and of the Court's insistence in Pullman cases that the parties may reserve
federal questions for the federal forum.
270 The state forum will usually, perhaps invariably, be a criminal trial court.
See note 256 supra & note 278 infra. But cf. note 323 infra.
271 The rule that equity will not interfere with criminal prosecutions does have
deep roots. The Supreme Court first expounded upon it in In re Sawyer, 124 U.S.
200 (1888), pointing out that well before the Declaration of Independence it was
settled in England that courts of chancery lacked power to stay criminal proceedings
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ings. 27 21 Language in Douglas supports both elements of this
explanation:
.

. .

Congress, by its legislation, has adopted the policy,

with certain well defined statutory exceptions, of leaving generally to the State courts the trial of criminal
cases arising under state laws, subject to review by this
Court of any federal questions involved. Hence, courts
of equity in the exercise of their discretionary powers
should conform to this policy by refusing to interfere
with or embarrass threatened proceedings in state
courts save in those exceptional cases which call for
the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent; and equitable remedies infringing this independence of the
states-though they might otherwise be given-should
be withheld if sought on slight or inconsequential
grounds....
It is a familiar rule that courts of equity do not
ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions .... 273
The Court's reasons for shifting the presumption in that
category of cases do, however, leave something to be desired.
Immediately preceding the above-quoted language, the Court
and that state courts had adhered to that limitation in interpreting the powers of
their respective court systems.
272 It is not absolutely clear that this is the explanation for the differing DombrowskiYounger and Pullman approaches to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, however, for it
is not settled whether the Dombrowski-Younger category is limited to interference
with criminal enforcement proceedings. See note 278 infra.
273 319 U.S. at 163. Further language suggests that the impetus against exercise
of federal jurisdiction comes largely from a reluctance to interfere with state criminal
processes:
Notwithstanding the authority of the district court, as a federal court, to
hear and dispose of the case, petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed
only if they establish a cause of action in equity. Want of equity jurisdiction,
while not going to the power of the court to decide the cause ..... may nevertheless, in the discretion of the court, be objected to on its own motion.
: . * Especially should it do so where its powers are invoked to interfere by
injunction with threatened criminal prosecutions in a state court.
319 U.S. at 162.
Language throughout Dombrowski and Younger also indicates that the Dombrowski-Younger analysis is limited to cases in which a plaintiff attempts to interfere with
state criminal prosecutions, as does the language in other cases as well. E.g., Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, & 73 (1971); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S.
228, 235 (1943). And support is found for a traditional equitable doctrine against
interfering with state criminal proceedings in Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 531-32
(1899), and In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1888). But cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 349-50 (1943); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 143 (1924).

1170

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:1071

said, "The power reserved to the states under the Constitution
to provide for the determination of controversies in their
courts may be restricted by federal district courts only in obedience to Congressional legislation in conformity to the judiciary Article of the Constitution. ' 274 Yet congressional legislation rather clearly places the cases in question within the
federal jurisdiction. The Court's reference to a congressionally
adopted policy of leaving criminal cases to the states is apparently an attempt to circumvent that difficulty; its language
"Congress, by its legislation, has adopted the policy" may suggest the cases are not in fact in the federal sphere. The Court
2 75
does not, however, inform us what legislation it has in mind.
Moreover, it becomes clear that the Court is not referring to
a legislative directive, but simply a policy the Court derives
from congressional laws generally, when it goes on to say that
federal courts should accordingly "in the exercise of their
discretionary powers" decline to interfere with state criminal
proceedings except when such interference is absolutely necessary to prevent irreparable harm. One wonders how such an
uncodified congressional policy, admittedly not binding on
the courts, can outweigh and displace the explicit congressional
grants of jurisdiction contained in the general federal question
276
statute and the Civil Rights Acts.
But even if one were to accept a tradition of noninterference with state criminal proceedings as sufficient explanation
for the differing Dombrowski-Younger and Pullman approaches
to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, there would remain a
274 319 U.S. at 162-63. In In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), the Court quite
properly noted that the traditional bounds of equity courts' jurisdiction, which it
was describing, were controlling only "unless enlarged by express statute." Id. at 210.
275 The legislation most suggestive of the kind of congressional policy the Court
refers to is congressional legislation permitting removal much more broadly in
civil cases in state courts involving federal questions than in similar criminal cases.
276 Cf text accompanying notes 40-45 and 65-71. One could argue instead
that the presumption in favor of state fora in these cases derives from the policy
behind the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), which forbids
injunctions against state proceedings except in certain circumstances. Justice Black
explained the policy this way in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Such an
explanation of the deference paid state courts in this class of cases does not, however,
advance the inquiry, since the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to these cases. At
the time of the Younger decision it was an open issue whether cases arising under the
Civil Rights Acts, as all the cases in question do, see text accompanying note 164 supra,
are excepted from § 2283 or not; the Court in Younger declined to decide the issue.
401 U.S. at 54. It is now settled, however, that such an exception does exist. Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). And it has long been settled that the anti-injunction
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difficulty in knowing which cases to treat as Dombrowski-Younger
cases, with the attendant presumption in favor of the state
forum, and which instead to subject only to Pullman analysis.
The difficulty in knowing how to treat a particular case is
solely in the demarcation of the Dombrowski-Younger category,
which changes the usual presumption concerning the exercise
of federal jurisdiction in cases within a jurisdictional grant.
Once it is known which cases warrant the application of the
Dombrowski-Younger presumption, the interaction of that doctrine with the Pullman abstention doctrine seems clear. If the
facts of a given case place it within the Dombrowski-Younger
category, and if application of that category's rules suggests
the state forum is proper, then a Pullman analysis becomes
superfluous; the state forum will decide all issues in the case
regardless of whether the case contains an unclear question
of state law whose resolution might avoid a federal constitutional question. Like the administrative abstention category,
then, the Dombrowski-Younger category can remove an otherstatute applies only against state proceedings that are pending at the time the injunction is sought, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908), a rule that excludes some of the cases in the
Dombrowski-Younger category from the statutory prohibition, including Dombrowski
itself. There is another respect as well in which the Dombrowski-Younger category
differs in scope from the anti-injunction statute: The statute applies to all pending
state civil and criminal proceedings that are not excepted, whereas the DombrowskiYounger presumption may be limited to criminal proceedings, see text accompanying
notes 271-76 supra, and at any rate does not cover more than state enforcement proceedings, see notes 256 supra & 278 infra.
It is clear then that it1 is not the anti-injunction statute itself that requires the shift
in presumption in these cases. It seems strange, then, to assume that the policy
behind the act could extend it to cases excepted from its reach. Nonetheless, that
is the approach of Younger, in which the Court avoided deciding whether the act did
apply by holding that the same result concerning the availability of an injunction
would obtain whether or not it did; in either event, the federal court would exercise
jurisdiction upon a showing of bad faith or harassment, which was deemed to satisfy
the irreparable harm requirement, but not otherwise.
Even accepting that the same rule will obtain in cases within the statutory prohibition and those within exceptions, however, "the policy of the act" does not explain
the shift of presumption in Dombrowski-Younger cases without identification of what
that policy is. Nor can one know how far beyond the statute's terms the policy will
apply without identifying it. In Younger, Justice Black admitted that "the precise
reasons for this long-standing public policy against federal court interference have
never been specifically identified," but he said the "primary sources" are, first, "the
basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has
an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable
relief" (see note 271 supra) and second, "the notion of 'comity', that is, a proper
respect for state functions," a doctrine which Justice Black refers to as "Our Federalism." 401 U.S. at 43-44.
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wise appropriate case from Pullman treatment. If, on the other
hand, the case is within the Dombrowski-Younger category but
is one in which the exercise of federal jurisdiction is deemed
proper, then Pullman analysis as well must be undertaken. The
case will remain wholly within the federal forum if it does not
contain an unclear issue of state law whose resolution might
avoid a federal constitutional question. If it does contain such
an issue, however, Pullman abstention under the England procedures is proper and the parties retain the right to return
27 7
to the federal court for adjudication of the federal issues.
Assuming that the Dombrowski-Younger category is accurately described as "cases where the plaintiff seeks to interfere
277 Professors Bator, Shapiro, Mishkin, and Wechsler in H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 8, at 1044, have suggested that a case that survives Dombrowski-Younger
analysis but is ultimately referred to state court as a result of Pullman analysis is "a
merely theoretical possibility." It does seem perfectly possible, however, that a case
that under Younger and Dombrowski is deserving of a federal forum because the federal plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if limited to the state enforcement proceedings might also contain an unclear issue of state law whose resolution might
avoid a federal constitutional question. Such a case seems unlikely only if it is deemed
essential, in order to meet the Dombrowski-Younger irreparable harm requirement,
that the case be one where the disputed issue does not appear capable of resolution in
one state proceeding. For courts will not abstain under Pullman unless it appears that
a single state proceeding can dispose of the state issue. See note 166 supra. But even
if this were so, Pullman abstention might in a given case be proper on a different
issue than the one that, if left to the state enforcement proceeding, would cause
the litigants irreparable harm. Moreover, it is not clear whether it is essential to the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in a Dombrowski-Younger case that the case be one where
the issue the federal plaintiff raises could not be settled in a single state proceeding.
If a federal plaintiff alleges bad faith or harassment, that may itself be sufficient to
impel the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Language in Younger is ambiguous on the
point. 401 U.S. at 49, 53, & 54. It could be read either as requiring only bad faith
or harassment, or as requiring as well that the challenge be to a vague and/or overbroad statute, with which most Dombrowski-Younger cases are concerned, see Maraist,
Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski,
48 TEXAs L. REV. 535, 580-81 (1970), and where it is deemed that the defendant
cannot adequately protect his federal rights by defending a single proceeding.
In Dombrowski in fact, after holding that the irreparable harm requirement for
the exercise of federal jurisdiction was satisfied, the Court went on to discuss the
propriety of Pullman abstention, 380 U.S. at 489-92. And the Supreme Court seems
to have first analyzed AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946), as a Dombrowski-Younger
case and, having found that the irreparable harm requirement was met, 327 U.S.
at 593-95, then held that Pullman abstention was nevertheless proper. (The only
doubt concerning this categorization of AFL v. Watson comes from the Court's statement in the midst of its apparent Dombrowski-Younger analysis that it could look to
the law side only of the federal courts in deciding whether alternative remedies are
adequate. 327 U.S. at 594. In other respects, however, its analysis appears to be a
Dombrowski-Younger one.) In Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), moreover, a
three-judge court, NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 521 (E.D. Va. 1958), found
sufficient irreparable harm to overcome Dombrowski-Younger requirements, but the
Supreme Court deemed abstention necessary on the basis of Pullman analysis.
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with a state criminal prosecution, ' 278
what will be considered an attempt to
criminal prosecution. It is settled that,
criminal proceeding is pending when

the question remains
interfere with a state
at least when a state
the federal plaintiff

files suit,27 9 an attempt to interfere by declaratory relief will

be treated as the equivalent of an attempt to enjoin. But cases
provide little guidance concerning which suits constitute attempts to interfere with criminal prosecutions. That category
is not limited to situations in which criminal prosecutions are
pending, for none was pending in Dombrowski, and despite the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in the case it is a "DombrowskiYounger" suit in the sense that the Court required special circumstances to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 28 0 "
Conceivably all cases in which a plaintiff phrased his aim in
his pleadings as enjoining a state prosecution would be Dombrowski-Younger cases, whereas if he said he sought to enjoin
27'The Dombrowski-Younger category may not, however, be limited to cases threatening interference with criminal enforcenient proceedings. The decided Supreme
Court cases do involve criminal proceedings, but it is an open issue, which has been
adverted to by a number of Justices, whether civil enforcement proceedings should
be included. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun seem to have
taken the position that no line should be drawn between civil and criminal proceedings. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 561 (1972) (dissenting opinion). See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 244 (1972) (concurring opinion). In
his separate concurring statement in Younger v. Harris, Justice Stewart, joined by
Justice Harlan, noted that the Court did "not deal with the considerations that should
govern a federal court when it is asked to intervene in state civil proceedings, where,
for various reasons, the balance might be struck differently" than in cases involving
state criminal prosecutions. 401 U.S. at 55. At the same time, however, Justice Stewart
indicated that he found major differences between criminal and civil proceedings.
401 U.S. at 55 n.2. In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973), the opinion
for the Court, authored by Justice White, stated that it was still an open question
whether the Younger v. Harris rules applied in state civil proceedings. At another
point in the opinion, however, it stated that only three "established principles" would
"under appropriate circumstances, restrain a federal court from issuing . . . injunctions" against state court proceedings: the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, Pullman abstention, and "the basic principle of federalism . . . that a
federal court may not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding in the absence of
special circumstances .... " 411 U.S. at 573-74 (emphasis added). See also Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230, 237 (1972); Allee v. Medrano, 94 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 (1974);
note 323 infra. In Speight v. Slaton, 356 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1973), a three-judge
district court declined under Younger to intervene in a pending state civil enforcement
proceeding. On appeal the Supreme Court vacated the decision on other grounds.
94 S. Ct. 1098 (1974). See text accompanying notes 323-27 infra. The Court has since
noted probable jurisdiction in a case that should resolve the issue. MTM, Inc. v.
Baxley,
94 S. Ct. 1559 (1974).
79
1 See note 266 supra.
280 One factor relevant to whether federal jurisdiction will be exercised in a case
that does fall within the Dombrowski-Younger category is whether the proceeding sought
to be enjoined is pending. It once appeared that this factor governed as well whether
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operation of a statute, albeit a criminal one, Pullman analysis
alone would apply. Such a rule would be extremely nonfunctional; no purpose behind either the Dombrowski-Younger or
the Pullman doctrines is fulfilled by allowing a plaintiff through
his pleading so to affect the choice of forum. And the cases
show that the plaintiff's pleading is not determinative. 28 1 Moreover the cases show the determinative question is not simply
whether the statute the plaintiff attacks carries criminal penalties. That line might be justified simply on the theory that the
basis for the presumption in favor of state jurisdiction is a
desire to allow states to control their own criminal processes
the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), would apply to these
cases since it covers only pending proceedings, see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 484 n.2 (1965); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908), but now it is settled
that civil rights actions are within the "expressly authorized" exception to the congressional prohibition, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), so the anti-injunction
statute would seem in any event ineffective in the suits in question. But cf note 276
supra.
Since Dombrowski itself did not involve a pending state prosecution, it is clear
that the line between pending and non-pending prosecutions does not demarcate
the Dombrowski-Younger category. But cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 52, 120-21 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That line may be relevant,
however, in deciding how to dispose of cases within the category. Douglas involved
threatened and pending prosecutions, while Younger involved principally a pending
one. In Younger the Court held the irreparable harm requirement would usually
not be satisfied in an attempt to secure federal intervention in state criminal proceedings absent a showing of bad faith and harassment. (The Court said, 401 U.S.
at 53, there might be other unusual circumstances that could show irreparable harm,
including perhaps that the challenged prosecution "is only one of a series of repeated
prosecutions to which [the plaintiff] . . . will be subjected," id. at 49, but it did not
detail them.) That rule for when the irreparable harm requirement is satisfied seems
narrower than Dombrowski's rule. The difference is explainable on the ground that
Younger involved pending proceedings while Dombrowski did not; there is language in
Younger that would support that explanation. 401 U.S. at 41 ("We express no view
about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun."); id. at
45, 49 (references to "pending" proceedings). See also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,
103-30 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other language,
however, would indicate that Younger cuts back on Dombrowski for non-pending cases
as well. 401 U.S. at 45-53 (reference to "threatened prosecutions" and use as examples
of cases involving non-pending prosecutions).
281 In both Pullman and Dombrowski-Younger cases the complaint typically prays
for an injunction and/or declaratory relief against enforcement of the challenged
state enactment. In Pullman and Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), for
example, both of which were treated as Pullman and not Dombrowski-Younger cases, the
plaintiffs sought respectively "to restrain the enforcement of a certain order made
by the Commission . . . ", Pullman Co. v. Railroad Commission, 33 F. Supp. 675,
676 (W.D. Tex. 1940); and "to secure a declaratory judgment and an injunction
restraining and enjoining the defendants from enforcing or executing [the statute at
issue]," NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 506 (E.D. Va. 1958). See also 360 U.S. at
169. The prayers for relief in Douglas and Dombrowski appear similar. In Douglas the
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and that the presumption must operate whenever a plaintiff
seeks to enjoin the operation of a statute with criminal penalties. Case holdings belie the explanation; not all cases in which
plaintiffs attack a statute with criminal penalties are treated as
Dombrowski-Younger cases; some are subjected only to Pullman
28 2
analysis.
A more functional line of demarcation for the DombrowskiYounger category would focus on whether a criminal proceeding brought under the statute challenged was either pending
or imminent. If it was neither, and there was nonetheless a
case or controversy, Dombrowski-Younger treatment would not be
proper. The rationale would be that though defense of a criminal prosecution might be adequate to protect the plaintiff,
if no such proceeding seemed imminent it would not seem
likely that the plaintiff would soon have that forum available.28 3 This line too has difficulties. The most obvious are
the difficulties in deciding how imminent should be considered
"imminent" and how imminence should be shown.2 8 4 Need
plaintiffs sought "to enjoin the defendant city of Jeannette and its Mayor from en... Douglas v. City of
forcing against them . . . a certain ordinance of that city.
Jeannette, 130 F.2d 652, 653 (3d Cir. 1942). In Dombrowski the plaintiff asked, inter
alia, "that a permanent injunction issue '* * * restraining the defendants, their agents
and attorneys from the enforcement, operation or execution of [the statutes in
question] ....... Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. La. 1964).
In Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), so far as appears from the reports,
the prayer for relief did explicitly ask that the defendant be restrained from "prosecuting" the plaintiff. 261 F. Supp. 985, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). It is not clear whether
it is a Dombrowski-Younger or solely a Pullman case. See note 292 infra. But in any
event the phrasing of the complaint is not a factor in that determination.
Nor can the two categories of cases be separated according' to the identity of
the defendants sought to be enjoined. Law enforcement and prosecuting officials
have been' defendants in such Pullman cases as Harrison and Pullman itself, as well
as in Dombrowski.
282 For cases involving statutes bearing criminal penalties, yet subjected only to
Pullman and not to Dombrowski-Younger analysis, see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959);
cf. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
It is noteworthy that the statute carrying criminal penalties in each instance
could be characterized as part of a regulatory program rather than an ordinary
criminal statute. On the basis of current case law, that distinction, though it is not
a very precise one, could be said to separate the Pullman and Dombrowski-Younger
categories.
283 Professors Bator, Mishkin, Shapiro and Wechsler in H. HART & H. WECHSLER,
supra note 8 at 1044, seem to assume that this is the line setting off the DombrowskiYounger category.
284 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), indicated DombrowskiYounger analysis should be used when the plaintiffs are "threatened" with prosecution, at least when they have earlier actually been prosecuted for engaging in similar
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state officials have threatened proceedings against the plaintiff prior to the institution of the federal suit, or is it sufficient
if in their answer they express an intent to institute such proceedings promptly? The latter approach would allow the state,
at the pleading stage, to control whether a case would get
Dombrowski rather than Pullman treatment, provided the plaintiff had violated the statute he challenged prior to his federal
suit. That result might not be dysfunctional, however, if when
a plaintiff challenges a state criminal enactment the only reason for not presuming in favor of state fora when no proceedings against him are pending or imminent is that he should not
have to forego the federal forum without an affirmative show2 5
ing that the state will provide an alternative.
In some situations the suggested categorization may be
the equivalent of a rule that any case in which the plaintiff
attacks a statute carrying criminal penalties should be analyzed
in the Dombrowski-Younger manner, for a plaintiff will often be
unable to satisfy "case or controversy" requirements unless
state enforcement proceedings are either pending or imminent. If the plaintiff has engaged in the conduct the state
makes criminal, and no prosecution is even imminent, a challenge to the criminal statute is not likely to satisfy those requirements 288 unless the criminal conduct is conduct he wishes
to continue to engage in. If he does wish to continue, however,
he may well be deemed in need of a present adjudication of
the validity of the state statute 2 8 -a need that could satisfy
justiciability requirements and that would not appear satisfied
by an ability to defend a prosecution in the absence of the
imminence of any such prosecution. Similarly when the plaintiff's attack on the validity of a statute that he has not yet violated is justiciable, 2 88 he needs a forum in which to test the
conduct. Cf. note 292 & text accompanying notes 319-22 infra. AFL v. Watson, 327
U.S. 582, 588 (1946), applied Dombrowski-Younger analysis when law enforcement
agencies had been directed immediately to institute prosecutions against the plaintiffs
and were in the course of preparing those prosecutions.
285 If that were the test of imminence, the only way a plaintiff could assure a
federal forum for a constitutional challenge to a state criminal statute would be to
test that statute before violating it, and that method would be available only if he
could satisfy justiciability requirements at that stage.
288 Cf Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971).
287 Compare Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-55 (1967), and Steffel v. Thompson, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 1215-16 (1974), with Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969),
and O'Shea v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 669, 675-77 (1974). See also note 259 supra.
28 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Gardner v. Toilet Goods
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statute without having first to engage in criminal conduct.
In the latter two situations, in which justiciable controversies
can exist despite the absence of pending or imminent state proceedings, the "pending or imminent" line does produce a
different result than a test focusing on whether the challenge
is to a criminal enactment, and it allows those cases to be
analyzed only in accordance with the Pullman doctrine without
regard to the Dombrowski-Younger shift of presumption.
Decided cases are not altogether consistent with a "pending or imminent state criminal proceedings" limitation on
the Dombrowski-Younger category. That line can explain the
treatment of many cases. Baggett v. Bullitt,2 89 for example,

was treated solely as a Pullman case although it involved an
attack on a criminal statute, because the plaintiffs had not
violated the statute they challenged. 290 AFL v. Watson 29 1 was
treated as a Dombrowski-Younger case as well as a Pullman one.

There the plaintiffs were in violation of the challenged statute
and their prosecutions were, according to the complaint,
"in process of being prepared. '2 92 Lake Carriers' v. MacMulAss'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); cf. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 504-08 (1972). But see
Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961); International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-91 (1947).
289 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
290 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, see text accompanying notes 102-06 supra, escapes
Dombrowski-Younger treatment because the plaintiff had not been subjected to a
criminal sanction and was not threatened with any criminal proceedings. Insofar
as the posting of her name is considered the equivalent of imposition of a criminal
sanction, it had already taken place.
291 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
292 327 U.S. at 588. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967), casts doubt on
this analysis but does not squarely contradict it. The plaintiff Zwickler had been convicted of violating the statute he complained of when he distributed anonymous
political handbills in the past. His conviction had been overttirned on other grounds.
He then sought declaratory and injunctive relief against future prosecutions for violating the same statute. He seemingly had not again violated the statute but expressed
a desire to do so and claimed he was prevented from doing so by a fear of prosecution. 389 U.S. at 252-53.
In its treatment of the case, the Court did not make clear whether it would view
it as a Dombrowski-Younger case or not. The court below had so treated it and had held
the plaintiff had not satisfied the requirement of irreparable harm. The Supreme
Court avoided deciding whether Zwickler was actually a Dombrowski-Younger case by
holding that even if that conclusion were correct with respect to the plaintiff's request
for injunctive relief, the same analysis did not apply to declaratory relief. See note
266 supra.
Under the analysis suggested in text, Zwickler should not be treated as a Dombrowski-
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lan293

is not a Dombrowski-Younger case because though the
plaintiffs were in violation of the water pollution act they attacked and though the Michigan authorities had enforced the
provisions of the act regarding pleasure craft, 294 the Michigan
authorities had not enforced the provisions pertaining to industrial boats like the plaintiffs', nor had they threatened to
295
prosecute violations.
Supreme Court opinions, however, rarely indicate any
line of demarcation for the Dombrowski-Younger category or
address in particular cases whether Dombrowski-Younger or
Pullman treatment is proper. Moreover, they often do not disclose facts relevant to the proper treatment- of the case-such
as whether a criminal proceeding is imminent or indeed
whether the plaintiffs have violated the statute they challenge
-but instead talk simply of one doctrine in relation to a particular case without disclosing why it is the relevant one. Assuming that "pending or imminent criminal proceedings" is
indeed the line demarcating the Dombrowski-Younger category,
then Pullman itself is a case in which the Court's failure to
discuss such issues creates doubt whether the case was properly
handled. Neither the Supreme Court opinion nor the district
court opinion is informative on the point, but it seems likely
that in Pullman the complaining railroads were in violation of
the Commission's order, since that order sought to alter a preexisting practice. Nor do the opinions state whether enforcement proceedings had been threatened, 296 though the district
Younger case since the plaintiff had not engaged in the conduct he would be prosecuted for and accordingly no prosecution was imminent. See text accompanying notes
319-22 infra. Douglas v. City of Jeannette is like Zwickler in every respect except that
there was more than an individual plaintiff; there was a class, and despite previous
prosecution its members had engaged in further violations of the statute they challenged and had been threatened with further prosecution.
293 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
294 336 F. Supp. 248, 250 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
295 "Michigan authorities . . . seek the cooperation of the industry in the implementation of its program and have not instigated, nor does it appear, threatened
criminal prosecutions." Id. at 252.
296 Pullman did involve a penalty, subjecting a violator to a possible fine of up to
$5000. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6476 (1926). Multiple violations were multiply
cognizable, Gulf, Col. & S.F. Ry. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58, 60 & 62 (1918). The Pullman
enforcement proceeding appears to have been denominated civil, however, with civil
rules of evidence prevailing. That the case was thus not purely "criminal" might
explain why it was not treated as a Dombrowski-Younger case. See note 282 supra; cf.
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576 (1973) (suggesting that the dividing line between Dombrowski-Younger and Pullman cases may be whether state law characterizes
the proceedings as "quasi-criminal").
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court opinion does disclose that a temporary restraining order
against the order's enforcement was issued during the proceedings.297
The vice of Pullman is a failure to address these issues;
it may indeed have been correctly treated. There are two cases,
however, that were treated solely as Pullman cases in which it
affirmatively appears that the facts would justify DombrowskiYounger treatment if pending or impending prosecutions is the
test of that category. The district court opinion in Chicago v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 2 98 suggests that the plaintiffs
there had violated the statute of which they complained. Moreover, the city had threatened criminal prosecution. 299 As in

Pullman, however, a temporary restraining order against enforcement had been issued by the district court after commencement of the proceeding. Similarly, the district court
opinion in NAACP v. Patty3°0 shows that the plaintiffs there
were in violation of the statutes they challenged and also that
prosecution had been threatened. The district court therefore
treated the case as a Dombrowski-Younger one. It did find the
irreparable harm requirement satisfied, though in doing so it
applied a test seemingly less stringent than that the Court
would have followed.30 The Supreme Court, however, did
not mention the possibility of Dombrowski-Younger treatment
for the case 30 2 and applied only Pullman analysis. 30 3
The Supreme Court has recently decided several cases that
appear to contain the opposite error, applying Dombrowski297
298

Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675, 676 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
136 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Il. 1956), rev'd, 240 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1957), aff'd,

357 U.S. 77 (1958).
299 357 U.S. at 81.
300 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), vacated and remanded, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
301 Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-65 (1943); Spielman
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1935); & Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
312 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1941). Earlier the Court had followed a more lenient test closer
to that of the district court. See Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 143 (1924); cf. Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-63 (1908).
302 It did refer to the district court's finding that threatened enforcement produced irreparable harm and said the finding was supported by the evidence. 360 U.S.
at 178. It did not, however, appear to be thereby addressing the Dombrowski-Younger
issue but instead seemed to state concern that the parties be protected during the
Pullman abstention it ordered. That concern was satisfied by pledges state officials
made during the course of the litigation not to proceed against the plaintiffs for
conduct engaged in during the period they were testing the statutes. Id. at 179.
302England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), may
also properly be a Dombrowski-Younger case, though only Pullman abstention was discussed or ordered. The Supreme Court did not rule on the validity of the abstention.
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Younger analysis in situations calling only for Pullman treatment. While those cases do not fit within the categorization
this Article suggests for Dombrowski-Younger cases, they do not
suggest any other workable classification either. Indeed, they
do not recognize Dombrowski-Younger cases as a separate category at all; their common mistake is a failure to note any difference of approach between "Dombrowski-Younger cases" and
other cases within the federal jurisdiction, most noticeably
the difference in applying the irreparable harm requirement.
Consequently the opinions proceed on the assumption that the
only distinction to be made is between one group of cases in
which it is proper to exercise federal jurisdiction and one
group in which it is not.
In Steffel v. Thompson 30 4 the petitioner sought declaratory
relief 30 5 against a threatened application to him of Georgia's
criminal trespass statute. While distributing handbills protesting American involvement in Vietnam on an exterior sidewalk
of a shopping center, the petitioner had on two occasions left
under threats by police that if he continued handbilling he
would be arrested. On the second occasion, petitioner's companion had refused to leave and had been arrested and charged
with criminal trespass.
In his complaint the petitioner alleged he desired to continue handbilling but that threats that if he did he would be
arrested and prosecuted deterred him from doing so. The
district court and the court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed, Justice Brennan writing for a unanimous Court.
The Court found, first, that the petitioner's allegations
did establish the existence of an actual controversy at the time
he filed his action. His fears of prosecution were not "imaginary
or speculative, ' 30 6 as both police testimony and his companwhich was ordered by the district court. It appears that the plaintiffs had violated
the criminal statute and that threats of enforcement had been made.
30494 S. Ct. 1209 (1974).

305In the district court he sought injunctive relief as well. It was denied along with
the declaratory relief. Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1971). On
appeal to the court of appeals the petitioner abandoned the request for injunctive
relief. Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1972). The fact that injunctive relief was originally requested means that a three-judge court should have heard
the case in the first instance, but the abandonment of the request for injunctive relief
made the court of appeals' exercise of jurisdiction proper. 94 S. Ct. at 1214-15 n.7.
306 94 S.Ct. at 1215 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)).
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ion's arrest confirmed, and it was not necessary that he "first
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled
to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of
his constitutional rights. ' 30 7 The only question was whether
the controversy continued until the present, given the lessening of American involvement in Vietnam, 30 8 a question the
Court directed the district court to resolve on remand.
The Court then proceeded to ask whether declaratory
relief should have been precluded because the petitioner's
attack was levelled at a state criminal statute. The lower courts
had found relief inappropriate on grounds that Younger v.
Harris "made it clear beyond peradventure that irreparable
injury must be measured by bad faith harassment, ' 30 9 that
bad faith could not be found here, and that though Younger's
holding was limited in terms to situations in which a state
prosecution was pending, its reasoning applied equally to
threatened state proceedings. Likewise, the courts reasoned,
Samuels v. Mackell 3 1 0 -holding that in situations where Younger
made injunctive relief unavailable because of an absence of
irreparable harm, declaratory relief should be equally unavailable-should apply equally .to threatened criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court's reversal was on the theory that
"[n]either Younger nor Samuels . . .decided the question whether federal intervention might be permissible in the absence
of a pending state prosecution, ' 3 11 and that those decisions
should not apply when criminal proceedings were not pending
because in that situation
federal intervention does not result in duplicative
legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal
justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that
circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively
upon the state courts' ability to enforce constitutional
principles. In addition, while a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete
opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a
refusal on the part of the federal courts to intervene
when no state proceeding is pending may place the
30 7

Id. at 1216.

308 Cf Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
309
310

Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1972).
401 U.S. 66 (1971).

31"94 S. Ct. at 1217.
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hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally
flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what
he believes to be constitutionally protected activity
in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal
312
proceeding.
Therefore, the Court concluded, when no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time federal intervention is sought,
at least declaratory relief is not precluded, for it does not
require the irreparable injury traditionally prerequisite to
injunctive relief.3 13 The Court left open the question whether
3 14
injunctive relief would be precluded on the facts of this case,
since the petitioner had abandoned an earlier request for
3 15
that remedy.
While the Court's result is clearly proper, its reasoning
is problematic. A plain implication is that central to the
result is a difference between the equitable requirement of
irreparable injury and the requirements for declaratory relief. It cannot be simply a difference between the requirements
for equitable and declaratory relief that explains which cases
a federal court will hear, however, for in suits involving pending state prosecutions, requests for declaratory and injunctive
relief are equally barred. 31 6 More fundamentally, Pullman and
other cases subjected solely to Pullman analysis involved injunctive relief and yet were deemed to have satisfied the equitable
requirement of irreparable harm without a showing that state
criminal processes could not adequately adjudicate the controversy. If, as the Court said, it recognized as an open question whether injunctive relief might be proper on the facts of
Steffel, prdsumably without a showing of bad faith on the part
of law enforcement officials, that is because it is not solely a
difference between declaratory and injunctive requirements
that explains the exercise of federal jurisdiction in Steffel. An
injunction might be permissible in the circumstances of that
case on either of two theories: First, the less stringent test of
irreparable injury, not requiring a showing of inadequacy
in the state forum but instead presuming in favor of the fed31 2

Id.

3,' See id. at 1218-22.
31 4
Id.
315

at 1217. See also Allee v. Medrano, 94 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 n.15 (1974).
See note 305 supra.
316 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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eral forum, might be applicable and the case not be within "the
Dombrowski-Younger category" at all. Alternatively, special circumstances might be required to justify the exercise of federal
jurisdiction in the case without the test of special circumstances
3 17
being as stringent as when state proceedings are pending.
For example, the bad faith requirement usually prerequisite
to the exercise of federal jurisdiction when a state prosecution
is pending 3 18 might not be deemed essential if the prosecution
were not pending. This alternative would mean that Steffel,
though not within a Younger category of cases (those involving
pending criminal proceedings) was within the Dombrowski one
(imminent state proceedings, still requiring showing of special
circumstances for exercise of federal jurisdiction) and not in
a category, like cases properly subjected only to Pullman analysis, where the presumption is in favor of federal jurisdiction.
On the facts of Steffel the first of these alternatives should
be adopted and the case should not be subjected to DombrowskiYounger analysis at all. 3 19 For the petitioner in Steffel was seeking to enjoin a statute that would be applied to him only in the
event that he engaged again in handbilling; the threats to
prosecute were not for past conduct but for conduct the petitioner had yet to engage in. In that situation, to defer in favor
of state criminal proceedings would require persons to subject
themselves to criminal liability as a condition of attacking the
constitutionality of the state criminal statute, a plainly undesirable result if, in the absence of criminal liability, there is nonetheless an extant case or controversy.32 0 Since no deference
should be paid state criminal proceedings in a situation where
the conduct to be charged has not yet occurred, a constitutional attack on the criminal statute brought at that time should
proceed in federal court, unless Pullman requirements for
abstention are satisfied.
The Court's analysis in Steffel does not, however, proceed
along such lines. In addition to whether declaratory or injunctive relief is sought, a factor discussed above, the Court implies
that the differentiating factor between cases in which federal
jurisdiction is exercised and those in which it is not is whether
See note 280 supra.
Id.
319 See also note 292 supra.
32 0
See note 287 supra & accompanying text.
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state criminal proceedings are pending or merely threatened
at the time the federal suit is commenced. While that distinction may be operative in some cases,3 2 ' it does not explain the
difference in treatment between cases like Dombrowski and Pullman. The Court has failed to differentiate between two kinds
of threatened state proceedings: those threatened for conduct
that has already occurred and those threatened for conduct
yet to be engaged in. If in Steffel the threat was to prosecute
the petitioner for handbilling he had already done and, though
state proceedings had not commenced when the federal suit
was filed, state officials were in the course of preparing to
prosecute, the case would resemble Dombrowski; under that
holding more deference to state criminal proceedings would
3 22
seem appropriate than in the case as it arose.
Another case 323 containing errors similar to Steffel is Speight
321 See

note 280 supra.
It has not been clear whether the special circumstances required to justify the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in that instance would be the same as in a Younger
(pending state prosecution) situation or not. See notes 266 & 280 supra. The Steffel
holding purports to answer that question, saying at least as respects declaratory relief, a different and more lenient standard applies when the federal plaintiff wins
the race to the courthouse. No doubt Steffel will be taken so to settle the question.
See Allee v. Medrano, 94 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 2203 (1974). Query whether the Court
would have so held, however, if it had been presented with a case properly within
the Dombrowski-Younger category-if, for example, Steffel had been threatened with
prosecution for acts already engaged in. Since the issue is the standard of special
circumstances in that type of case, and Steffel is not that type of case, it should not
be deemed dispositive of the issue despite the fact that the Court apparently thought
it was involved there.
323 A third 1973 Term case contains errors similar to Steffel. In Allee v. Medrano,
94 S. Ct. 2191 (1974), the plaintiffs, farmworkers, sought to enjoin as unconstitutional
the enforcement of several Texas statutes, TEXAS PEN. CODE ANN. art. 474 (1948)
(breach of the peace) (since repealed); id. art. 482 (1948) (abusive language) (since
repealed); id. art. 439 (1948) (unlawful assembly) (since repealed); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. arts. 5154(d) & 5154(f) (1971) ("picketing" & secondary picketing), and
sought also to enjoin certain Texas law enforcement officials from interfering with
their constitutional rights. They prevailed in the district court, and the Supreme
Court affirmed, Justice Douglas writing for the five-man majority.
Justice Douglas first explained that a "case or controversy" was present, 94
S. Ct. at 2197-98, then took up the subject of the decree enjoining state officials.
After "not[ing] that this portion of the decree creates no interference with prosecutions pending in the state courts, so that the special considerations relevant to
cases like Younger v. Harris . . . do not apply here," id. at 2199-2200, Justice Douglas
said, "Nonetheless there remains the necessity of showing irreparable injury, 'the
traditional prerequisite to obtaining an injunction' in any case." Id. at 2200 (citing
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). He went on to say that irreparable injury
was apparent from the "persistent pattern of police misconduct" that the case involved. 94 S.Ct. at 2200.
From the language quoted thus far, it is apparent that Allee v. Medrano, like
Steffel, assumes that for purposes of the exercise of federal jurisdiction there are
322
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v. Slaton .3 24 There the three-judge district court had declined
to exercise its jurisdiction because of a pending state civil
enforcement proceeding. The Supreme Court avoided reaching the question whether Younger applied to civil as well as
criminal enforcement proceedings, 32 5 for subsequent to the
district court's decision, the Georgia Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional the state statute under which the enforcement proceedings had been brought. The Supreme Court
reasoned that
two categories of cases-those involving pending state criminal prosecutions and
others-without regard to any distinction between cases like Dombrowski involving
imminent state prosecutions and cases properly subject only to Pullman analysis
where state prosecutions are neither imminent nor pending. The Court's failure to
make the latter distinction is apparent in its comment that irreparable injury is invariably requisite to injunctive relief. It is unclear whether Justice Douglas is applying
that requirement in the Pullman or the Dombrowski sense when he says the showing
of persistent police misconduct satisfies it. It should be sufficient for the plaintiffs
in Medrano to satisfy the less stringent test of irreparable harm applied in Pullman,
since Medrano's injunction against Texas officials, which "[o]n its face . . . [did] not
more than require the police to abide by constitutional requirements," id. at 2199,
did not involve pending or threatened prosecutions at all. The Court's citation to
Dombrowski in making its irreparable harm argument, id. at 2200, however, may indicate it viewed the requirement it was imposing as equivalent to the one in that case.
In the final part of his opinion, Justice Douglas addresses the propriety of the
injunction against the Texas statutes. Since there was some confusion in the record
concerning whether there were pending prosecutions, Douglas remanded for a finding on this question, saying Younger and Samuels apply only when pending state prosecutions are present (citing Steffel). A confusing factor in Justice Douglas' discussion
of the issue is his reference to whether "there were pending prosecutions at the time
of the District Court decision," id. at 2201, or whether there are pending prosecutions
at the time of the remand, id. at 2202, whereas earlier cases dealing with pending
prosecutions clearly have been concerned, for Dombrowski-Younger purposes, with
their pendency at the time the federal suit was filed, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 94
S. Ct. 1209, 1217 (1974); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
Another indication of a departure from settled practice in the Medrano opinion
is contained in Douglas' statement, "because we cannot determine with certainty
whether there are pending prosecutions, or even whether the District Court intended to
enjoin them if there were, the proper disposition is to remand the case to the District
Court for further findings." 94 S. Ct. at 2202 (emphasis added). The implication that
the result may differ according to whether the decree speaks in terms of enjoining
a criminal prosecution or, instead, enjoining the criminal statute under which a prosecution pending against the federal plaintiff is brought is inconsistent with prior case
law. See note 281 supra & accompanying text; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 126
(1973). No such distinction according to the wording of an injunction should be accepted, since once a state criminal statute is declared unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined, any criminal prosecution proceeding under it is effectively interfered
with.
A final point of interest in Allee v. Medrano is that while two of the statutes sought
to be enjoined were civil statutes, the Court's opinion proceeds exactly as if all the
challenged enactments were criminal. Cf notes 256 & 278 supra.
324 94 S. Ct. 1098 (1974) (unanimous per curiam decided after oral argument).
325 See note 278 supra.
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appellants could obtain full relief in the state court
proceeding merely by moving to dismiss the state action, in accord with state procedural rules, in light of
.. . [the Georgia Supreme Court's recent decision]. If
that is the case, appellants could not now make any
showing of irreparable injury by reason of the state
court proceeding, and such a showing is of course required before the federal court could grant the equitable relief, apart from any special considerations involved in Younger v. Harris .... 326
The difficulty with this reasoning is that its correctness depends upon whether civil enforcement proceedings are within
the Dombrowski-Younger category at all-the question the Court
purported not to decide. For if the case is wholly without the
Dombrowski-Younger category, it is erroneous to apply as a prerequisite to injunctive relief an irreparable harm requirement
that looks to the adequacy of state proceedings.3 2"
Despite Steffel v. Thompson and Speight v. Slaton, there is
a difference in treatment between cases like Dombrowski and
those properly subjected only to Pullman analysis, though
distinctions may also be drawn within the Dombrowski-Younger
category between suits involving imminent and pending prosecutions. Whether a case is placed in the Dombrowski-Younger
category or the Pullman category may well determinatively
affect the exercise of state or federal jurisdiction. It is therefore both surprising and disturbing that Supreme Court opinions often seem oblivious to the fact that any two such categories exist; consequently, they neither address the demarcation
of these categories nor reveal any clear pattern of where the
line is drawn. If, as seems likely despite Steffel v. Thompson,
it is pending and imminent state criminal proceedings in which
the Court will presume in favor of the state forum, the Court
should explicitly recognize its shift of presumption from other
cases within federal jurisdiction and should attempt to explain
why the shift is allowable in the face of congressional jurisdictional statutes. In any event, enunciation of an explicit line
94 S. Ct. at 1099.
The Court's result might be permissible anyway under the discretionary rule
that when an ongoing state proceeding involves an issue presented to the federal
court, the federal tribunal may in its discretion await the state outcome without regard to usual abstention principles. See note 256 supra.
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would provide the parties and the lower courts with more
guidance than does the current amalgam of holdings, thus
avoiding much of the wastefulness that currently occurs in
determining whether the federal or the state forum should
proceed with a controversy. 328 Little can be said for retaining a category of cases of such uncertain scope and rationalea criticism applicable to the Thibodaux and administrative categories of abstention, as well as to this Dombrowski-Younger one.
328 Perhaps also, depending upon what definition of "imminence" prevails, an
explicit line drawn at imminent and pending state proceedings would often enable
a state's attorney general to take advantage of the Dombrowski-Younger presumption
by claiming an intent promptly to institute state criminal proceedings.

